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In a country ruled by traditions, Lebanon’s third president General Fouad Chehab was a 
moderniser with a radical, progressive vision. His unique political approach, Chehabism, 
developed out of a belief that socio-economic inequalities, not confessional differences, were 
at the root of Lebanon’s civil conflicts. In order to secure a stable, prosperous future, Chehab 
believed his imperatives were to promote national unity and social justice among a divided and 
disillusioned public.  
The Chehabists harnessed the full resources of the Lebanese state to advance stability, unity, 
and equality, but by the late 1960s, the country was more fractured than ever. They channelled 
their forces into strengthening and rationalizing state institutions, but ultimately left them 
weaker. They wanted to build a more meritocratic and democratic Lebanon, but in the end, 
they undermined Lebanese democracy. 
This thesis seeks to make sense of these apparent paradoxes. In essence, it contends that the 
principles which underpinned Chehabism as a political approach were anathema to the integrity 
of Lebanon’s existing political system. Independence-era Lebanon, in both law and practice, 
followed a consociational-democratic model whose stability depended upon elite cooperation 
and segmental autonomy. On the other hand, Chehab’s vision for the country was drawn from 
an idealised western liberal-democratic model, which stressed centralised power, competition, 
modernisation, unity, and equality in ways that directly threatened and compromised 
consociational principles. President Chehab mistook the objective of his program for its object: 
He believed that he was working to reform or strengthen the Lebanese state, but in fact, to fully 
implement his program he would have had to rebuild it from the ground up. President Chehab 
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1.  Introduction 
As members of the Lebanese parliament gathered in April 2014 for the first of some forty-odd 
attempts to elect a thirteenth president, campaign posters appeared across the walls of Beirut: 
a debonair man draped in medals and the presidential sash stood in grainy, sepia portrait, his 
eyes locked with the viewer. Below, in Arabic, read the words: Fouad Chehab for the Republic. 
General Fouad Chehab — Lebanon’s third president — died in 1973. Yet he and his program 
for Lebanon, Chehabism, continue to resonate among successive generations of Lebanese 
disillusioned with contemporary political life. Why does Chehab, among all Lebanon’s ex-
presidents, bear such mythic stature?  
In a country ruled by traditions, Chehab was a moderniser with a radical, socialist vision. 
Chehabism developed out of a belief that socio-economic inequalities, not confessional 
differences, were at the root of Lebanon’s civil conflicts. In order to secure a stable, prosperous 
future, Chehab believed his imperatives were to promote national unity and social justice 
among a divided and disillusioned public.  
Yet for all the incremental successes of Chehab and his followers, the project ultimately failed. 
Still more damning, just five years after Chehabism came to an end Lebanon collapsed into 
precisely the dystopian, sectarian civil war Chehab had assumed the presidential mantle to 
avert. 
The Chehabists harnessed the full resources of the Lebanese state to advance stability, unity, 
and equality, but by the late 1960s, the country was more fractured than ever. They channelled 
their forces into strengthening and rationalizing state institutions, but ultimately left them 
weaker. They wanted to build a more meritocratic and democratic Lebanon, but in the end, 
they undermined Lebanese democracy. 
Over the following chapters, this thesis will attempt to resolve these paradoxes through the 
following argument: the principles which underpinned Chehabism were anathema to the 
integrity of Lebanon’s existing political system. Independence era Lebanon, in both law and 
practice, followed a consociational-democratic model whose stability depended upon elite 
cooperation and segmental autonomy. On the other hand, Fouad Chehab’s vision for the 
country was drawn from an idealised western liberal-democratic model, which stressed 
centralised power, competition, modernisation, unity, and equality in ways that directly 
threatened and compromised consociational principles. President Chehab mistook the objective 




Lebanese state, but in fact, to fully implement his program he would have had to rebuild it from 
the ground up. President Chehab and his followers and allies were, in effect, unwitting state-
challengers rather than state-builders. 
Chehabist efforts to out-manoeuvre the zu’ama,1 the elite vested in the current system – and 
the elite’s corresponding reactions – tipped Lebanon into a perilous disequilibrium. This state 
of imbalance constrained decision-making by Chehab’s successor, Charles Helou, undermined 
the government’s legitimacy, led to the disempowerment of Lebanon’s security forces, 
reinforced socio-economic divisions, and ultimately challenged the wellbeing of the country as 
a whole. In short, the domestic environment cultivated during the Chehabist era left Lebanon 
highly vulnerable to the same forces that would soon help tip the country into civil war. 
The political scientist Michael Hudson once suggested that “further analysis of the Shihabist 
experiment and its failure” might hold vital clues for the development of a better Lebanese 
model.2 Yet a quarter century on, Chehabism remains almost wholly unstudied. This project 
will detail Chehabism’s advancement alongside indicators of consociational health at the time, 
exposing the causal processes which generated Chehabism’s counterproductive results and, in 
the end, devastated both systems.  
The objective of this research is multi-fold: First, to examine how and why Chehabist attempts 
to ‘strengthen’ the Lebanese state left it weaker, and explore the ways in which its seemingly 
democratic goals in practice undermined Lebanese democracy. In so doing, it will also bridge 
an unacceptable gap in Lebanon’s historical record, filling in the long-forgotten details of a 
critically important yet murky era. Furthermore, a robust examination of Chehabism and 
Lebanon’s political system lays the groundwork for subsequent investigations into the nature 
of the Lebanese state itself – another woefully under examined topic. 
While this project specifically considers statebuilding and stability through the example of 
Chehabism, its conclusions may also be instructive in other cases where orthodox state-
building models appear to have failed, especially in the non-Western world. I intend to provide 
sufficient evidence for these claims to allow limited generalisation and encourage comparative 
research.  
                                               
1 Hottinger defines the Lebanese za’im (pl. zu’ama) as “a political leader who possesses the support of a 
locally circumscribed community and who retains this support by fostering or appearing to foster the interests 
of as many as possible from amongst his clientele.” (Hottinger (1966), p. 85) 




Finally, the conclusions of this study cast light on later reform efforts as well as political 
stability in Lebanon more generally, with strong implications for the present. Many of the 
pressures on contemporary Lebanon bear remarkable similarity to those of the Chehabist era: 
educated young people and intellectuals lament the salience of sectarian identity over national 
feeling; various domestic and international actors demand that Lebanon move towards the 
rationalised, competitive democratic political model; reform priorities routinely cite 
strengthening state security forces and extending the government’s reach into the hinterlands, 
as reflected in the billions of dollars of international aid funnelled to these causes. The 
challenges elites present to democracy, stability, unity, and security in Lebanon likewise 
remain at the centre of national debate. With a civil war ongoing in Syria – and increasingly 
seeping into Lebanon – the regional climate in 2017 is arguably even more turbulent than that 
of the 1960s. 
As people search for solutions, an idealised vision of Fouad Chehab’s project and person 
continues to serve as the model for presidential integrity and reform among a significant 
tranche of the Lebanese population. It may not be a coincidence that in similarly tumultuous 
times, the man finally elected Lebanon’s thirteenth president in late 2016, General Michel 
Aoun, is another former army commander whom his supporters view as above the traditional 
Lebanese political fray. Those vintage campaign posters illustrate Chehabism’s connection to 
the present, but the wrong lessons are taken from Chehab’s failed project. It is essential that in 
trying to solve Lebanon’s most endemic problems they not be once again exacerbated. 
Chehabism 
The ‘Chehabist’ era coincided with independent Lebanon’s ‘golden age’, but also with the first 
stage of its descent towards the 1975-90 civil war. During this period, President Fouad Chehab 
and his allies mounted an aggressive reform program popularly known as Chehabism or al-
Nahj (the Method). Chehabism sought to bolster the state by promoting modernisation, social 
justice, and national unity while strengthening the security establishment. This attempt to 
expand and consolidate the government’s remit came unapologetically at the expense of the 
elite, whom Chehab regarded as corrupt and ineffective fromagistes. Nonetheless, despite 
twelve years with significant power to advance their agenda, the Chehabists left a vulnerable 
Lebanese state in their wake. 
General Fouad Chehab’s reluctant ascent to the Lebanese presidency in the autumn of 1958 
was negotiated as an act of national salvation. As commander-in-chief of Lebanon’s Armed 




in so doing was credited with preventing a more destructive contest. When the warring parties 
sought a new, consensual president as an exit from the quagmire, Chehab — the ‘father of the 
army’ —3 was the only man all sides could accept. In a sense, his selection and subsequent 
election were the symbolic peace accord that brought that crisis to a close.  
Consequently, Chehab assumed a presidential mandate of unusual weight: He viewed his task 
as not only to lead, but to unite the Lebanese people behind their country and mend the societal 
damage wrought by the war.4 One of his first acts as president was to contract a French 
organisation, IRFED,5 to conduct an ambitious survey of national development to determine 
where need was greatest.6 Chehab embarked on a major program that saw administrative 
reform, the expansion of public services and support, and the extension of public utilities, 
education, and services into the periphery. He promoted more balanced economic development 
and established the Lebanese Central Bank. Significantly, he bolstered the security services, 
particularly the army’s Deuxième Bureau intelligence services, to promote law and order and 
curtail the power of the traditional elite, whom he saw as a root cause of corruption and 
insecurity in the country.7 Above all, Chehab strove to consolidate national feeling and build a 
more inclusive Lebanon, by pursuing a neutral foreign policy and more equitable distribution 
of government posts among Lebanon’s sects.8 He played a key role in selecting his successor, 
President Charles Helou, and the Chehabists maintained a majority in parliament. 
Why, then, did Chehab’s carefully designed and implemented program fail to build a strong 
state? After his election, Helou quickly sought to distance himself from the Chehabist bloc, 
and they were routed in the 1968 parliamentary elections. Within what little has been written 
about Chehabism, a wide consensus exists on the program’s failure.9 Although Kamal Salibi, 
writing in the midst of the Chehabist era, cast the growth of national identity as Chehab’s 
“supreme achievement”,10 Michael Hudson finds Chehabism’s key shortcoming in the same 
domain. He notes that, “[Chehabism] seems not to have fared so well in inculcating a general 
sense of its moral worth -- it could not elicit the legitimacy from enough key elite and mass 
                                               
3 Malsagne (2011), p. 103 
4 Beshara (2005), pp. 51-52 
5 IRFED is an acronym for Institut de recherche, de formation et de développement 
6 Malsagne (2011), pp. 302-303 
7 Malsagne (2011), pp. 273-74; 304 
8 Salibi (1966), p. 225; Beshara (2005), p. 59 
9 For example, see Goria (1985); Hudson (1988); Corm (1988); Traboulsi (2012); Najem (2012) 




constituencies to re-establish a more liberal and participatory order.”11 Many conventional 
accounts, to the extent that they discuss Chehabism’s failure at all, link its results to supposedly 
naive efforts to undermine the zu’ama, who perceived Chehabism as a threat to their interests.12 
While the confrontation between Chehab and his followers and the zu’ama was significant, if 
somewhat exaggerated,13 the processes at work require deeper interrogation and make little 
sense outside of the structural context of Chehabism’s design. It was not a simple issue of 
attitude or elite resistance. Moreover, as Salibi observes, Chehab’s strategies were complex: he 
deprived zu’ama of sources of patronage through his reforms and curtailed their activities 
through the Deuxième Bureau, but he also worked closely with members of this elite, and 
cultivated rivals to his opponents.14 Indeed, Adel Beshara goes so far as to argue that Chehab’s 
downfall came from his insistence on working within the political system.15 
For Wade Goria, it was not Fouad Chehab that caused Chehabism to fail. He places primary 
responsibility on Chehab’s disappointing successor Helou, citing his lack of a natural political 
base, poor leadership abilities, failure to act as a secular, neutral arbiter among sects, and 
insufficient “manliness” in comparison to other contemporary leaders.16 Had Chehab, whom 
Goria identifies as “Lebanon’s most effective leader in modern times”, continued in office for 
another term, the Chehabist project might have been a success.17 Nadim Shehadi takes a 
different view, citing four key issues: that Chehabism came about through the will of the 
President rather than the people; that the IRFED survey itself was ill-suited to the Lebanese 
context; the possible prevalence of an “anarchist liberal ideology” resistant to Chehab; and the 
poor state of public administration and institutions to implement the Chehabist plan.18 All the 
above were almost certainly factors in the demise of Chehabism. None of these explanations 
on their own, however, is sufficient to explain Lebanon’s vulnerability and decline.  
Chehabism’s failure — and the decline of the Lebanese state more generally in the late 1960s 
— is also often linked to the increased external loads on the system, most notably through the 
adventurism of Palestinian commandos and Israeli raids in Lebanon from the late 1960s 
                                               
11 Hudson (1988), p. 238 
12 Johnson (2000), pp. 59-60; Corm (2012), pp. 108-109; Traboulsi (2012), pp. 141-42 
13 Salibi (1966), pp. 222-23 
14 Salibi (1976), p. 11 
15 Beshara (2005), p. 55, 76 
16 Goria (1985), pp. 75-78 
17 Goria (1985), pp. 246-247 




onwards.19 Again, these linkages are valid, but insufficient. Equally important are the internal 
factors which, when combined with these external pressures, made catastrophe inevitable: As 
we shall see, “the drama of the war … diverted attention from the real sources of the malaise”.20 
This project will seek to locate all these factors within the broader conflict between Chehabist 
reform ideals and the de jure and de facto practices of Lebanon’s consociational system. 
Novelty & General Relevance  
This thesis offers a credible, robust, and historically sound explanation for the failure of 
Chehabism and the internal factors driving the decline of Lebanon’s political stability in the 
late 1960s. Little research has taken place on Chehabism itself. Fouad Chehab may be among 
the most resonant of Lebanon’s ex-presidents, but paradoxically he and his tenure have 
received the least scholarly attention. Adel Beshara’s book on the attempted coup against 
Chehab in 1961 offers the most extensive published treatment in English, though through the 
prism of this single event.21  
Many books include a few pages on Fouad Chehab’s presidency, and some make reference to 
Chehabism as a project.22 This leads to overly simplistic accounts of the project’s failures 
which are not grounded in the historical record. Given the abundance of work on Lebanon’s 
1975-90 civil war, a healthier literature addresses the period from 1967 onwards than the rest 
of the decade. However, it largely focuses on the external pressures noted above, given the 
orientation towards Lebanon’s descent into war. As for internal factors, confessionalism takes 
the blame. 
Michael Hudson writes that, because “the pillars of the consociational-confessional system had 
been eroded” by the mid-1970s, it was unable to withstand external loads from the Palestinian-
Israeli crisis.23 Hudson maintains that the overly static consociational system itself was the 
ultimate culprit.24 This argument is unconvincing and borderline tautological: it is effectively 
saying that the political system eroded itself.  
                                               
19 Hudson (1976), pp. 114-115; Seaver (2000), p. 258; Cobban (1988), p. 100; Lijphart (1977), p. 154 
20 ‘No End to the Affair’, 14 Sep 1967, The Times (London), p. 23 
21 Beshara (2005) 
22 For example, see Kerr (1966); Traboulsi (2012); Najem (2012); Salibi (1976); Corm (2012); Barak (2009) 
23 Hudson (1976), pp. 117 




Hudson speaks at some length on modernisation and social mobilisation, and their caustic 
interactions with consociationalism.25 However, despite his recognition of this fundamental 
incompatibility, he consistently speaks of Chehab’s modernisation and reform efforts in 
glowing terms. The closest he will come to criticism of Chehabism is acknowledging that these 
moves raised the ire of the zu’ama.26 This thesis agrees that consociationalism obstructed 
modernisation and reform – but the inverse is also true. Since consociationalism was the system 
in place, its obstruction was far more deleterious to the country’s health.  
The following quote confirms Hudson’s tendency to think about consociationalism and 
Chehabism in isolation: “If the ‘traditional liberal system’ (1943-58 and 1970-5) constituted a 
‘power sharing’ model, the Shihabist era (1958-70) constituted a ‘strong state’ alternative. Both 
models failed”.27  
Hudson comes closest to articulating an argument similar to that of this thesis. However, he 
fails to fully develop his ideas. He comes at the problem of Lebanon’s decline from a point of 
view which prioritises modernisation and social mobilisation over other social goods (which 
he seems to take for granted). He complains that “all these developments have been taking 
place in Lebanon, and the consociationalist structure has impeded a positive systemic response 
to them”.28 This, however, is somewhat akin to blaming the desert for a flower’s failure to take 
root. While technically valid, the issue may be understood more usefully as the absence of an 
environment conducive to such growth. Either a more hospitable environment must be 
cultivated, or more suitable flora planted.  
This thesis focuses on the dialectic between Chehabism and Consociationalism; how the two 
systems obstructed and marginalised one another, with an emphasis on why Chehabism failed. 
However, it implicitly bears on the corollary issue of why consociationalism failed. For this 
reason, it is worth briefly reviewing the larger body of work that addresses the latter question. 
When considering the inherent weaknesses that undermined Lebanon’s consociational system, 
authors typically stress three factors: immobilism, inefficiency, and its tendency to exacerbate 
social cleavages. It is worth noting that Arend Lijphart, the father of consociational theory, 
acknowledges all three shortcomings.29 Nonetheless, he believed his consociational model 
                                               
25 Hudson (1976), pp. 113-114 
26 Hudson (1976), pp. 114-15 
27 Hudson (1988), p. 234; emphasis in original 
28 Hudson (1976), p. 113 




offered the only real chance for deeply-divided societies to achieve stability and democracy, 
and as such was worth the risks. 
According to Simon Haddad, Lebanon’s consociational system perpetuated, rather than 
mitigated, the fundamental problems which stoked the civil war, including  
[T]he reinforcement of sectarian identity, the weakening of the state, the proliferation of 
alternative power centres, the prevalence of the inert nature of government and its failure to 
absorb new social forces, and the incapacity of this rigid political organisation to adapt to a 
changing demographic environment.30 
In 1966, Shils had warned that Lebanon “must be kept completely still politically” to prevent 
communal frictions from boiling over into conflict.31 Hudson argues that this immobilism 
“prevented government from dealing with socio-economic and ideological challenges” in the 
pre-war era.32 Lijphart himself, however, considered such claims to be exaggerated, singling 
out Shils specifically for criticism. Writing after the outbreak of the civil war, Lijphart 
continued to insist that “the Lebanese consociational regime established a remarkable – 
although obviously far from perfect – record of democratic stability”.33 Rather, he maintained, 
it was “primarily to Lebanon’s increasingly unfavourable international environment – 
combined with the internal flaw of consociational rigidity – that the 1975 breakdown of the 
democratic regime must be attributed”.34 
Many Lebanese, of course, have been less satisfied with the consociational political model. 
Farid el Khazen notes that the model “raises the question of legitimacy and, by extension, the 
effectiveness of the political system in situations of crisis, particularly when consensus among 
communal leaders is lacking.”35  
Both the legitimacy and effectiveness of the elite cartel are likewise questioned by Haddad, 
who writes, “Consensus … is confounded with unanimity, contradicting the very essence of 
democracy and democratic choice”.36 For Imad Salamey, these issues logically progress into 
                                               
30 Haddad (2008), p. 411 
31 Shils (1966), p. 4 
32 Hudson (1988), pp. 228-229 
33 Lijphart (1977), p. 150 
34 Lijphart (1977), p. 155 
35 Khazen (2000), p. 6 




“a self-perpetuating capture of the state by a political sectarian elite that both lacks national 
accountability and undermines government commitment to the public good”.37  
Salamey describes the route from consociationalism to crisis: 
The confessional predetermination of state power among many sects, each having veto power 
over public decisions, undermined the realisation of a functional and strong government 
system. Instead, a deeply divided and a weak confessional state was established. The immediate 
result was a spread of social and political insecurity among its citizens, forcing sectarian groups 
to rely on their own social and security networks, and to look for support beyond Lebanon's 
borders.38 
Recourse to external support, moreover, had the potential to increase the foreign affairs load 
on the system. 
Dekmejian argues that Lebanon’s chief problem was that it was never really consociational in 
the first place, given “its turbulent environment and the related Palestinian issue,”39 a point 
echoed by Brenda Seaver and Haddad.40 Heavy loads on the pre-war Lebanese system, they 
argue, violated consociationalism’s key conditions.41  
However, as we shall see in the following chapter, while a heavy load on the system is a 
unfavourable factor for consociationalism, it does not inherently alter the system’s underlying 
nature – other than to make positive outcomes less likely. Salamey also sees the regional 
environment as a disqualifier, though for consociationalism as a normative model: “The 
viability and stability of a sectarian based consociational state has proven difficult, if not 
impossible, to be achieved amid the turbulent regional and international political 
environment.”42  
Kabbara’s response to consociational theory also merits a brief mention. He reads Lijphart in 
purely normative terms, and castigates him for “completely disregard[ing]” other means of 
regulating conflict in plural societies: namely, making them less plural.43 Of course, the entire 
premise for Lijphart’s articulation of the consociational model was to demonstrate that 
                                               
37 Salamey (2009), p. 84 
38 Salamey (2009), p. 84 
39 Dekmejian (1975), pp. 260-261 
40 Seaver (2000), pp. 268-69; Haddad (2008), p. 411 
41 Lijphart (1968), p. 30 
42 Salamey (2009), p. 94 




countries could find stability and democracy without attempting this daunting task. Kabbara 
misunderstands Lijphart as actively desiring to increase pluralism through consociationalism.44 
More justifiably, Kabbara complains that the consociational argument has a “limited and 
reductionist understanding of the process of formation and deconstruction of social identities 
and its attempt to fix social differences”.45 He continues, 
The failure of the theory to acknowledge the presence and importance of the plurality of social 
and political identities within any social formation and the nature of antagonism that makes 
certain conflict of identities more dominant in a certain moment… limit the efficiency of the 
theory and turn it into a mere short term solution to a crisis but … not a long term system of 
government. 46  
Kabbara is justified in being sceptical of attempts to “fix” identities into a specific discursive 
framework, and this may represent a fundamental issue in the implementation of 
consociationalism.47 Yet each of these issues is produced by the ways in which Lebanon 
diverged from the consociational model laid out by the country’s constitution. Even if meeting 
the constitutional ideal would have been, as Kabbara convincingly suggests, impossible, it does 
not undermine the fundamental descriptive power of the consociational model for Lebanon’s 
system. The observation that multiple discursive ‘realities’ exist48 transcends the scope of this 
thesis, which does not argue that consociationalism reflected Lebanon’s ‘true nature’ but rather 
its constitutional arrangements. 
Finally, Kabbara raises important concerns about the consociational model’s implications for 
Lebanon. If stability is dependent on a balance of power among segments, Kabbara warns, in 
the case of Lebanon that effectively means that stability is dependent on the interests of the 
segments’ external benefactors. Significantly, he notes that this dynamic is precisely what 
spurred the creation of Chehabism in the first place, but he fails to further develop the concept.49  
 
                                               
44 Kabbara (1988), p. 19 
45 Kabbara (1988), p. 31 
46 Kabbara (1988), pp. 32-33 
47 Kabbara (1988), p. 33 
48 Kabbara (1988), pp. 22-23 




In English, there are no published scholarly works devoted to Chehab or his policies, other than 
a short journal article written by Salibi in the early months of the Helou regime in 1964.50 
Salibi’s 1976 Crossroads to Civil War also includes several chapters on the era in question.51 
In French, one good biography of Fouad Chehab exists, but its title is indicative of the broader 
problem: Fouad Chehab 1902-1973: Une Figure Oubliée de L’Histoire Libanaise [Fouad 
Chehab 1902-1973, A Figure Forgotten by Lebanese History].52 Malsagne also wrote a French-
language paper for the Centre IRFED-Lebret on that organisation’s founder, Père Louis-Joseph 
Lebret, and his influence on Chehabism, but this has not been widely distributed.53 Finally, in 
French, the work of Eric Verdeil on planning and urbanism in mid-century Lebanon offers 
solid contributions to our understanding of Lebanon’s socio-economic development during the 
Chehabist era.54 
Malsagne’s reference to a ‘forgotten’ Chehab echoes the title of one of the few Arabic 
biographies in print: Bassem al-Jisr’s Fouad Chehab, zalika al-majhoul [Fouad Chehab, That 
Unknown One].55 In Arabic, Nicolas Nassif has written significant books on both Fouad 
Chehab himself and his controversial Deuxième Bureau.56  
The widest range of secondary literature on the Chehabist era comes from the era itself. While 
most of this material is out of print and some wholly inaccessible, Lebanese authors were 
reasonably prolific in the mid-1960s: Iskandar Bashir’s work on administration and civil 
service reform, Kamal Salibi’s writings on administration and politics, and Charles Rizk’s 
treatment of Chehabist politics all deserve mention.57 However, these works have the inevitable 
and rather severe shortcoming of having been written in the middle of the Chehabist story. 
They consider its institutions through the lens of an uncertain but largely optimistic future, 
rather than, as we do, through a devastating past. As such, in some cases publications from the 
period itself are more properly treated as primary sources. 
                                               
50 Salibi (1966) 
51 Salibi (1976) 
52 Malsagne (2011) 
53 Malsagne (2003) 
54 Verdeil (2009) 
55 Jisr (2000) 
56 Nassif (2006); (2008) 




Several theses have considered Chehabism; at the doctoral level, notably the work of Stephane 
Malsagne and Nawaf Kabbara.58 As the best single contribution to the question of why 
Chehabism failed, Kabbara’s 1988 thesis merits a brief discussion.  
Kabbara describes Chehabism as “a hegemonic project directed towards the creation of a 
Lebanese national identity that has failed”.59 In the end, Kabbara cites three primary reasons 
for Chehabism’s failure: the lack of an appropriate intellectual and political environment in 
1960s Lebanon; Chehab’s refusal to stand for re-election or to form a political party; and the 
shift in regional power away from Nasser post-1967.60 To an extent, this thesis agrees with all 
three points – a different, more progressive climate, more forceful Chehabist leadership, and 
Nasser’s continued presence as a domestic and regional stabiliser would each have helped 
sustain the Chehabist project. However, again, they are not sufficient to explain its collapse. 
Kabbara is overly dismissive of the consociational model’s relevance to Chehabism. This 
attitude is partly due to his misreading of Lijphart, but chiefly a production of the circumstances 
in which he was writing. Kabbara, who is Lebanese, undertook his research in the mid-1980s 
as civil war continued to ravage Lebanon. For Kabbara, consociationalism was a normative 
model which many scholars and public figures continued to promote as a solution to the conflict 
on the basis that sectarianism was Lebanon’s essential, immutable characteristic. Kabbara 
rightly rejected this notion, but he was seemingly unable to disaggregate his scepticism about 
consociationalism’s future in Lebanon from his reading of its past.61 Consociationalism is not 
the only possible model for Lebanon, now or after independence. This belief, however, is fully 
compatible with an acknowledgement that it was – and remains – the constitutional system in 
place. 
Over the following chapters, this thesis will draw upon Kabbara’s work. Where it agrees with 
Kabbara, it is important to note that it does so on the basis of different data. With scant textual 
or statistical sources available to him at the time, Kabbara’s research chiefly involved elite 
interviews.62 Kabbara’s access to many of the key figures on both sides of the Chehabist project 
is both unparalleled and irreplaceable: three decades on, few of these voices can still be heard. 
Prime Minister Rashid Karami, Kabbara recalls, died just two weeks after their final 
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interview.63 Kabbara’s thesis represents a stunning documentation of the Chehabists’ legacy, 
in their own words.  
This thesis, on the other hand, relies primarily on archival sources – the majority of which, in 
Kabbara’s time, had yet to be declassified. The fact that some conclusions coincide despite our 
different primary sources is no less instructive than the fact that others differ. 
Beyond Kabbara, the words of several key players from the era are preserved in their 
autobiographies. President Charles Helou wrote a French-language memoir chronicling his 
first two years in office.64 The memoirs of Lebanese statesman and jurist Fouad Boutros, which 
were published in both French and Arabic, feature several chapters on his interactions with 
President Chehab, adding nuance and detail to historical accounts.65 Boutros, like Bassem al-
Jisr, served as a government minister during Chehab’s tenure. The autobiography of Sheikh 
Najib Alamuddin, former chairman of Lebanon’s Middle East Airlines and cabinet minister 
under Helou, also provides first-hand accounts of key events including the Intra Bank crash of 
1966, which receives special treatment in this thesis. On the subject of Intra, one 
comprehensive Arabic book on the crisis was published recently: Kamal Deeb’s Youssef 
Beidas: The Intra Empire.66 
It is worth noting than none of the books surveyed here could properly be considered as 
‘histories’ of the 1958-1970 era, though several of those mentioned do chronicle it in part. For 
the purposes of this research, this gap was filled with extensive archival work in both the UK 
and France, as well as online. Diplomatic archives can be problematic, undercut with biases 
and ignorance. However, the celebrated Lebanese historian Georges Corm reports being 
“astonished” by the objectivity, quality, and seriousness of the French, British, and American 
diplomatic correspondence from the Chehabist era.67 I agree with Corm’s assessment: the level 
of professionalism imposed by the embassies, moreover, makes it easy to differentiate opinion 
from factual record. The quality of these archival sources is attested by their prominent use by 
nearly all other scholars writing about Lebanon in the 1950s and 1960s over the past 20 years, 
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including Adel Beshara, Stephane Malsagne, Nicolas Nassif, Caroline Attie, Irene Gendzier, 
and others.68 
The UK National Archives contains a wealth of practically untouched material from the 1960s: 
Foreign Office documents and communications, labour reports, British Council files, and a 
treasure trove of miscellanea, including newspaper clippings from Lebanese and foreign 
papers. The French Diplomatic Archives in Nantes offer a similar range of content, as well as 
invaluable daily summaries of the Lebanese Arabic-language press. Perhaps most useful of all 
were the wonderful archives at the now-closed Centre Lebret-IRFED, which held a vast range 
of documents from their Lebanon mission: publications, treatises, handwritten letters and 
diagrams, reports, proposals, as well as vast socio-economic data from 1959-60. Indeed, Corm 
highlighted the IRFED collection as an example of an under-utilised private archive which may 
be more significant than many public records. 69 
Limited relevant archival material exists in Lebanon. Lebanon’s National Archives are in 
terrible disrepair and contain little material from the period under examination. The army’s 
archive on Chehab consists largely of mundane administrative details and reports on Chehab, 
but nothing that represents his own views.70  Chehab’s handful of biographers have all 
struggled, in particular, to find credible documentation or even reliable accounts of his life 
before joining the army.71 However, this obstacle was overcome through access to alternative 
sources, including official digital archives devoted to Chehab, Michel Chiha, Raymond Edde, 
and other specific figures and institutions, Lebanese newspaper archives, and copies of official 
Lebanese documents within the French and British collections. Happily, because the IRFED 
mission in Lebanon operated from within the Lebanese Ministry of Planning, the Lebret-
IRFED archives include significant documentation from that Ministry, much of which has 
otherwise been lost in the decades since it was shuttered. 
 
Few conclusions can be made about the ‘literature’ as a corpus in light of the paucity of material 
on Chehabism and the Chehabist era. Individual authors provide valuable contributions, though 
almost exclusively within specific niches of the broader subject. The current literature does a 
capable job explaining the regional and external pressures on Lebanon in the late 1960s. Yet 
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internal factors – to the extent they are addressed at all – are rarely placed in the historical 
narrative beyond their relation to external events. What minimal investigations have taken 
place into Chehabism’s failure tend to focus on Chehab’s confrontation with the zu’ama and 
geo-political instability. This project contends that both are insufficient to fully explain why 
Lebanon became so unstable and fractured, and why this happened when it did.  
In order to provide a better answer to the question of why Lebanon declined during a period of 
ostensible reform, the first and most urgent step is to fill in the historical record of the 1958-70 
period so that arguments can be placed in context. This context also helps mitigate the 
traditional overreliance on external explanatory factors, as it grants access to internal dynamics 
and thus better insight into causality. In response to this disproportionate emphasis on the 
external, this thesis will focus on the internal pressures to Lebanon’s political system in the 
1960s. Of course, the internal and external can only be disaggregated so far, especially in a 
country like Lebanon which so often serves as a battleground for regional disputes. 
Nonetheless, this thesis will demonstrate how profoundly vulnerable Lebanon had already 
become by the late 1960s when those external pressures – chief among them those related to 
the Arab-Israeli conflict – came to bear. 
This thesis will provide that historical and analytical context, and thereby help bridge an 
alarming gap in scholarship on Lebanon that spans the 1960s. It will explain and substantiate 
the clash between the kind of state implied by Chehabist objectives and the consociational 
system in place in Lebanon at the time, and show that this conflict has profound explanatory 
power for Chehabism paradoxical results. 
Consequently, this project will make a significant contribution to Lebanese studies. Moreover, 
the distillation of the case study permits its comparison with reform and state-building 
elsewhere, which highlights the study’s broader thematic relevance. Lebanon, it is argued, may 
be a stark example of ill-fated state building in a non-Western setting, but its seeming 
exceptionality makes it what James Ferguson calls a “privileged case”, which allows us “to see 
in stark outline processes that are likely present in less extreme cases”.72  
Much has been written on the problematic nature of exogenous state-building efforts, 
particularly since the end of the Cold War. However, much less work has been done on 
                                               




endogenous peacetime state-building in the developing world. As such this study may also 
contribute to that literature. 
Finally, a note on translation: French and Arabic source material is identified as such in the 
bibliography, including any titles or file information in the original language. Except where 
explicitly stated otherwise, all translations from French and Arabic into English are my own.  
 
Research Questions 
My research is designed around the broad, central question: 
• Why did large-scale efforts by the government to advance unity, social justice, and 
political stability during Lebanon’s Chehabist era (1958-1970) produce antithetical 
results? 
In turn, this core question is informed by several interrelated micro-investigations: 
• To what extent did the core principles of Chehabism coincide or clash with the principles 
of the Consociational Democracy model? 
• What role did Fouad Chehab as an individual play in the success or failure of this 
project? 
• What critical internal pressures challenged Lebanon’s political stability and democracy 
during the Chehabist era? How did the government respond? 
• What are the implications of the Chehabist experience across other spaces and 
temporalities, and for state-building efforts generally? 
 
Overview of chapters 
This thesis is made up of nine chapters, including an introduction and conclusion. The second 
half of the current chapter surveys the emergence of Lebanon’s political system and political 
culture, through a review of its pluralist history, the competing nationalisms of the 20th century, 
and its constitutional documents, the 1926 Constitution with its 1943 amendments, and the 
1943 National Pact.  
Chapter Two establishes the theoretical framework for this project through a detailed 
exploration of the consociational democracy model. First, it describes the origins and 
articulation of consociationalism as a theory. Next, the chapter breaks down how the model 




stability. It will interrogate consociational democracy’s ‘democratic’ bona fides, and consider 
the major criticisms levelled against the model which are relevant to this study. Next, the 
chapter considers how the literature has used the consociational model to describe 
independence-era Lebanon, as well as alternative readings based on class conflict rather than 
sect. Next, we present the Chehabist approach to the Lebanese political system. Finally, the 
chapter identifies a set of ‘indicators’ to be deployed in later chapters to gauge consociational 
strength and Chehabist progress. 
Chapter Three turns to the other side of the equation and explores the ideological origins and 
objectives of Chehabism. First, it considers Fouad Chehab personally, looking at his 
temperament and his experiences as a young man and a soldier. Next, we explore how the 
dominant ideological currents of the day, as well as the thinking of Father Louis-Joseph Lebret 
contributed to the development of Chehab’s socio-economic and political philosophy. From 
there, Chapter Three turns its attention to the emergence of Chehabism as a project, articulating 
its tenets and objectives. 
This thesis will then progress with its two sets of indicators and use them to analyse a historical 
record reconstructed from original research. Chapter Four considers Chehabism’s first phase, 
from Fouad Chehab’s election amidst the chaos of the 1958 crisis until his attempted 
resignation in 1960. This chapter pays special attention to Chehab’s reform drive, the IRFED 
mission in Lebanon and the release of its first report in February 1961. The chapter uses the 
consociational and Chehabist indicators developed in Chapters Two and Three to explain the 
1958 autumn counter-revolution, the perils of ‘neutrality with a difference’, and the uneasy 
balance of power between the two systems’ imperatives. 
Chapter Five proceeds to the second phase of the Chehabist approach, up through the 1964 
general elections. The chapter focuses on the abortive coup staged against President Chehab at 
the end of 1961 and the conditions which precipitated it, the security crackdown that ensued, 
and the rise of an empowered Deuxième Bureau. As Chehabism assumes a more authoritarian 
mantle and reforms come into force, our indicators reveal the pressures building on the 
consociational-democratic system.  
Chapter Six moves on to the final phase of Chehabism as an active political project, from the 
election of Chehab’s successor in 1964 until the eve of Lebanon’s financial crisis. The chapter 
will focus on the acrimonious nature of the campaign to get Chehab reelected (in spite of his 
refusals), the eleventh-hour agreement on Charles Helou as a candidate, and the ossification of 




as the Chehabists unwittingly relinquish control; new, non-sectarian rifts fracture the 
parliament; and Helou embarks on a personal vendetta with his infamous purge.  
Chapter Seven examines Chehabism’s fall from the Lebanese political scene, which culminated 
in the Chehabists’ disintegration after the 1968 parliamentary elections. It looks closely at the 
catastrophic fall of Lebanon’s Intra Bank in October 1966: How and why the region’s largest 
bank was allowed to fail, as well as the repercussions of that event. This thesis makes the case 
that the Intra crisis was the culmination of the conflict between the Chehabist and 
consociational political systems, and in turn laid waste to both. 
In the Conclusion, we revisit the achievements and failures generated by its clash with 
consociationalism, to understand why Chehabism is best understood as a revolutionary political 
project, rather than one of reform. Finally, we consider the implications of the Chehabist project 





Lebanon’s Political Tradition 
Origins of the Lebanese system 
‘Lebanon’, like ‘Syria’, traces to antiquity as a geographical reference within bilad al-sham but 
not as a polity of its own.73 The subject of Lebanon’s vintage as a political entity has 
implications for national identity, as well as the depth of its political culture. Lebanon’s 
National Pact, which introduced the consociational system in 1943, was a product of warring 
Lebanese and Arab Nationalisms – as was the 1958 crisis which brought General Fouad 
Chehab to power. Historian Albert Hourani’s account of the diversity of Lebanese views on 
“the nature of Lebanon” illustrates the existential stakes at play:  
These conceptions are often expressed in the form of historical or ethnological answers to 
the question whether the Lebanese are or are not Arabs … At the basis of them… there is 
a view of the function which Lebanon should perform, an answer to the question of what 
her relations should be with the West and with the Arabs.74 
If on one end of the spectrum, some claim a ‘Lebanese’ identity dating back to ancient 
Phoenicia (or even further),75 at the other extreme are those who cast Grand-Liban’s 
establishment after the First World War as a wholly artificial, colonial project.76 In addition to 
ethnic differentiation, Kamal Salibi explains that the appeal to ancient history was used to 
legitimate Greater Lebanon as an independent entity through an “illustrious pre-Arab 
antiquity”.77  
Carole Hakim laments that “this controversy has clouded the historiography of Lebanese 
nationalism”, as too many scholars ignore alternative accounts. 78 Ussama Makdisi  is 
particularly scathing on teleological approaches which uncritically present the Western nation-
state “as the culmination of history”.79 He is critical of the class of Lebanese scholars, including 
Philip Hitti and Salibi, who seemed to embrace this idea in their writing, with a narrative of 
primordial sectarian hatreds thwarting Lebanon’s ascent to modernity.80   
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Historian Abdul-Rahim Abu Husayn, based on extensive research in the archives of the 
Ottoman Register of Public Affairs, makes the case that the paucity of early documentation is 
itself evidence that “the territory today known as Lebanon did not constitute an historical unit 
on its own, but was divided between the different provinces of Ottoman Syria” before the early 
eighteenth century.81 Abu Husayn argues that a Lebanese polity emerged no earlier than 1711, 
when the Shihabi emirs “regularised” governance across Mount Lebanon.82  
Significantly, the eighteenth century postdates the reign of Lebanese national hero Fakhreddine 
II and challenges the popular belief that a recognisable Lebanese polity emerged under the 
Shihabs’ Maani predecessors or even earlier.83 The notion of a united Mount Lebanon under 
the Maans, though “not historically true”, “has been the main thesis of Lebanese national 
ideology to this day.”84  
 
The Iqta’ System and the Double Qa’imaqamiya 
At the turn of the eighteenth century, Mount Lebanon was a poor, sparsely populated, and 
loosely administered principality within the Ottoman Empire. Nonetheless, the reorganisation 
of the Ottoman iqta’ system during the Shihabi emirate (1697-1842) was a key phase in 
Lebanon’s political evolution.85 Hourani writes, “If we want a symbolic date for the emergence 
of Lebanon, it might be 1697”, the year when the Maans were replaced as emirs of Mount 
Lebanon by the Shihabs.86 
Briefly, the iqta’ system placed parcels of land in the hands of local leaders (muqati’jis) to be 
worked by peasants and sharecroppers. These territories fell within the broader concession 
granted by the Sublime Porte to the ‘prince’ of Mount Lebanon, the Emir al-Hakim, and his 
ruling dynasty. The emir’s primary role was to ensure that taxes and loyalty were delivered to 
the Sultan and to guarantee the emirate’s sovereignty within the Ottoman Empire, repelling 
attacks and incursions by neighbouring lords.87 Although the iqta’ system was created as a tax-
farming arrangement, with more autonomy it came to structure not just economic but also 
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social and political relations between classes and sects in Mount Lebanon.88  The muqati’jis 
were the primary source of security and justice within the emirate, with coercive power vested 
at the local level rather than in the central government.89  
According to Khazen, “the elimination of the iqta’ system in the 1860s did not really terminate 
the iqta’ approach to communal politics”; rather, post-feudal muqati’jis maintained their 
relevance after the emirate by evolving into modern zu’ama.90 Arnold Hottinger explains how 
this process unfolded: 
… Under the special conditions of Lebanon, the feudal relationship had developed into an 
organic institution whose utility was not exhausted when the military function of the za’im 
became obsolete. Buttressed by private property and by administrative office, as he had 
once been sustained by the delegated “feudal” authority of the state, the za’im continues 
to fulfil social and political functions similar to those of his ancestors.91   
Hottinger stresses the role of both as intermediaries between their clients and the government, 
and as keepers of the peace: “The zu’ama’ still speak for “their” community; they still mediate 
between this community and the alien outside world – at first the Turkish government, then 
later the European powers … eventually the national central government of Beirut”.92  
The iqta’ system was characterised by non-sectarian structures of allegiance. A key element in 
both social and political structure was ‘asabiyya, group solidarity built on “kinship ties, real or 
imagined”.93 The most salient social divisions followed the ancient tribal Qayssi and Yamani 
lines, which transcended sect.94 Subjects’ roles and identities were chiefly defined by their 
muqati’ji’s house and status, but – for Christian and Muslim, if not Druze subjects  – loyalty 
was based along territorial rather than confessional lines.95  
In the final years of the emirate, the Porte actively cultivated sectarian animosities in a bid to 
replace the Mountain’s traditional autonomy with direct Ottoman rule.96 These tensions fed 
into vicious Druze-Christian clashes in 1841. In response, the Ottomans in concert with the 
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Great Powers abandoned the emirate, dividing Mount Lebanon into two qa’imaqamiyas or 
administrative districts, with one district administered by a Maronite and the other by a Druze.97 
The Ottomans transferred many of the traditional prerogatives of the muqati’jis to a council 
that included representatives of the major sects.98 This formalisation of political order 
coincided with broader administrative reforms and centralisation efforts by the Porte as part of 
the Ottoman tanzimat, which lasted from 1839-76.99 However, these changes, coupled with 
extensive external meddling by the Turks and the Great Powers, ultimately ignited confessional 
and class animosities in Mount Lebanon.100 Abou Nohra notes how the Porte, which created 
the dual qa’imaqamiyya to regain control and reduce unrest, ultimately came to see the system 
as little more than an “organised civil war”.101 Following the dual qa’imaqamiya’s bloody 
crescendo in 1860, European powers intervened to demand the Ottoman government grant 
autonomy to Mount Lebanon within the empire.  
 
The Mutasarrifiya 
The autonomous mutasarrifiya or ‘governorate’ of Mount Lebanon was created102 in response 
to the brutal sectarian clashes across the Mountain in 1860. The mutasarrifiya would survive 
until the outbreak of the First World War, and it coincided with the longest peace enjoyed in 
Lebanon’s modern history. Its founding document, the 1861 Règlement Organique (replaced 
in 1864 by an updated document of the same name) was Lebanon’s first constitutional text and 
introduced its first representative government, albeit one whose powers were circumscribed. 
Abou Nohra describes the Règlement as a mutual compromise which granted the Maronites 
Lebanon’s unity and autonomy, but the choice of governor to the Porte; to the Druze, the prize 
was the exclusion of Maronites from that highest office.103  
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Under the terms of the agreement, Mount Lebanon would be autonomous, but governed by a 
non-Lebanese Ottoman Christian mutasarrif, or governor, who was assisted by an elected local 
administrative council.104 Hourani describes the system imposed by the Règlement: 
[The Mutasarrif] was to have full executive powers and to be assisted by a central 
administrative Council, on which the more important religious communities were to be 
equitably represented. They were similarly to be represented in the local administration. 
Lebanon was to have its own judiciary and police force. Feudal privileges were abolished, 
and all were declared equal before the law.105 
In time, the administrative council assumed a strong legislative role “akin to that of an 
assembly, at the hub of Mount Lebanon’s governmental structure. To many… it appeared that 
Lebanon was only one step from becoming an independent state”.106 
Religious identification had risen with the clashes of the mid-nineteenth century, but 
structuring representation along confessional lines granted sects a new relevance in the 
mutasarrifiya. Accordingly, Burke describes Lebanese sectarianism as a construct only 
politicised during this period: “…religious ethnicity became a key marker in the nineteenth 
century primarily as a result of the kind of state that was created and how it came about”.107 
This point is emphatically supported by Lebanese historian and politician Georges Corm.108 
Lebanese historian Ussama Makdisi also locates the invention of Lebanese sectarianism in the 
conflict that preceded the mutasarrifiya and its specific historical context.109 He writes, 
… Sectarianism is a modernist knowledge in the sense that it was produced in the context 
of European hegemony and Ottoman reforms and because its articulators at a colonial 
(European), imperial (Ottoman), and local (Lebanese) level regarded themselves as 
moderns who used the historical past to justify present claims and future development.110 
One strategy employed by mutasarrifs to keep the former feudal chiefs in line was to integrate 
them into Mount Lebanon’s government and administration.111 As Burke explains, 
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Although the 1858 thawra overturned feudalism in its administrative/juridical forms, it 
left intact the social and economic power of the great families in most of Lebanon… In 
the ensuing compromise, the control over the means of violence in the countryside 
remained in their hands.112 
Over time, many Christians grew dissatisfied with mutasarrifiya, resenting the imposition of a 
non-Lebanese mutasarrif as well as “the reduction of Lebanese territory, and insisted on the 
reintegration in Lebanon of the Biqa’, Beirut, and the regions of Tripoli and Sidon”.113 This 
expanded view of Lebanon, which corresponds with the country’s modern borders, is 
ubiquitous in early twentieth century writings, as well as military maps drawn during the 
French intervention in the early 1860s.114 In 1853, Colonel Charles Henry Churchill wrote of 
the future Lebanese state, 
When Mount Lebanon ceases to be Turkish, it must either become English or else form 
part of a new independent State which, without the incentive to territorial aggrandisment, 
or the means of military aggression, shall yet be able to maintain its own honour and 
dignity and more especially to promote the great object for which it will be called into 
existence, for which indeed by its geographical position it will be so eminently qualified; 
that of creating, developing and upholding a commercial intercourse in the East, which 
shall draw together and unite the hitherto divergent races of mankind.115 
‘Uniting mankind’ may be ambitious, yet Churchill’s vision was very much in line with the 
daydreams of an emergent Lebanese nationalism.  
 
Lebanism & Arabism 
In the late nineteenth century, an Arabic literary and cultural renaissance nurtured a fresh 
generation of Levantine intellectuals and a renewed sense of Arab pride.116 This awareness of 
an Arab identity was amplified by a concurrent surge in Turkish nationalism at the centre of 
the Ottoman Empire. Whereas previously, Sunni Arabs had belonged to the dominant group 
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based on religion, now they were outsiders on the basis of ethnicity.117 Hakim describes how 
both forms of nationalism “emerged and involved in tandem against the background of 
profound social, economic and political transformations wrought by the reformation of the 
Ottoman state”.118  By the end of the nineteeth century, both Lebanese nationalism, or 
Lebanism, and Arab nationalism had emerged as coherent political ideologies in the 
mutasarrifiya.  
A turning point for both ideologies came with the rise of the Young Turks in 1908. The new 
Ottoman regime made its Arab subjects uneasy, as they saw that “the centralisation of the 
Ottoman Empire…was henceforth to be accompanied by an attempt at the deliberate 
Turkification of all Ottoman peoples, Moslems and non-Moslems alike”.119 The Young Turks’ 
policies catalysed the spread of Lebanism and Arab Nationalism.120  
In 1915, in the midst of a world war, the Ottomans abruptly stripped the mutasarrifiya of its 
autonomous status. Although the fighting did not reach Lebanon, the next four years were 
characterised by famine, atrocity, mass conscription and increasingly harsh repression under 
direct Ottoman rule. In 1916, the Ottoman Governor in Beirut publicly executed 21 Christian 
and Muslim nationalist ‘traitors’, and banished many more into exile. 121  
Lebanism 
In 1909, Lebanese nationalists at home and in the diaspora set up a raft of organisations with a 
similar mission – to articulate and disseminate a Lebanist ideology, in defence of Lebanon’s 
autonomy (if not independence) and its special character. 122  
The keystone of all forms of Lebanese nationalism, or Lebanism, was the belief Lebanon had 
a special character and should exist as an autonomous entity separate from the other Arab 
nations. Early writers, such as Maronite intellectual Paul Noujaim (who wrote under the 
anagrammed nom-de-guerre M. Jouplain), did not necessarily conceptualise Lebanon as an 
independent state per se. Rather, Noujaim’s focus was on Lebanon as a nation, which deserved 
autonomy and liberty within the broader Ottoman state. Noujaim envisioned an Ottoman 
Empire one day transformed into a “federated state, with partial administrative autonomy for 
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the different nations that comprise it”.123 The priority for Noujaim was the extension of an 
autonomous Lebanon’s borders to include those territories ‘stolen’ from it in 1861.124  
With the Ottoman Empire’s collapse and Greater Lebanon’s constitution as a ‘state’ in 1920, 
Lebanist characterisations of Lebanon adapted accordingly; Firro notes the conspicuous 
disappearance of the term ‘Syria’ from Lebanist tracts.125 Much of the Lebanist ideology was 
passed along intact, with ‘the state’ simply substituted for ‘the nation’.  
The transition was less seamless for those with unfavourable views of the new status quo. For 
Arab nationalists in particular, this was the moment of original sin: As Carol Hakim observes, 
they “tended to write off Lebanese nationalist aspirations prior to the establishment of the 
Lebanese state and to attribute the emergence of the country as part of a French scheme to 
thwart and contain genuine Arab historical nationalist aspirations”.126 
 
Arabism 
Avi Shlaim’s account, while somewhat ahistorical, does mirror the mainstream Arabist 
perception of the post-Ottoman status quo: 
In the war’s aftermath, [Britain and France] refashioned the Middle East in their own 
image, building a new political and territorial order on the ruins of the old. They created 
states, they nominated persons to govern them, and they laid down frontiers between them. 
But most of the new states were weak and unstable, the rulers lacked legitimacy, and the 
frontiers were arbitrary, illogical, and unjust, giving rise to powerful irredentist 
tendencies.127 
Arab Nationalists in Lebanon were by no means uniformly Muslim, but most Lebanese Sunnis 
at the time subscribed to the philosophy. Arab Nationalists desired a single, unified Arab state, 
as “they were vividly aware that there had been a time when the Arabs had been conscious of 
themselves as a special community, and as a community had played a leading part in 
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history.”128 After centuries of suppression and division, Arab nationalists believed unity could 
empower the Arab peoples to reprise that leading role.  
Arab nationalists saw the unification of the Arabs as the best means to preserve their heritage 
while moving forward into an uncertain modern age. Politically, they sought to cultivate an 
Arab consciousness, liberate “all Arab lands” and establish “some degree of unity between 
them”.129 But as vital as these ambitions were, as Hourani observed in 1946, “of all the factors 
which have stimulated the sense of Arab unity in the past twenty years, the most important has 
been the struggle of the Palestinian Arabs against Zionism”.130  
Clashing national ideas 
By most accounts, conflict between Arab Nationalism and Lebanism only came to the fore in 
the interregnum between Ottoman rule and the mandate. With the collapse of the Empire in 
1918, Lebanon – after one dramatic week of Sharifian Arab rule in October of that year – was 
officially placed under the custodianship of the Allied Forces. During the period of military 
administration, the Maronites successfully lobbied the French to support their bid for a 
Christian homeland in the Middle East. In 1920, French forces proclaimed the State of Greater 
Lebanon, which annexed territories adjacent to the mutasarrifiya over the protests of their 
inhabitants.131  
The Arab nationalists did not object to a state based on the mutasarrifiya itself: indeed, Sharif 
Husayn’s son Faysal accepted the premise at the Peace Conference in Versailles in 1919, on 
the condition that Lebanon remain in economic union with a unified Arab state.132 However, 
they were strongly opposed to Greater Lebanon’s annexation of these ‘disputed territories’.133 
For the Sunni coastal elite, at issue were not just separation from their brethren and hopes for 
an Arab monarchy, but also economic concerns: international borders now separated them from 
primary markets in the Syrian interior.134 
From 1925 - 1936, Greater Lebanon was one of four ‘Levantine States’ under French 
mandatory power alongside Syria, an Alawi state centred in Lattakia, and Jabal Druze. The 
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latter two were folded into the Syrian state in 1936; despite French flirtations with transferring 
some of Lebanon’s territories to Greater Syria during the revolts of the mid-1920s,135 Lebanon 
endured in its present borders.  
The League of Nations mandates were meant to provide an incubatory period for the new 
countries to prepare for their eventual independence. However, the terms of the mandate 
spelled out far greater authority for France in Lebanon’s governance.136 A French High 
Commissioner, based in Beirut, administered the mandate in both Syria and Greater Lebanon. 
From 1920 until the passage of Lebanon’s 1926 Constitution, a French governor ruled Greater 
Lebanon alongside an appointed advisory council whose members were selected from the 
major confessional groupings. In 1922, an elected Representative Council was added.137 A 
formal system based on proportional confessional representation was inaugurated with the first 
Council elections, with Lebanon divided into districts corresponding to the six governorates of 
Beirut, Mount Lebanon, North Lebanon, Bekaa, Nabitiye, and South Lebanon. The French 
mandatory powers were widely criticised for excessive meddling in the electoral process.138  
Bou-Nacklie observes that the French used sectarian distribution within the various Lebanese 
institutions as a balancing mechanism, to keep certain groups from gaining excessive power.139 
Despite any good that may have come from the mandate, N. Ziadeh does not equivocate:  
French policy in Syria and Lebanon was not in the interest of the people. In Lebanon it 
emphasised the ‘confessional’ nature of the ‘State’, and thus succeeded in creating a 
diversity of interests which drove people into enclaves.140 
Religion, ironically, was one of the only realms where control was delegated to local 
authorities. Article Nine of the Mandate, for example, bars the Mandatory from interfering with 
the management of religious communities; Article Ten limits mandatory control over religious 
missions “to the maintenance of public order and good government”.141 Although the Ottomans 
had taken a similar legal approach, within Islam they only had recognised Sunnism – meaning 
the Shia community in Lebanon had been judged by Sunni courts, and effectively 
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disenfranchised.142 The mandate placed all sects on equal legal footing with Sunnis “for the 
first time in many centuries”.143 
Yet even Christian dissatisfaction with the mandate rose alongside the costs of bad French 
economic policy as well as their curbing of Lebanese civil liberties.144 A falling out in the mid-
1930s between the Maronite Patriarchate and the French High Commissioner softened 
Maronite positions towards Syria while hardening their view of the French, who were seen as 
exploiting their power.145 Increasingly, Maronite support was linked to demands for immediate 
independence.  
Greater Lebanon’s Sunni leaders clung to the goal of Arab unity, but following the 1936 
Conference of the Coast two distinct strategies crystallised within their ranks: while some 
continued to seek immediate unification, a small contingent among the Sunni elite began to see 
Arabism as a long game that could best be won by getting their domestic affairs in order first.146  
Khazen describes the dilemma as expressed by Kazem al-Solh, a leading proponent of the latter 
view:  
…The problem was: either creating a country in union with Syria and alienating half the 
population, or leaving Mount Lebanon outside a united Greater Syria thereby inducing the 
Christians to seek protection and surrender to colonial domination. In the latter scenario 
Mount Lebanon would become a ‘French province’, that is, a centre of subversion against 
the Arab nation.147 
Furthermore, as Sunni economic and political interests converged with those of other Lebanese 
sects, communal coexistence muted concerns among the elite.148 Much as the mutassarifs used 
the advantages of public office to lure the former muqati’jis into tacit acceptance of the status 
quo, the promise of patronage – and threat of losing it to rivals – brought some Sunnis and 
other Lebanon-sceptics into the administration.  
A key shift in Arab Nationalist positioning came in 1943, as several major Maronite factions – 
the Kataeb and Destour Party most notably – moved to support Arabist demands for the end of 
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the Mandate. This newfound solidarity made the idea of a mutual compromise seem 
achievable.149 In the summer of 1943, internal pressures, along with the interference of external 
actors – Syria, Egypt and Britain chief among them – finally brought together Maronite 
Bechara al-Khoury and Sunni Riad al-Solh to negotiate a National Pact.150   
Yet from the beginning, accepting Lebanon as a state had been one thing; accepting the 
proposition that Lebanon itself could be a nation was another. Lebanon’s ideological divide 
complicated the task of building a constitutional structure. So, as Sunnis and other non-
Maronites “began to come around to the idea of Greater Lebanon as a territorial state, this only 
intensified the debate among them as to what the defining national features of that state ought 
to be”.151 
 
Lebanon’s Constitutional Documents 
In his indispensable annotations to the Lebanese constitution, Bechara Menassa reflects on the 
uncommon durability of Lebanon’s constitutional framework, which has been altered but never 
replaced since its original promulgation in 1926. He suggests that this “unstable equilibrium” 
is produced by the give-and-take between Lebanon’s constitutional documents, the written 
Constitution and the unwritten National Pact: as the former pulls politics towards Western 
democratic norms, the latter corrects with “the imperatives of our communal coexistence”.152 
Among the most influential figures behind the 1926 constitution was Michel Chiha, a banker-
cum-intellectual who inspired much of Lebanon’s political philosophy. Chiha sought to 
reconcile Lebanon’s warring nationalisms, and to expand the narrow, Christian-oriented 
Lebanism to envelop other communities through Lebanon’s identification as a cosmopolitan, 
laissez-faire ‘mercantile society’.153 Accordingly, “Chiha portrayed Lebanon not only as an 
inclusive project that would protect all of its “minority” groups, but he presented the protection 
and inclusion of these groups as a definition and moral reason for Lebanon’s existence”.154 
Kliot argues that, as such, the constitution represented the first “political compromise among 
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the various “state-ideas” of Lebanon”.155 Rondot offers a good (albeit idealised) summary of 
the nature of this constitutional compromise: 
The Lebanese State, expanded in 1920, since then has gathered together around a dozen 
Muslim and Christian communities, spurred into mutual understanding at once by this 
tradition of association, by the fact that no one among them holds the numerical majority, 
and by their common desire to live in an independent national setting where their balance 
can be safeguarded under the rubric of a perfect mutual tolerance. 
Founded on such bases, the Lebanese State had been led to give itself, in practice even 
more than on paper, an original Constitution. The essential principle of its institutions rests 
in the sharing of public offices, such as the responsibilities of the State, among the diverse 
communities, pro rata according to the number of their adherents.156 
Meir Zamir describes the mandate period as “formative for the Lebanese state, determining its 
independence as a distinct entity, defining its borders, shaping its unique political system and 
capitalist laissez-faire economy”.157 He suggests that during the period from 1926 to the 
outbreak of the Second World War, the goal was “to form a nation-state based on the Western 
concept of parliamentary democracy, within a society divided along national, religious and 
sectarian lines”.158  
 
The 1926 Constitution 
Lebanon’s first constitution was promulgated in May 1926 through the cooperation of the 
mandatory authorities, French jurists, and a Lebanese drafting commission. It was modelled 
after the French constitution of 1875, along with earlier Belgian and Egyptian statutes.159 In 
addition to these foreign influences, Nicola Ziadeh observes, the mutasarrifiya also left its 
mark: 
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There is no doubt that when the [1926 constitution] for Lebanon was being drafted … the 
traditions of the second half of the nineteenth century were not only allowed to be upheld, but 
were permitted to establish themselves permanently in the minds of the people.160 
The 1926 Constitution added structure and detail to the mandatory system. Firstly, it created a 
bicameral legislature including an elected Chamber of Deputies and an appointed Senate. The 
two chambers were subsequently merged in 1927, as the bicameral system was deemed “too 
elaborate” for such a small country.161  
Of course, the Constitution reaffirmed expansive mandatory powers over Lebanon (these 
articles were abolished with independence in 1943). Yet with no sense of irony, it laid a strong 
emphasis on the principles of democracy and liberty. Menassa explains this emphasis was 
partly a fortification against a regional wave of coups d’état. It also offered reassurance to other 
sects that Greater Lebanon would not be a resurrection of the Maronite emirate.162 In any case, 
the Constitution’s preamble declared that, 
Lebanon is a parliamentary democratic republic based on respect for public liberties, especially 
the freedom of opinion and belief, and respect for social justice and equality of rights and duties 
among all citizens without discrimination.163 
As Menassa notes, this statement is plainly false, given that personal status laws are dictated 
by sect: Lebanese have different fundamental rights in areas of inheritance, divorce, and 
different representation in the parliament on the basis of their religion.164  
It also institutionalised political sectarianism, through the perennially ‘temporary’ Article 95, 
which reads as follows: 
On a transitional basis and in accordance with the first article of Mandate Charter, and with the 
intention of promoting fairness and harmony, the [sectarian] communities will be equitably 
represented in the public service and in the formation of governments, except where to do so 
would damage the well-being of the State. 165 
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With no precedent in foreign statutes, Article 95 was one of the articles that had to be written 
from scratch, and its wording was the subject of much debate in the new chamber.166 Menassa 
notes that Muslims on the Representative Council were just as amenable as the Christians to 
Article 95, as it helped consolidate and protect their communities’ power under the mandate.167 
Around the time of independence, interestingly, Chiha on several occasions noted his discomfit 
with with a political system tied to confession, “which he recalled had led to failure and even 
the need for European intervention”. 168 
While the constitution called for equitable sectarian representation, it made no mention of the 
ratio by which positions should be distributed. Neither did it specify a religion for Lebanon’s 
president, although in practice, the French insisted on Christians filling the role. Indeed, the 
first suspension of the Constitution by mandatory powers came in response to Lebanese 
attempts to install a Sunni President.  
In effect, from 1926 - 1990, the Lebanese Constitution “consecrated a Christian superiority, 
under various guises, in all the institutions of state”.169 
The National Pact 
At the height of the Second World War in 1941, Free France’s representative in Syria and 
Lebanon General Catroux declared both countries’ independence from the Mandate.170 Yet 
despite this official declaration, the French procrastinated handing over power or even 
reinstating the constitution, which they had suspended several years prior.171  
Then in 1943, reasonably fair elections granted a parliamentary majority to Bechara al-
Khoury’s Constitutional Bloc, which for several years had been engaged in discussions on 
independence with members of the leading Sunni al-Solh family.172 Khoury ascended to the 
presidency, appointed Riad al-Solh as prime minister, and called upon him to form a 
government. The French resisted the new government’s moves to abrogate the Mandate, and 
threw Khoury, Solh, and their new ministers in prison. In response, the country’s major 
Christian and Muslim factions joined forces to organise a nationwide strike. The prisoners were 
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released from Rachayya Castle on 22 November 1943, and over the next two months the French 
grudgingly transferred power to the Lebanese.173 
The modus vivendi reached by Khoury and Solh in their consultations became known as the 
National Pact. The Pact built on the 1926 Constitution to formalise Lebanon’s confessional 
political system and outlook. The purpose of the 1943 National Pact was to address the 
dilemma presented by Lebanon’s competing and incompatible nationalisms, Lebanism and 
Arabism, and their respective visions for the country.  
Despite the part outsiders played in brokering the Pact, Hanna Ziadeh argues it was a milestone 
in Lebanese autonomy:  
For the first time in its modern history Lebanon’s independence was guaranteed not by the 
authority, sovereignty or Mandate of a single or group of non-Lebanese powers, but 
through its integration into a regional political and security system, in which it enjoyed a 
privileged role.174 
As an unwritten accord, much of what we know about the contents of the National Pact derives 
from the Ministerial Statement read by Prime Minister Solh in Parliament in November 1943. 
That text identified Lebanon as a sovereign, independent nation “with an Arab face”, but one 
which also “accepts what is useful and beneficial from Western civilisation”.175 This famous 
phrase was a Sunni-Christian compromise on foreign policy with profound domestic 
repercussions: the Lebanese would lean neither to the East nor to the West, but treat and 
cooperate with both from a position of neutrality.176 Salibi recounts the argument – advanced 
chiefly by Christians – that,  
[T]he Lebanese Republic under the National Pact was actually a secular state. In every other 
Arab country … Islam was pronounced by a special article of the constitution to be the state 
religion, or at least the religion of the chief of state. Only Lebanon had no state religion…177 
In terms of internal arrangements, the key outcome of the Pact was the confirmation of a 6:5 
Christian-Muslim ratio in the distribution of political and administrative posts, supposedly 
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reflecting the results of the 1932 census. It also allocated the ‘three presidencies’ of President, 
Prime Minister, and Speaker of Parliament to the Maronites, Sunni, and Shia respectively. 
From then on, the Pact’s terms would be “reproduced in almost every presidential election, and 
after major crises, albeit with different actors and under different regional and international 
circumstances”.178  
The National Pact established a de jure consociational system in Lebanon.179 However, it was 
also a consociational act par excellence.  
The Lebanese Approach 
If the National Pact was a means to manage Lebanon’s clashing ideologies, it did not dictate 
specific policy approaches for the newly independent state. Lebanon mined its past for a 
national identity that could appeal across sectarian lines. In the late 1940s, Hourani wrote of 
Lebanon’s longstanding “specific tradition” of asylum – peaceful coexistence, if not tolerance 
– and autonomy. He conceded that the territory had seen its share of civil conflict, but insisted 
that even ostensibly sectarian feuds were mostly caused by socio-political issues, “the strife of 
factions and families”.180 
Gabriel Menassa, a lawyer and economist at the heart of Lebanon’s political aristocracy,181 saw 
three paths open to Lebanon in the late 1940s: Laissez-faire liberalism, ‘statist’ 
interventionism, and a point between the two. Menassa’s recommendation was for the middle 
course: “There is space to find the right formula between two extremes, which would safeguard 
liberty and initiative but would also prevent the abuses, disorder and serious errors of an 
unscrupulous, individualistic capitalism”.182 Perhaps Lebanon’s predominantly Christian 
merchant elite had had enough of compromise: Despite Menassa’s warnings, the country 
veered towards laissez-faire. 
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2.  Theoretical Framework  
When Lebanon won its independence in 1943, the world was alight; those embers of war and 
revolution continued to scatter and combust for several decades. So Lebanon entered the 
‘community of states’ in an unusually large cohort; for the next 30-odd years, the country’s 
prosperity, cosmopolitanism, and reasonably democratic character seemed to differentiate it 
from others in the Arab world and the broader community of ‘new states’. 
In the 1940s, ‘50s, and ‘60s, political science was no longer just a subject for scholarly 
reflexion; it was a matter of strategic and national importance.183 At the same time, the social 
sciences were swept up in the rise of ‘functionalism’ and empiricism. Western scholars fixated 
on the need to develop a rigorous, scientific political formula that could be applied globally, to 
help newly independent states find the right footing and develop stable liberal democracies.184 
Political arrangements were viewed on a spectrum, with “pre-Western systems” gradually 
progressing towards the ideal Anglo-American model, in Gabriel Almond’s well-known 
typology.185  
Today, the paternalistic, functionalist approach has been firmly disavowed (even if the impulse 
to disseminate Western-style statehood remains in contemporary discourse and practice).186 In 
the 1960s, as Western liberal-democracy and ‘modernity’ failed to take root, some political 
scientists began to reconsider their teleological model of development but they were less 
willing to abandon the notion of an empirical formula for statebuiliding. Rather, they suggested 
that alternatives to the Anglo-American model could yield productive, stable, democratic 
political systems.  
One such alternative arrangement was ‘consociational democracy’, which was developed in 
the late 1960s through the work of Arend Lijphart and Gerhard Lehmbruch,187 partly in 
response to Almond.188 The consociational hypothesis was that deeply-divided plural societies 
could, in fact, sustain stable democracies through overarching elite cooperation and the 
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institution of non-competitive political systems.189 Meanwhile, social scientists developed “a 
fascination … with the dynamics of ethnic differentiation, accompanied by a generalised desire 
on their part to discover how rival communal groups can relate to one another without conflict, 
chaos, and the disintegration of large political units”.190  
Lijphart and Lehmbruch’s core cases studies were Continental European – Lehmbruch 
highlighted Switzerland and Austria, to which Lijphart added the Netherlands and Belgium – 
but both used Lebanon as a final “principal case”, a promising example of the model at work 
in the developing world.191 As we shall see below, Lebanon was descriptively consociational 
during the Independence era. It is less clear that consociationalism promoted stability in the 
country. Regardless, in the 1960s and early 1970s, Lebanon looked like what political scientists 
had been waiting for: Proof that a broader form of political evangelism might still work.  
This chapter will examine the consociational democratic model. After establishing its 
theoretical basis, it will assess the model’s democratic credentials, as well as the conditions 
under which a consociational democracy is more or less likely. Next, it will look at the major 
conditions of consociational stability – all of which seem to contradict basic democratic 
principles. In the second part of this chapter, we turn back to Lebanon, and assess its 
consociational credentials at independence, as well as criticisms and alternatives including, 
most notably, the Chehabist approach. Finally, we identify analytic criteria which may be used 
to gauge a country’s consociational-democratic health and Chehabist progress. 
Consociational Democracy 
In the middle of the 20th century, accepted wisdom in political science predicted that deeply-
divided societies would tend towards being weak, immobile, and anti-democratic, and thereby 
more vulnerable to civil conflict. When looking at deeply-divided societies, Ian Lustick 
explains, we come from a ‘conflict-oriented approach’: Rather than viewing a society as a 
cohesive unit which, under certain circumstances, can be broken apart, we view it as a 
collection of groups and individuals which, under certain circumstances, can be made to cohere 
and endure. After all, most theories describe societal coherence based on levelling social 
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cleavages, whether by assimilating divergent groups or stamping them out.192 In general, we 
expect to find conflict in societies whose internal cleavages retain a high degree of salience.  
Consociationalism was the first theory to emerge from mainstream political science to 
challenge this expectation, citing a handful of deeply-divided societies which seemed to have 
achieved political stability under reasonably democratic institutions. The consociational 
model’s key innovation was that it did not regard the deep, incompatible divisions in these 
countries as immutable obstacles to stability. On the contrary, Lijphart described 
consociationalism as offering a route whose “approach is not to abolish or weaken segmental 
cleavages but to recognise them explicitly and to turn the segments into constructive elements 
of stable democracy”.193 This led Lijphart, among others, to view consociationalism as more 
than a descriptive typology: it was also a “normative model” which could offer a path to 
democratic stability for other divided nations across the planet.194   
Lehmbruch was somewhat more cautious, though he called upon political science to accept the 
system as one of several liberal-democratic models available to emerging states. Like his 
colleague Eric Nordlinger, he saw promise in consociationalism as a model for conflict 
management and the expansion of democratic theory.195 Lehmbruch hoped the consociational 
democracy model would challenge existing teleological views of political development that 
posed Anglo-American democracy as the system’s best and truest form, and disregarded the 
democratic potential of non-competitive systems.196 Along similar lines, Hans Daalder praised 
consociational democracy as a typology which “undermines the assumptions of dichotomous 
models based implicitly or explicitly” on the Anglo-American and Continental European 
models.197  
Consociationalism’s prospects as a normative model undoubtedly drove a good deal of 
scholarly interest in Lebanon in the 1960s and ‘70s. However, as a final caveat, the reader is 
reminded that ‘normative’ consociationalism is outside the scope of this thesis: Consociational 
democracy’s descriptive power for Lebanon’s political system implies no normative evaluation 
of the model itself. Neither this chapter nor this thesis in general will tackle the separate issue 
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of whether or not consociationalism out of all possible political systems was ‘good’ for 
Lebanon. Nor will it interrogate the broader question of whether or not consociationalism can 
be used to promote or explain sustained political stability in deeply-divided countries. Rather, 
it simply seeks to establish that Lebanon was structured as a de jure and de facto consociational 
democracy in the post-independence era as the result of a specific historical legacy.  
 
What is consociational democracy? 
Consociationalism, or consociational democracy, emerged from the broader pluralist school. 
Pluralism covers a range of theoretical approaches whose first and most obvious commonality 
is an emphasis on the importance of groups. According to Martin Smith, “Fundamental to all 
pluralists and pluralist thought is the notion that diversity is a social good that prevents the 
dominance of one particular idea. Power should be dispersed and not allowed to accumulate in 
the state.”198  
Consociational democracy is effectively a democracy of groups rather than individual citizens. 
In ‘deeply-divided societies’, segmental affiliation – whether based on ethnicity, religion, 
linguistic group, or another standard – has a high degree of political salience. That affiliation, 
moreover, is not something that can be transferred under ordinary circumstances. 
To keep a consociation democratic, what matters is for the elite, the leaders of these varied 
segments, to cooperate and reach negotiated settlements on national policy.199 Thus, the key 
characteristic of consociational democracies is the formation of ‘grand coalitions’ by the 
leaders of each constituent segment. Although specific traditions and practices vary by country, 
Lijphart describes the following generalisable principles:  
1. Power sharing 
2. Proportionality 
3. Segmental autonomy 
4. Mutual veto 
Power sharing means that, rather than seeking bare-majority governing coalitions, ‘grand 
coalitions’ of all major players are formed so that each key segment has a voice in policy 
decisions roughly proportionate to its share of the electorate.200 Contentious issues are resolved 
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through bartering among these elite; because each segment has effective veto power, it can 
preserve its most vital interests. Meanwhile, on a day-to-day level the simplest solution for 
navigating mutually-exclusive interests among the segments is to permit a high degree of 
segmental autonomy where possible.201 
Similarly, three of the most important of Eric Nordlinger’s six ‘conflict-regulating practices’ 
in deeply-divided societies mirror those described above: stable coalition, proportionality, and 
mutual vetoes.202 The other three conflict regulating practices (depoliticisation, compromise, 
and concessions) will be considered below in our discussion of preconditions that favour 
consociational success.  
Nordlinger stopped short of defining a theoretical model, but he expressed a hope that his work 
“may play some part in the development of a democratic model which will differ considerably 
from the one now widely accepted”.203 Like the other consociational theorists he attempted to 
address a perceived gap in democratic theory, and he explicitly focused on democratic or ‘open’ 
regimes in deeply-divided societies. But just how democratic were these cases? 
 
The ‘Democracy’ Factor 
In a consociational democracy, these power-sharing principles are institutionalised to ensure 
that all major segments of a population are represented in decision-making – for example, in 
the case of Lebanon by allocating key political and administrative positions on the basis of sect. 
It is clear how the model is ‘consociational’, but is it truly democratic? As Barry observes, 
“Rival politicians may get together to supress dissent and we may if we wish call the result 
‘consociation’, but if it is to be consociational democracy they must carry their supporters with 
them voluntarily.”204 
In order to assess consociationalism’s democratic credentials, one must first define 
‘democracy.’ For the purposes of this thesis, unless explicitly stated otherwise ‘democracy’ 
should be understood as a cognate of Robert Dahl’s ‘polyarchy’ or ‘polyarchal democracy’. 
Dahl coined the term in an effort to differentiate between the unachievable, idealised vision of 
democracy and the realities of contemporary ‘democratic’ systems.205 So the question may be 
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better stated as, “What standards should we use to determine whether, and to what extent, a 
government is democratic?”206 According to Dahl, the minimum requirement for a country to 
qualify as a polyarchy is the meaningful presence of six ‘democratic’ political institutions:  
1. Elected officials 
2. Free, fair, and frequent elections 
3. Freedom of expression 
4. Alternative sources of information 
5. Associational autonomy 
6. Inclusive citizenship207 
For Dahl, the core principle of democracy is political equality: the constitution must consider 
all the members of a democratic group – or citizens of a democratic state – as “equally qualified 
to participate in the process of making decisions about the policies the association will 
pursue”.208  
This more functional definition of ‘polyarchy’ helps disaggregate ‘traditional’ democracies, 
like the Greek city-states, as well as the ideal-democratic models they inform, allowing us a far 
more meaningful gauge of real-world, contemporary democratic practices. It is all the more 
useful to this study as Lijphart himself turns to ‘polyarchy’ to judge a country’s democratic 
character.209  
In traditional ideas of ‘democracy’, the majoritarian principle holds high ideological salience. 
For this reason, on an intuitive level, non-competitive coalition building may feel rather 
undemocratic. However, both Lijphart and Lehmbruch explain that different principles apply 
to coalition-building in adversarial and cooperative democracies. In competitive, adversarial 
political systems like the United Kingdom’s, governments are typically led by the majority 
party alone. When electoral results leave no party able to form a government independently, 
power brokers seek a ‘bare majority’ coalition with as few other parties included as possible in 
order to minimise policy concessions. The substantial political base excluded from that 
majority then forms the opposition. This generally works as a democratic model, rather than a 
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‘tyranny of the majority’, Lijphart explains, because the majorities and minorities in adversarial 
systems tend to trade places over time.210  
Moreover, majorities and oppositions in a more homogenous society can often reach 
‘democratic’ compromises by meeting each other halfway, since as Lehmbruch observes, “if 
actors agree on political ends and means their preferences tend to be generally compatible and 
transitive”.211 On the other hand, preferences in deeply-divided societies are likely to be 
“incompatible and intransitive” in at least one area of major interest.212 In such an area, the 
groups’ interests are not found on the same spectrum, meaning a ‘rational’, ‘democratic’ 
compromise is far harder to achieve, if not impossible. For these reasons, a competitive 
majoritarian system yields highly undemocratic results in deeply-divided societies, with much 
of the population relegated to permanent minority status and thereby disenfranchised. 
Nordlinger also observes majoritarian democracy is incompatible with all of his conflict-
regulating practices.213 
 For divided societies, the cooperative model typified by ‘consociational democracy’ offers a 
way to avoid this majoritarian tyranny via grand coalition building on the basis of power 
sharing, proportionality, segmental autonomy, and mutual veto. Nothing in the consociational 
model directly contradicts the indicators of polyarchal democracy. Some polyarchal principles 
may even be facilitated by a consociational model, such as free expression and varied, 
independent dissemination of information. Most significantly, consociationalism’s inherent 
plurality necessitates some degree of freedom of organisation and opposition.214 
However, while the consociational model does not inherently violate principles of electoral 
freedom, it may marginalise them. Although individual citizens vote, the constitutional 
immutability of the segments means that electoral results reflect little change over time.215 
Because this kind of ‘democracy’ reduces popular accountability, the stability of a 
consociational system depends upon – and perpetuates – a relatively ‘passive’ electorate.216 
Moreover, as both Nordlinger and Daalder emphasise, leaders need to depoliticise the issues 
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as much as possible in order to avoid ideological deadlock, meaning the most contentious 
debates are kept away from the public altogether.217 
Lijphart’s foundational defence of his model’s democratic bona fides is that its outcome – the 
grand coalition – is the only way of assuring that all segments of the population are represented 
in government.218 Dahl also suggests that, as popularly-elected officials, elites can be “a 
channel through which popular desires, goals, and values enter into governmental 
decisions”.219 Indeed, Dahl notes that apparently un-democratic elite and bureaucratic 
bargaining are found in all polyarchal democracies. In consociational and non-consociational 
democracies, regular elections help keep representatives accountable, and elites may “mutually 
influence and check one another”.220  
Clearly, consociationalism has democratic deficits. Yet as we have seen, in highly 
heterogeneous societies with intransitive interests, the primary mechanism of traditional 
democracy – majority rule – is functionally non-democratic. In these specific cases, 
consociationalism may present a plausible liberal-democratic alternative. Nonetheless, the 
weakening of electoral accountability leaves consociationalism particularly vulnerable to the 
erosion of democratic principles.  
Daalder emphasises the need to disaggregate ‘consociationalism’ and ‘democracy’.221 To fully 
understand the consociational model, we must turn away from the democratic question to 
assess those conditions which challenge or facilitate the growth and stability of the 
consociation itself. Political science orthodoxy suggests that deeply-divided societies should 
be prone to collapse and civil conflict. What stressors push a consociation towards this gloomy 
prophecy? 
The Conditions of Consociational (In)Stability 
Previously, we referred to Dahl’s concept of ‘polyarchy’ to define what, for the purposes of 
this thesis, constitutes the democratic. The second ideal-outcome for a consociational 
democracy is that the system be stable.  
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 Ian Lustick defines political stability as uninterrupted, “specific patterns of political 
behaviour” (excluding the illegal use of force) which can be expected to continue 
indefinitely.222 Lijphart offers a similar view, that political stability is a “multidimensional 
concept” combining “system maintenance, civil order, legitimacy, and effectiveness”.223  
The primary distinction between the two men is whether or not a ‘stable’ government needs to 
be actively functioning: for Lijphart, decisional effectiveness is a core component of stability, 
but Lustick simply demands that the current pattern be stable indefinitely. From a literal 
perspective, Lustick makes the more compelling argument. However, for the purposes of this 
thesis, we defer to Lijphart’s view for two reasons: Firstly, given its reliance on analytic 
variables derived from Lijphart’s work, using his definition limits the potential for later 
inconsistency. Secondly, ‘immobilism’ is a highly relevant criterion for Lebanon’s post-
independence political system, and in the Lebanese context may be more properly understood 
as factor working against stability. 
In narrative form, this thesis thus uses the following definition: Political stability denotes a 
state of continuous political activity that preserves the civil order with the tacit support of the 
population. 
A related, albeit broader concept to consider is conflict regulation. According to Nordlinger, 
while it is difficult to pinpoint a specific threshold for bare ‘success’, the conflict regulation 
spectrum runs as follows: Completely successful conflict regulation implies an “absence of 
widespread violence and governmental repression”, while on the other end, completely failed 
conflict regulation is when “widespread violence occurs in the form of a civil war with a death 
toll running into many thousands, or when an open regime becomes closed as the dominant 
conflict group uses the ‘agencies of social control’ to repress, imprison, or slaughter members 
of the opposing segment”.224 
When we consider a consociational political system, interestingly, several of the most 
deleterious forces to political stability and conflict regulation come from traditional democratic 
drivers: majoritarian-democratic practices, modernisation, and the promotion of an overarching 
national identity. We will consider each in turn. 
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Many of the anti-democratic effects of majoritarianism in consociational systems have already 
been discussed above: in deeply divided societies, the principle of ‘majority rules’ may 
effectively disenfranchise broad swathes of the population. Indeed, Lijphart explicitly states 
that “consociational democracy is more concerned with the equal or proportional treatment of 
groups than with individual equality”; 225 the inverse is true as well. 
Yet as Nordlinger explains, the problems with majoritarianism are not restricted to the level of 
elite coalition building: the classic principle of ‘one man, one vote’ may also run counter to 
democratic public interest in deeply-divided societies. He writes that, in such societies, 
Conflict groups … do not generally conceive of equal and interchangeable individuals as the 
foundation stone of democratic decisionmaking. To them the basic political unit is the segment 
or the conflict group. At least one conflict group – usually the smaller one – bases its claims 
and demands upon the equality of each segment rather than on the number of individuals 
comprising them. The negation of this assertion by pure majoritarianism is likely to hamper 
the appearance of effective conflict-regulating practices.226 
Furthermore, Nordlinger observes that democratic theory fails to acknowledge that fierce 
political competition can lead to civil discontent under certain conditions, “and eventually the 
complete breakdown of a democratic regime through widespread violence or repression”.227 
Lijphart agrees that “in a plural society democratic peaceful coexistence is vastly preferable 
both to nondemocratic peace and to an unstable democracy rent by segmental strife”.228 To 
mitigate the risk of competition turning into conflict, Nordlinger advises the practice of 
purposive depoliticisation, or removing the most contentious issues from public debate and 
electoral campaigns.229  
Majoritarian, competitive decision-making practices are often seen as a means to ensure that 
the best idea wins – and that the competition takes place on an even and transparent field. For 
reasons explained in the previous section, in conventional democracies, these practices promote 
stability by expressing the popular will. Yet in deeply-divided societies, the same practices may 
become a tool of oppression. 
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Another surprising ‘unfavourable’ factor for consociational stability is the promotion of an 
encompassing national identity. Surely, the promotion of nationalism should lessen conflict, 
dissolving segmental cleavages in favour of unity beneath a common banner? As Lijphart 
warns, “Although the replacement of segmental loyalties by a common national allegiance 
appears to be a logical answer to the problems posed by a plural society, it is extremely 
dangerous to attempt it”.230 The first danger lies in the attempt to foster national feeling itself. 
Lijphart explains, 
Because of the tenacity of primordial loyalties, any effort to eradicate them not only is quite 
unlikely to succeed, especially in the short run, but may well be counterproductive and may 
stimulate segmental cohesion and intersegmental violence rather than national cohesion.231 
Nordlinger makes a similar argument, and adds that nationalism may be disruptive on a 
systemic level as “a strong sense of nationality might jeopardize the carefully worked out 
internal balances which a consociational system allows”.232  Furthermore, he posits, the only 
means to rapidly cultivate nationalism in a deeply-divided society may be from the pulpit of a 
charismatic leader. Yet in this case, 
There is the very real danger that the outcome will be repressive rule rather than conflict 
regulation. In purposefully attempting to shape common loyalties to the leader or the symbol, 
the leader or the wielders of the symbol (usually the party) almost invariably claim to be the 
embodiment of the nation and thus to stand above the nation. … Unity comes to mean the 
eradication of segmental and other group attachments because only the leaders(s) represents 
the general will. 233  
In his early work, Lijphart seems surprised to find that strong nationalism correlates with 
consociational instability. It is unclear, moreover, whether successful consociations are stable 
despite the lack of national feeling or because of it. Lijphart leans towards the latter, suggesting 
that “superpatriots tend to have an inflated image of their nation’s worth and stature, and tend 
to attribute its weaknesses both to external and internal enemies. A strong nationalism may 
thus become a divisive force and a serious danger to an already fragmented society”.234 
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Modernisation and socio-economic development constitute a third major ‘unfavourable factor’ 
for consociational stability. Although in the long term, modernisation may reduce the strength 
and salience of cleavages, in the short and medium terms it seems to exacerbate them.  
Firstly, during modernisation, “the relative isolation of the segments which was conducive to 
peaceful coexistence among them is increasingly being challenged by the processes of 
urbanisation, geographical mobility, and nationwide trade”.235 Closer contact increases the 
opportunity for conflict among members of different segments; even more significantly, these 
processes create a keener sense of relative grievance among the lower socio-economic strata 
and are likely to outpace any rise in their material standard of living. Nordlinger explains,  
Socio-economic modernisation … detracts from the realisation of regulatory outcomes in 
societies deeply divided along communal lines by further increasing the number of nonelite 
individuals who manifest hostile beliefs, feelings and jealousies toward the opposing segment, 
by further intensifying such attitudes among individuals who already hold them, and by placing 
individuals in situations which allow or encourage them to act out their antagonistic beliefs and 
feelings.236  
He observes that this trend is most visible in deeply-divided societies where modernisation 
efforts are new but rapidly accelerating, as the speed of change itself raises tensions and 
anxieties among the segments.237 On this basis, Nordlinger argues that modernisation poses the 
greatest threat to consociational stability “among contemporary nonwestern societies 
characterized by a combination of open regimes (at least on an intermittent basis since 1945), 
intense communal conflicts, low levels of modernisation, and the activation of the 
modernisation process”.238 He cites Lebanon specifically as a case where this applies.  
 
Preconditions  
Beyond these major ‘unfavourable factors’, there are various preconditions that make a 
consociational system more or less likely to stabilise and thrive.  
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Lijphart describes the purposive formation of an elite coalition as consociationalism’s defining 
feature, rather than “any particular institutional arrangement”. This means that the elite must 
come together with the express purpose of “counteracting disintegrative tendencies in the 
system”.239 His only essential conditions for achieving consociational democracy concern the 
elite, and their willingness to sit down and negotiate in order to minimise conflict.240 Daalder 
likewise draws attention to the importance of segmental elites being invested in the 
preservation of the status quo.241 
Compromises and concessions represent the last of Nordlinger’s six conflict-regulating 
principles, and both also concern elite behaviour. In deeply-divided societies where segmental 
interests may not sit on a sliding scale, compromises usually mean a barter agreement involving 
multiple, possibly unrelated issues.242 On the other hand, granting concessions is just as likely 
to harm conflict regulation as to help it. What matters, per Nordlinger, is who is conceding: if 
an actor offers a major concession to an equal or stronger party, it may exacerbate conflict. 
Only when a much stronger actor makes a ‘goodwill’ concession does this practice play a 
constructive role.243 
Popular behaviour  
Lijphart also stresses the importance of “popular attitudes favourable to government by grand 
coalition”: after all, it may be difficult to govern if the coalition is constantly under barrage for 
being ‘undemocratic’ compared to competitive systems. For this reason, “the Anglo-American 
stable two-party system is thus not only a particular empirical type of democracy, but also a 
normative model which may form an obstacle to alternative attempts to establish stable 
democracy”.244  
Additionally, while strong nationalism would constitute ‘unfavourable behaviour’ for 
consociational democracies, as explained above, Lijphart suggests that public support for the 
status quo may be encouraged by moderate nationalism.245  
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A relatively low total load on the system 
If elite behaviour must be purposive, it follows that consociational democracies usually develop 
in response to some kind of existential crisis. Both Lijphart and Daalder emphasise the 
solidarity-building qualities of external dangers to a country.246 However, after the actual 
formation of the consociation, external pressures are more likely to be damaging. The 
relationships between internal and external conflicts can also be a major stressor.247  
Daalder, among others, stresses the need for “a relatively low load on decision-making 
processes”.248 In consociational systems, it is more difficult to juggle demands, as “the 
management of subcultural cleavages is already a major burden requiring much of the leaders’ 
energies and skills”. 249 In the case of significant external pressures on a country, it is vital the 
balance of internal cleavages be calibrated to offset them – although ultimately it may be 
beyond of control of any internal actors.250  
The Nature of Cleavages 
According to Lijphart, “Distinct lines of cleavage between subcultures”251 limit contact and 
thus opportunity for conflict: the efforts of the elite are more likely to succeed “if conflict at 
the mass level can be reduced – that is, if overlapping memberships are kept to a minimum”.252 
Moreover, he argues that distinct segments promote internal cohesion, which in turn helps the 
elite retain support. A related issue concerns the salience of these divisions: Consociational 
democracy is more likely to succeed where segmental cleavages have a high degree of political 
salience.253 
Multipolarity 
Lehmbruch raises the significance of polarity in a consociational political system. He argues 
that bipolar, ‘pillarised’ systems – especially when built upon a centralised bureaucracy – may 
be more prone to immobilism than more multipolar consociational systems.254 This is because 
in ‘multipolar’ arrangements, conflict resolution can be managed through a majority principle 
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within the coalition itself. Thus, he concludes that “a plurality of independent centers of 
political power” is more effective in a consociational system as it lessens the chances of 
deadlock.255 
Furthermore, Lijphart and Daalder add that when compared to binary system, “a multiple 
balance of power among the subcultures” in a consociational democracy encourages 
cooperation and discourages attempts to dominate rivals.256 
 
Criticism & Responses  
Consociational democracy has been the subject of considerable criticism, in large part directed 
towards its viability as a normative model.257 However, these doubts – justified as they may be 
– over consociationalism as a means to build political stability have little bearing on the scope 
of this thesis, which solely concerns the empirical model of consociational democracy. 
More relevant, however, are two other classes of critique, which will be considered 
successively: challenges to the model’s descriptive power, and structural shortcomings within 
the model itself. 
Descriptive challenges 
Brian Barry’s general point of contention with consociationalism is that it is too “theory-laden”, 
encapsulating “a complex theoretical construction” that yokes together a string of dependent 
variables.258 If a political system had all but one of the characteristics of consociational 
democracy, Barry suggests, the term could no longer apply. While much of his critique seems 
overly pedantic, he raises a valid concern that, per Lijphart’s typology, government by elite 
cartel is laid out as the only way that a deeply divided country could achieve stability.259 Surely, 
there must be cases where conflict has been successfully regulated by other means? 
Ian Lustick makes a similar observation, but goes further to suggest an alternative model 
alongside consociationalism: “control”. Lustick’s ‘control’ model describes a political system 
in a deeply-divided society whose stability is maintained through the subordination of some 
                                               
255 Lehmbruch (1967), p. 6 
256 Lijphart (1968), p. 27; Daalder (1974), p. 612 
257 For example, see Daalder (1974), p. 620; Barry (1975); Lustick (1979) 
258 Barry (1975), p. 479 




segments to another.260 While less palatable than consociationalism as a normative model for 
conflict-management, he argues in some cases it may be more effective: 
… In some deeply divided societies, the effective subordination of a segment or segments by 
a superordinate segment may be preferable to the chaos and disorder that might accompany the 
failure of consociationalism. … In deeply divided societies where consociational techniques 
have not been, or cannot be, successfully employed, control may represent a model for the 
organisation of intergroup relations that is substantially preferable to other conceivable 
solutions: civil war, extermination, or deportation. 261 
Lustick’s ‘control’ model harkens back to M.G. Smith’s approach to ‘pluralism’ a decade 
earlier, where stability was achieved through one minority segment’s domination of the rest.262 
It is unclear why Lustick’s model of ‘control’ does not constitute a form of totalitarianism. 
None of the founding consociational theorists denied that there were other means of stabilising 
deeply-divided societies, only that there was no other way to do it ‘democratically’. 
Lustick also criticises the consociational model for imposing an intentionality on elite 
behaviour where, in fact, there may be none – an argument echoed in Barry.263 Barry questions 
whether the consociational democracy model accurately describes all the ‘classic’ European 
cases, raising particular doubts about Switzerland and Austria. In the case of Switzerland, Barry 
finds the various ‘consociational devices’ present, but no sign they have been used for conflict 
regulation.264 in practice, he argues, decision-making bypasses these devices: For example, the 
Swiss tradition of simple majority referenda violates fundamental consociational principles.265 
He also observes that, in contemporary Switzerland, there is little conflict to regulate in the 
first place. Rather than consociational democracy, Barry suggests that a basic lack of hostility 
among segments may preserve Swiss stability. 266 
In the case of Austria, he readily concedes that it is consociational, but questions whether the 
model is really responsible for regulating conflict since the consociational system came into 
place.267  
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For the final two European exemplars, Belgium and the Netherlands, Barry writes they “have 
been indubitably consociational in their method of conflict-management”.268 However, he 
asserts that since these last two exemplars are both characterised by religious and class 
cleavages, one must be cautious in applying consociationalism to societies divided along other 
lines. Barry argues that ethnic divisions in particular may be impervious to consociational 
regulation, for three reasons: he claims that ethnic groups (as compared to other forms of 
cleavages) lack an organisational hierarchy; share a stronger commonality of interests; and 
have a higher potential for truly savage intersegmental violence.269 Of course, these distinctions 
are manifestly invalid across much of the contemporary world, where religion in particular may 
more closely resemble Barry’s ‘ethnic’ mode. In practice, this seems little more than a claim 
that inter-European cleavages are less profound than those found outside its borders, or 
between Europeans and non-Europeans. The observation that consociationalism seems to work 
best in Continental Europe is hardly novel. 
Shortcomings 
Greater insight may come from perceived shortcomings within the model itself, which have 
been observed by critics and consociational theorists alike.  
M.G. Smith observes that in practice, consociational systems inevitably produce de facto 
discrepancies in power between segments, which in turn exacerbate segmental tensions. As 
such, consociational systems would, over time, tend towards instability.270 
Rothchild also raises the issue of adaptability: Even if a consociational arrangement reflects 
the current balance of forces, what mechanisms are in place to ensure it will continue to do so 
as demographics shift in the future? 271 He warns, “Unless a consensus emerges over the 
particular institutional mechanism adopted under these circumstances, it is unlikely to carry the 
loads involved in accommodating ever-shifting group interests and power”.272 
Rothchild continues, “Unless the coalition partners come to share a minimal consensus on goals 
and values, the political negotiating process implicit in coalition government is likely to foster 
intense conflict or debilitating immobilisme rather than fruitful cooperation”.273 His pessimism, 
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however, is directly informed by a reification of socially constructed ‘primordial hatreds’ as 
immutable and eternal –274 a premise which has been widely debunked. 
Most worryingly, Smith and Rothchild both recognise that the system – even when working 
correctly – may foster negative outcomes including inefficiency and immobilism. Lijphart 
addresses these critiques, arguing that the model’s results must be considered with a long view: 
In the short run, an adversarial system may be a great deal more decisive and effective in a 
plural society than a consociational democracy. But the price that probably has to be paid for 
this favourable result is the increasing antagonism and suspicion of those segments that have 
been denied participation in the government and that, rightly or not, feel unjustly treated. Short-
term efficiency is therefore likely to lead to a breakdown in the long run.275 
Similarly, Lijphart acknowledges – with caveat – is that consociationalism tends to initially 
make plural societies more plural. Again, however, he maintains that over time the cooperation 
fostered by consociationalism will sand the hard edges off a society’s cleavages.276 
In short, Lijphart suggests that these are risks that consociational democracies will have to take. 
As we will see in the following chapter, they are also among the most common criticisms of 
the model’s performance in Lebanon. Lehmbruch was dismissive, however, of such critiques: 
“Lebanon offers numerous examples of impediments to social change and innovation which 
arise if an elaborate equilibrium of groups has to be preserved; but there is no reason to believe 
that the political systems of the Arab neighbour states are more efficient”.277 
All of the primary cases used in the development of consociational democracy were small 
states. A common explanation for this pattern is that consociationalism complicates the 
management of foreign relations, so it works better for small, less engaged polities. Barry, 
however, rejects the theory, suggesting that the small size of consociational democracies is 
more likely a function of the need to co-opt experts to restrict and manipulate public 
information, as this would be easier to manage in a relatively small country.278 Dismissing the 
foreign policy hypothesis, he writes, “There seems to be no reason why 'consociationalism' 
should make the conduct of foreign affairs especially difficult and it is significant most non-
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consociational countries have all-party coalitions in wartime, presumably the better to deal with 
external threats”.279 
What Barry does not seem to consider is that, in wartime, all-party coalitions form to respond 
to a common external threat. Lehmbruch contends that his case studies show “that the 
preservation of the inner equilibrium presupposes a reduction of external demands to the 
political system”.280 In the case of deeply-divided societies, internal cleavages may mirror 
external conflicts, with different regional or international powers supporting different 
segments. Thus, as Lehmbruch suggests, internal stability may be highly dependent on the 
behaviour of external players. Small countries, with less power and resources, may have an 
easier time maintaining a degree of neutrality. 
 
The Origins of Consociational Democracies 
How do consociational democracies come into the world? For the original theorists, interest in 
this point was primarily in reference to the consociational model’s normative value and 
applicability to new states. Yet putting aside consociational engineering, the question remains: 
Why did this specific pattern of governance independently emerge in multiple deeply-divided 
societies? Political systems in the original cases such as Lebanon, after all, inform and 
necessarily predate consociational theory.  
As Lehmbruch reminds us, consociationalism cannot be explained by social structure alone. 
While structure “is an essential condition of this pattern of conflict management … it offers no 
sufficient explanation” and as such on its own “cannot explain the practice of proportional 
distribution of offices and of non-competitive agreements”.281  
He calls for investigation into the “intervening variables” which coincide with these social 
structures to produce the consociational pattern.282 These include the interaction of domestic 
and regional/international political conflicts, but the most important ‘variable’ is what he calls 
‘political culture’, “the fact that peculiar norms of conflict management develop under specific 
historical circumstances”.283 Over time, “they become norms which are retransmitted by the 
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learning processes in the political socialisation of elites and thus acquire a strong degree of 
persistence”.284 
Lijphart and Nordlinger among others suggest that elites must knowingly adopt consociational 
measures as a means to manage conflict.285 Daalder, however, is less convinced that 
consociationalism must be purposive at its point of origin, and wonders if the system could 
evolve organically. He calls for deeper investigation of “the historical factors which may 
account for the development of that special type of political culture at the elite level that 
allowed the later peaceful transition to modern pluralism”.286  
The Lebanese example features both a lengthy historical tradition and purposive elite 
behaviour. In the following section, we will explore the origins of Lebanon’s pluralist political 
system, and their culmination – through the will of the Lebanese elite – in an independent 
Republic in 1943. 
 
Consociational Lebanon 
As noted in the previous chapter, the consociational model garnered attention for challenging 
the entrenched, orthodox position that unity and homogeneity were democratic prerequisites. 
Mid-century Lebanon, as an apparent demonstration of the model’s usefulness outside of 
Europe, symbolised this promise. De Vaumas, writing not long after Lebanon’s independence, 
described Lebanon’s adaptability: “Modern political institutions presuppose a society based on 
the individual, the Lebanese have taken them on like a coat which, not fitting well, they tailored 
to their traditional way of life”.287  
The Lebanese political system from 1943 until the early 1970s was empirically and 
descriptively consociational in its structure.288 Although the consociational democracy model 
was only articulated in the 1960s, it corresponds with Lebanon’s written and unwritten 
constitutional framework from earlier decades. One obvious reason for the correlation is that 
consociational model was developed, in part, from the Lebanese case. While there are issues 
inherent to the application of a Western model to Lebanese politics, Dekmejian argues that the 
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application of consociationalism is ‘justified’ by the uniqueness of Lebanon’s political system 
in the Middle East and the theory’s ability to offer “cross-nationally generalizable hypotheses 
that have proven validity”.289  
The statement that Lebanon’s political system was consociational does not imply that 
consociational democracy is a ‘natural’ model which reflects the intrinsic nature of Lebanese 
society, nor a normative judgment. However, independent Lebanon’s consociational 
democratic system did grow out of a long history of pluralism. Lehmbruch recognises the 
significances of this history, and specifically traces the consociational system in Lebanon to 
“the Ottoman tradition of autonomy of the religious communities (millets) and to the 
cooperation of Christian and Druse millets in the Turkish province of Lebanon since the treaties 
of 1861 and 1864 which established Lebanese autonomy and provided for a multi-
denominational council of notables to assist the governor”.290  
Although Lijphart places less emphasis on history in his analyses in general, he concedes that 
“prior traditions conducive to consociational democracy have played … an especially 
prominent [role] in Lebanon”. However, as seen in the previous chapter, the seeds of pluralism 
can be traced back still further than the 19th century, germinating through discourse between 
the communities in Mount Lebanon, the Ottomans, and Europe. 
The ideas of ‘cleavage’ and ‘segment’ are used loosely in much of the consociational literature, 
despite their fundamental salience to the model as a whole.291 Lustick states that “as a minimum 
condition, boundaries between rival groups must be sharp enough so that membership is clear 
and, with few exceptions, unchangeable”.292 Fortunately, in the specific case under 
consideration, we can determine both with precision, as they are legally prescribed.  
This thesis correlates ‘segments’ to the constitutionally-defined sectarian groupings recognised 
by independence-era Lebanon: in the broad sense as Christian and Muslim, and in the narrow 
sense corresponding to seventeen officially recognised sects. Other forms of societal division, 
such as ethnicity, language, or political orientation, are not recognised as ‘segments’ in this 
thesis. ‘Cleavages’, in turn, are the gaps between those segments.  
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The State of the Consociation – Pre-Independence 
The earliest formal iteration of a representative system based proportionately on sect is found 
in the Double Qa’imaqamiya: First, by creating two districts under the separate authority of 
Druze and Christian administrators, and second through its majlis, or Council, which included 
a judge and an advisor representing each of the Sunni, Druze, Maronite, Greek Catholic, and 
Greek orthodox sects. Even the Shia were granted a representative on the Council, although 
the Ottomans did not recognise their sect as separate from Sunni Islam. 
This proto-democratic plural system was strengthened during the mutasarrifiya. The 
Règlement Organique stipulated that seats on the administrative council be allocated along 
confessional lines to the major sects: four to the Maronites, three to the Druze, two to the Greek 
Orthodox, and one each for the Greek Catholics, and Sunni and Shia Muslims. Distribution 
was also based on geography, with each seat assigned to a specific district according to the 
most recent census data.293 At the local level, the Règlement stipulated that “each village 
community…would elect a village shaykh for itself, and the village shaykhs of each 
administrative district would elect the councillors from that district.”294 
Under the French Mandate, confessional representation continued through the Representative 
Council. Article 95 of 1926 Constitution enshrined the distribution of public service and 
government posts to each sectarian community ‘on an equitable basis’.  
However, while Lebanon’s pre-independence political systems were plural, they were not 
consociational. Consider the four constitutive elements of consociational democracy:  
• Power-sharing  
• Proportionality 
• Segmental autonomy  
• Mutual veto  
Certainly by the time of the Mandate, an inter-sectarian elite cartel was taking form, but until 
1943 it was both incomplete and divided; moreover, many of those elite were not committed 
to an independent Lebanon within its current borders. France’s preferential treatment of the 
Christians meant that they held at least two and sometimes all three of the ‘presidential’ 
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positions – president, prime minister, and speaker of parliament – for the duration of the 
Mandate,295 which undermined the credibility of power sharing.  
The 1926 Constitution formalised the principle of proportional political sectarianism, as 
Lijphart himself recognises. He writes that the Constitution “already embodied the principle of 
proportionality for civil service appointments, and that the turn toward the allotment of the 
highest offices to specific sects was gradually set in the 1930s”.296 Crucially, however, the 
Constitution did not specify the terms of proportional distribution. Meanwhile, once again, 
preferential treatment skewed the proportionality of the nascent system towards the Christians, 
and Maronites in particular. 
From one view, segmental autonomy was reasonably high during the Mandate, as the 
administrative apparatus of Mount Lebanon had yet to be expanded to encompass the annexed 
territories. The Mandate and the 1926 Constitution also granted authority to religious groups 
to manage their own affairs on issues such as marriage and education.  
Power-sharing, proportionality, and autonomy thus were all partly fulfilled, but they were 
obstructed by the same factor that denied any kind of mutual veto: The near-absolute powers 
vested in the French mandatory authorities. None of the Lebanese officials or elite had 
meaningful decision-making power, with virtually every judgment subject to French approval.   
The Independent Consociation 
From the early 1940s, consociationalism’s four elements – power-sharing, proportionality, 
segmental autonomy, and mutual veto – were all substantively present in Lebanon, and the 
country met the criteria for polyarchic democracy. 
The National Pact was itself a consociational act, which saw the leaders of Lebanon’s largest 
communities come together to work out a compromise between their opposing visions for 
Lebanon’s future. The Pact established a power-sharing framework which predicated Lebanese 
policymaking on elite cooperation and consensus. In addition to the formula of ‘neither east, 
nor west’, it was through the National Pact that the sectarian allocation of the three major 
political offices was enshrined. If neither Christians nor Muslims were truly happy with the 
Pact’s results, both sides were willing to accept it, and able to bring along enough of the 
population to make it viable.  
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Presidential systems are rarely compatible with consociational democracy, given their reliance 
upon “the predominance of a single leader”. However, Lijphart cites Lebanon as an example 
where a presidential system can be reconciled with the model. In the case of Lebanon, he 
explains, the ‘grand coalition’ comprises all three ‘presidents’, who represent the three major 
sects, as well as the multisectarian government.297 In effect, Lebanon ends up with a 
combination presidential and parliamentary system of government, with an executive 
encompassing all major sects. 298 
In 1943, President Bechara al-Khoury and Prime Minister Riad al-Solh negotiated a 
government with representatives from the six largest sects. So together, the three ‘presidents’ 
and the new ministers formed Lebanon’s first ruling coalition, with each major group holding 
effective veto power over the rest. Salibi explains that, in this moment, “a new Lebanon 
emerged into being – a full partnership between the various Christian and Moslem sects in 
which no one sect alone could determine policy”.299  
Meanwhile, new conventions defined ‘proportionality’ in the distribution of offices. During the 
1943 general elections, the French and their Lebanese allies had initially pushed for 54 
deputies, 32 of whom would be Christian and just 22 Muslim. After considerable pushback 
against this patently non-proportional division, the number of seats was increased to 55, with 
30 going to Christians and 25 to Muslims.300 This 6:5 ratio would be observed until the Civil 
War. Despite the rigidity of the 6:5 ratio, Nordlinger describes Lebanon’s confessional 
electoral system as a force for consociational stability: 
In each constituency the candidates belonging to one religious sect compete against each other, 
thereby taking much of Christian-Muslim conflict out of the electoral arena. And there is some 
advantage accruing to those candidates who play down the appeal to their own segment and 
cooperate with a candidate of another segment. The upshot is electoral competition, but of a 
kind in which “no community acts in such a way as to maximize the number of its reps at the 
expense of the other. Instead of communal strife, a tendency to develop communal cooperation 
between the candidates ... is established.301   
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Finally, as for segmental autonomy, Lebanon’s constitution explicitly and implicitly promises 
“that the regime will not interfere in the area of intra-confessional social relationships. … This 
situation permits the several communities to coexist and even interact although their respective 
social structures are very sharply diverse”.302 Each sect would rely on its own court system, 
independent of the Ministry of Justice, to resolve personal status issues among its adherents.303 
Informally, the elite agreed to stay out of other segments’ internal affairs. 
The National Pact was a flawed document. Most glaringly, the Christians came out of the 
agreement overrepresented, the Maronite President of the Republic had vastly more power than 
the Sunni Premier or the Shia Speaker, and no mechanism existed to adjust these allocations 
over time. In Lijphart’s view, this inflexibility was the primary defect in Lebanon’s 
consociational system.304 
Nonetheless, all major components of consociational democracy were observable in 
independent Lebanon. While the Pact was unable to act as a positive factor of cohesion, as one 
Lebanese observer in 1965 put it, “the source of political stability in Lebanon is the concept of 
the state as a federation of sects, with no single group allowed to dominate the others”.305  
Independence-era Lebanon also broadly met the criteria for polyarchic democracy. As the 
Constitution protected free expression – as demonstrated by the great diversity of opinions 
expressed in the Lebanese media – independence from the Mandate brought the electoral 
trappings of democracy. Although female suffrage was only instituted in 1952, that particular 
inequality was consistent with contemporary global trends. From 1943 - 1958, the country held 
regular, reasonably free and fair elections under two presidents, four different speakers of 
parliament, and nine different prime ministers.  
On the other hand, the allocation of political posts on the basis of sect undermines the 
polyarchic principle of political equality, particularly through its restriction of each of the 
presidencies to a single sect. Yet these arrangements had been implemented to ensure fair non-
majoritarian representation for minorities, as discussed previously. If we take into account the 
structural challenges presented by the consociational model, Lebanon can be seen as reasonably 
democratic during the independence era. 
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Favourable and Unfavourable Factors 
As we consider Lebanon post-independence, we can speak to several factors identified by the 
literature as favourable or unfavourable to consociational stability. 
Elite behaviour: Lijphart insists that elite behaviour must be purposive. Additionally, elites 
should recognise the perils of fragmentation; commit to system maintenance; transcend 
cleavages at the elite level; and reach “appropriate solutions for the demands of the 
subcultures”.306 At independence, the Lebanese elite, and particularly those within the elite 
coalition, readily met these conditions: The consociational system was created through the 
purposive action of Christian and Muslim elites seeking an exit to a national crisis; in the 
medium term, all were committed to system maintenance; they were able to transcend their 
religious and ideological differences in order to cooperate; and they demonstrably reached 
solutions which satisfied the minimum demands of the subcultures, for the time being. 
Nordlinger praises the Lebanese elite’s adherence to “both kinds of purposive depoliticisation”: 
limiting governmental interference in segmental life, and actively attempting to keep the most 
contentious debates behind closed doors so as not to inflame popular sentiments.307 
Popular behaviour: Lijphart and Nordlinger both note the weakness of national identity in 
Lebanon; weak nationalism constitutes a form of favourable behaviour where 
consociationalism is concerned. Although they may overstate the absence of nationalism in the 
country, their basic premise is correct: nationalism never became a mass movement in 
Lebanon, and ‘segmental nationalisms’ were far more salient.308  
A relatively low total load on the system: Although external loads on the Lebanese system 
would snowball over the following years, in the early to mid-1960s Lijphart still viewed loads 
as light, and thus working in the government’s favour: “The Lebanese version of this type of 
democracy is neither very developed nor very efficient. But its society has so far been relatively 
static, and the government’s tasks have consequently been relatively simple and limited”.309 
Nordlinger also observes that, because it is so easy to trigger segmental conflict in Lebanon, 
governments “have studiously refrained from taking on more than a bare minimum of 
governing responsibilities,” and constituted a virtual “night watchman state” prior to 1959.310  
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The Nature of Cleavages: According to Lijphart, consociational democracy is facilitated 
when cleavages have high political salience: “In plural societies with free elections, the salient 
social cleavages tend to be translated into party system cleavages; the political parties are likely 
to be the organised political manifestation of the segments”.311 Given that Lebanon’s political 
system was formally regulated almost exclusively along sectarian segmental lines, the 
country’s cleavages were highly politically salient. 
Multipolarity: Within the elite coalition, the three presidencies fostered a multipolar system 
alongside the elite from other sects. Lijphart describes Lebanon’s segmental makeup as close 
to the multipolar ideal, as the country “contains numerous segments, but they are all minorities 
and the four largest ones together comprise about 80 percent of the population”.312 
 
Critiques 
To understand arguments against the application of consociational theory in the Lebanese 
context, we must look at two categories of criticism: general critiques of consociational theory 
mentioned above when held up against the Lebanese case, and those critiques made specifically 
in reference to Lebanon. As with the former, most critiques of Lebanese consociationalism 
focus on whether the model is good for the country, not whether it is present. However, some 
of the normative critiques have implications for the empirical. 
In his critique, Brian Barry conceded that the Low Countries were empirically consociational. 
His challenge was whether consociationalism deserved the credit for conflict regulation in 
Europe. Barry did not reference Lebanon explicitly in his paper. However, Lebanon meets the 
criteria Barry used to determine its empirical presence in Belgium and the Netherlands: The 
core consociational devices are formalised in the country’s political structure and used in 
decisionmaking. So, how does his argument fare when applied to Lebanon? 
Barry questioned whether the consociational theorists were catastrophising counterfactual 
outcomes where an elite cartel did not unite.313 Yet in the case of Lebanon, there is a solid basis 
for believing that outcomes would have been negative in the absence of the National Pact. 
Firstly, cross-sectarian cooperation at the elite level was crucial in bringing an end to the French 
mandate and achieving independence. Secondly, it was only through elite bargaining that Sunni 
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Lebanon was convinced to put aside their demands to unite at least parts of the territory with 
Syria. Finally, in Independence-era Lebanon, we have evidence of what happened when 
compromise and elite cooperation broke down in the civil wars of 1958 and 1975. 
Barry also wondered whether the conciliatory attitude which presaged the formation of an elite 
coalition might be enough to ensure stability on its own. Once the various segmental elite knew 
that their rivals were reasonable and open to compromise, could they have proceeded to 
peaceably govern in majority and opposition, rather than grand coalition?314 
Again, in the case of Lebanon, this is utterly implausible. Interests were simply too divergent 
and existential for real trust. Lebanon’s continued existence within its borders was dependent 
upon overarching elite cooperation and visible mutual concessions; the fundamental 
intransitivity of the Lebanese segments’ respective interests necessitated both sides be present 
when deciding issues of national concern. Aside from authoritarianism or other forms of 
oppressive rule, some iteration of a grand coalition was the only arrangement that could have 
ensured the country’s survival in the independence era. It is less clear that this is true for later 
decades, once all the major blocks had come to accept the idea of Lebanon as an independent 
state, but that question is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
In short, while Barry’s critiques may be instructive for the relatively unburdened European 
consociational democracies, they do not apply for Lebanon in 1943. Some kind of mutually 
acceptable power-sharing arrangement between the segmental elite was necessary to achieve 
and sustain independence. 
 
The consociational system blocks unity and requires crises 
Most of the Lebanon-specific critiques in one way or another imply that the consociational 
system is simply a mask. Gendzier describes it as “Janus-faced, with a modern exterior and a 
‘traditional’ interior that far more accurately represented the organisation of the clientage 
system that operated through its carefully tended interstices”. 315 For many Lebanese at the 
time, the National Pact’s consociational national blueprint, sometimes referred to as the ‘double 
negation’ (‘no to the east, no to the west’), seemed a poor foundation for statehood. Georges 
Naccache, editor of L’Orient and a spokesman for the Lebanist camp, wrote in his editorial 
pages in 1949: “The madness was to have elevated a compromise to the loftiness of State 
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doctrine … to have believed, finally, that two ‘noes’ could, in politics, produce a ‘yes’”.316 
Naccache argued that the terms of the Pact engendered a system whose survival depended on 
continual division and crisis and precluded any kind of national unity or indeed governance.317 
 
The consociational system means an impotent state 
In 1966, Edward Shils warned that the power-sharing formula of the National Pact was “too 
limited a constitutional basis for any state, least of all a modern commercial state situated in a 
very uneasily, even scarcely, equilibrated field of forces.”318 In Shils’s view, the problem was 
lodged in Lebanon’s underdeveloped civil society. Under such circumstances, Lebanon could 
at best “maintain a ‘night-watchman’ state”, but the consociational balance remained highly 
vulnerable to upset.319 In the same volume, Malcolm Kerr takes an equally dim view, citing 
two “two mutually reinforcing reasons” for the state’s poor condition: 
First is the public mentality, which displays such scanty acknowledgment of State authority 
and, indeed, appears scarcely to grasp its conceptual meaning. Second, there are the divergent 
stresses and interest of representatives with the constitutional organs of leadership, that is, 
among politicians in office. On the one hand, the right of the State to take decisions is 
inadequately recognised; on the other hand, the trustees of the State are incapable of agreeing 
upon decisions to be taken.320 
Given this lack of consensus, to Kerr, pluralism was not even working in the first place, let 
alone making Lebanon stable or democratic. Rather, pluralism may simply mask a decidedly 
undemocratic distribution of power and resources, with a weak state as its collateral.  
Consociationalism perpetuates sectarianism 
Helena Cobban argues that, while the trappings of modern, Western democracy may “come 
and go in Lebanon, … the sects, and the politics of the sects, seemed to live on for ever”.321 
There is significant evidence, however, to support the claim that sectarianism was actively 
cultivated in Lebanon over the 19th and 20th centuries, and that as such it represents no 
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‘essential’ or ‘primordial’ divisions in the country.322 While the lack of genuine ‘primordiality’ 
may suggest that workable alternatives to consociationalism for Lebanon exist, it does not 
impact consociational democracy’s descriptive relevance for Lebanon. Conflation of the two, 
nonetheless, is a regular feature in the literature.323 
 
Alternative approaches  
After Lebanon’s descent into the ‘Hobbesian’ chaos of the civil war, Michael Hudson observed 
a new model distinct from consociationalism and Chehabism: 
Lacking both an effective concentration and a legitimate distribution of power, the Lebanese 
political system over the past decade has evolved in terms of a third model, neither statist nor 
consociational, which we might dub the ‘non-state model’, and whose motto might well be e 
uno plura.324 
However, if we return to the independence era, the only descriptive alternative to 
consociationalism to ever gain traction is the class-based model.325 Chehabism as an approach 
to the Lebanese political system may be – loosely -- included in this category. Despite the 
charges of some of Chehab’s critics, Chehabism was never Marxist; indeed, Chehab himself 
repeatedly cited communism among the greatest threats to Lebanon and world.326 It was, 
however, avowedly socialist, and understood class as the true driver of Lebanon’s misfortunes. 
Class-based approaches 
Class-based approaches to Lebanon’s political system often sit adjacent to consociationalism. 
Both, after all, are concerned with the elite, and many who describe Lebanon as descriptively 
‘consociational’ still acknowledge class as well as sect in their analyses.327 The key distinction 
is that class-based approaches understand class and socio-economics as the salient cleavages 
in Lebanese policy design, rather than sect. Lebanon’s elite cooperate across confessional 
boundaries not to minimise domestic conflict, but to advance their common socio-economic 
interests.  
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From a class-based approach, interestingly, consociational dynamics may still be at play lower 
in the political hierarchy. ‘Radical elitist’ C. Wright Mills explains that “the pluralist model of 
competing interests … applied only to the ‘middle levels’, the semi-organised stalemate of 
interest group and legislative politics, which pluralists mistook for the entire power structure 
of the capitalist state”.328 Consociationalism, then, might govern local and bureaucratic 
Lebanese politics, even the parliament – but it serves to mask the self-interested nature of 
upper-level decisionmaking within the ruling class. In Lebanon, one major alternative to 
consociationalism was derived from this position: Lebanese Marxism.329  
The Lebanese Left found its stride in the 1970s.330 Under the stewardship of Kamal Jumblatt, 
the Lebanese communists, secular Arab nationalist parties and others came together as the 
Lebanese National Movement. The movement argued that class, not sect, was the fundamental 
driver of Lebanese conflict and that “Lebanese society is under the control of a feudal-
bourgeois class that needs to be defeated in order to modernise Lebanese social structure and 
create a secular state”.331  
In privileging class over sect, the Marxists were not denying the significance of the latter. 
Rather, they believed that sectarian conflict was, at its root, a form of class conflict. According 
to Mahdi Amel (nom de guerre of prominent Lebanese Marxist intellectual Hassan Hamdan), 
sectarianism was not really a religious phenomenon, but rather “a political relationship in the 
service of the bourgeois class, whose function is to bind the working classes to the bourgeois 
in a dependent relationship”.332  
Mahdi referred to Lebanon as a ‘confessional state’, to distinguish this sectarian bourgeois state 
from the secular, “fully realised” bourgeois state of the West, which was “the very type that is 
meant to be the model on which the Lebanese state should be based”.333 The ‘confessional 
state’ based on two key principles: “the economic domination of the bourgeoisie” and “the 
political, ideological and constitutional system that enables the bourgeoisie to maintain its class 
dominion...”.334 But these principles produced what Mahdi called ‘the critical contradiction’. 
Traboulsi explains Madhi’s logic:  “Even as sectarianism is the basic precondition for the 
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existence of the state (the bourgeois Lebanese state) it also constitutes the primary obstacle to 
the construction of this state as a bourgeois state”.335 
Traboulsi, however, is not convinced by Mahdi Amel’s clean division of sects and classes or 
his “critical contradiction”.336 For Traboulsi, Mahdi’s belief in this inherent ‘contradiction’ is 
“indistinguishable from the Lebanese Left’s belief … in the existence of an incompatibility 
between the capitalist infrastructure and the pseudo-feudalist, sectarian superstructure of 
Lebanese society.”337 Traboulsi contends that sectarianism transcends the political, and 
moreover shares that space with class power: 
The relationship between [sects and classes in Lebanon] is not one of separate but parallel 
entities, but rather a complex network of interaction and disengagement, mutual influence and 
competition, on the grounds that both are frameworks for engaging in the battle for domination 
and the acquisition of the social surplus.338 
 
The consociational framework laid out by Lebanon’s constitutional documents unquestionably 
empowered the country’s sectarian elite. It was equally plain that considerable overlap existed 
between this group and Lebanon’s economic elite. Traboulsi explains,  
The Lebanese bourgeoisie flourished under the wing of the French Mandate’s political 
authorities then … established its republic by taking control of the state and subordinating its 
policies and laws to its financial/commercial interests, its loyalties shifting over the years 
between different centres of power.339   
Through the capture of various presidents the group steered the state towards non-
interventionism, giving themselves almost complete freedom to conduct business as they saw 
fit.340 Samih Farsoun and his student Walter Carroll described this ruling class as a union of 
“compradores, merchants, and landlords”.341 Traboulsi refers to them as ‘the Consortium’:342 
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an “oligarchy”343 of about thirty families who, “not content to control the main levers of the 
economy … used the political authorities to reshape the entire Lebanese economy in 
accordance with the rules of the free market”.344  
For Johnson, the excessive power and influence held by Lebanon’s ‘hegemonic’ bourgeoisie 
made it impossible for the state to serve its structural purpose: “In Lebanon [the dominant 
economic] class had direct control, which meant the state lacked the relative autonomy 
necessary to make it a ‘factor of cohesion’ that could mediate between the competing interests” 
within and among the social classes.345  
Class-based approaches and consociationalism describe superficially indistinguishable 
systems, generating the same purposive elite cooperation and accommodation; popular 
disenfranchisement; and a deepening salience of sectarian identities.  
The key distinction is that, in class-based approaches, the elite are motivated by capitalism 
rather than national (or indeed any other) interest – the elite want to perpetuate the status quo 
and actively oppress the masses for financial gain. Consociationalism, on the other hand, 
requires that the elite also be motivated by interests unrelated to class struggle.  
In theory, consociational elite seek to maximise benefits and minimise costs accruing to their 
segments (rather than to themselves) while maintaining stability. Most if not all consociational 
elites, therefore, should be dissatisfied with the status quo; they accept it as the best of bad 
options. In Marxist theory, on the other hand, the elite actively benefit from the system, and 
presumably would seek to defend it even if it were no longer needed. 
Class and socio-economic inequality have always been a source of conflict in Lebanon, and 
have a better claim than sectarianism to ‘primordiality’. It is difficult, however, to disaggregate 
class and sectarianism – especially in independence-era Lebanon. There is insufficient 
evidence to back the claim that, beneath a consociational mask, the Lebanese elite was united 
chiefly by economic interests. Arguments that make this claim seem to present the Consortium 
as synonymous with Lebanon’s economic elite. The Consortium was real and held tremendous 
power, but it was overwhelmingly Christian in its composition. Most of the Muslim bourgeoisie 
operated independently of the group, and often pursued divergent interests. (Indeed, on several 
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occasions, segmental elite appeared to pursue policies that harmed their own economic 
interests, for little reason other than to punish their opponents.)  
The argument could be put forth that it was the Consortium alone which, in tandem with 
presidents, constituted Lebanon’s ‘real’ ruling elite. But if this were true, that would mean that 
their Muslim socio-economic peers were excluded from the cartel – suggesting that sect, after 
all, was more important than class. 
Class-based allegiances, even at the elite level, do not seem to have transcended sect. Yet as 
we shall see, Chehabism as an approach owes much to the class-based view of Lebanon. Fouad 
Chehab believed that socio-economic inequality, not sectarianism, was the true source of the 
discord that fuelled the conflict in 1958.  
 
 
The Chehabist Approach 
Looking at the Chehabist era, Johnson claims the civil conflict of 1958 compelled “the 
establishment of more powerful and more autonomous state institutions in order to reinforce 
the superstructural unity which was so important for the cohesion of the social formation”.346 
This explanation brings us back to the central question of this thesis – why did Chehab’s efforts 
fail to produce the desired cohesion? If Lebanon’s political system were really based on class, 
hidden behind a sectarian mask, Chehabism should have been more effective.  
 
The Chehabist approach comes with an asterisk: Unlike consociationalism and class-based 
approaches, Chehabism was not grounded in scholarly research nor formally developed into a 
‘theory’; as such, it is riddled with contradictions. However, it is vital we understand how the 
Chehabists conceptualised their state and political system. After all, the state was the target of 
the Chehabist project, through which they hoped to advance “a new vision of how the 
precarious patchwork of parties and religious groups might be sewn together into something 
more coherent and durable”.347 
This thesis defines Chehabism as a radical political project designed to transition Lebanon from 
a precarious, divided society into a stable, cohesive whole under a ‘new National Pact’. The 
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primary indicators of this new Pact’s success would be the achievement of national unity, 
modernisation, and social equality, through 1) The formation of a universal, inclusive Lebanese 
identity; and 2) Even socio-economic development and modernisation across Lebanon’s 
communities and regions. These aims could only be achieved through a rational, balanced, 
scientific, sustained, and ethical approach.  
This definition, along with Chehabism’s ideology, principles, and imperatives, will be explored 
in depth in the following chapter. Here, we restrict ourselves to its approach to the 
contemporary Lebanese system: Chehabism’s take on Lebanese democracy and political 
culture, its principles for moving forward, and the outcomes they ultimately hoped to achieve. 
The ideas informing Chehabism were most clearly articulated by Georges Naccache, whose 
1960 lecture at Le Cenacle Libanais is credited with bringing the term ‘Chehabism’ into 
common usage. For the Cenacle’s publication, Les Conferences du Cenacle, Naccache wrote 
an article based on his address several months later; it is this written document that we rely 
upon in the following discussion. While Naccache offers the more systematic explanation of 
Chehabism, these points are echoed in Chehab’s own speeches from the time. 
Naccache was the outspoken editor of L’Orient newspaper, as well as an ardent supporter of 
President Chehab; at the time of writing, he held the portfolios of Information and Public 
Works in the government of Ahmad Daouk. This latter experience further qualified him to 
articulate the Chehabist project and ethos. Naccache wrote that his time in government “gave 
me a direct, lived experience of the subject … I had the privilege to live rather close to the man, 
to directly participate in this project we have settled on calling ‘Chehabism’…”.348  
As the first person to formally and publicly articulate the Chehabist project, Naccache began 
by explaining that, pared down to its essentials, Chehabism had created “a new mechanism for 
relations between Power and Opinion”.349 Naccache believed that by launching a broader 
‘conversation’ about Chehabism, the shared experience of the two years since Chehab had 
come to power could be used to “re-examine the very structure of our political society. We will 
see how this society holds together, and also how it could come apart – and what, precisely, 
we must do to ensure it does not come apart”. 350 
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So, what was the Chehabist understanding of Lebanon’s political system? First, let us consider 
what Naccache understood as the fundamental question at the heart of Chehabism: 
Here we have a country whose name has been written in history for 5,000 years. Two 
Worlds come face to face here – two spiritual authorities coexist – two moral Universes. 
Yet this is our whole problem (and the ‘Chehabism’ of which I would like to speak has no 
other meaning, it does not concern anything else): The whole problem is knowing whether 
synthesis is possible; If upon this coexistence, a state could be built. If from this 
contradiction, a Unity could be extracted. 351 
After the civil war of the summer of 1958, the tug-of-war between liberty and security had 
taken on greater urgency. In order to protect Lebanon’s independence and sovereignty, a 
stronger state needed to make inroads in marginalised communities. But could a strong, stable 
state be built in Lebanon while upholding its liberty and democracy? According to Naccache, 
Chehabism had developed since 1958 as “nothing other than the ultimate attempt to prove this 
case; to establish a shared orientation for the nation that would not be anarchy”.352 Paraphrasing 
Lenin, Naccache notes, “’Where everyone is free, everyone is a slave’: this is easily the 
definition of the anarchy where we are, and to which Chehabism wants to put a stop.”353  
Chehabism would seek to stabilise the precarious balance between liberty and democracy and 
diffuse political power, through the creation of a robust, inclusive Lebanese national identity, 
vested in a modern, rational, and effective state.   
Democracy 
Much like consociationalism, the first question Chehabism had to confront was whether or not 
Lebanon was, or even could be, democratic. Since independence, Lebanon had been in search 
of a “institutional equilibrium which we clearly have not met”.354 Was there, Naccache 
wondered, some structural flaw in Lebanon’s plural system that made stable democracy 
impossible? 
Lebanese liked to think of their country as democratic, he wrote, and it certainly looked “an 
island of liberty” amidst the regional neighbourhood.355  However, Naccache noted that many 
of the pillars of Western style majoritarian democracy were absent in Lebanon. The Lebanese 
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system, he argued, was embedded in neo-feudal, tribal structures, and lacked “the base of every 
parliamentary regime: political ideologies represented by parties organized on a national 
scale”.356  These factors, he contended, gave root to  
 This whole crazy game of Lebanese public life … this fantastical carrousel where we see 
cabinets and majorities made and unmade without reason, where no government in 15 
years has been installed or removed by the parliament, where all legislation is made 
through emergency powers.357   
On this basis, Naccache wrote, “We are evidently not a democracy in the strict, conventional 
sense of the word: the model democracy whose description is in the manuals, an English or 
Scandinavian style democracy”.358 In fact, Naccache questioned whether any country, in 
reality, met that exacting standard. In order to evaluate Lebanon’s democratic credentials, he – 
like Dahl – believed it was necessary to use a less rigid definition. And in that case, things for 
Lebanon looked rather better: 
If democracy is the opposite of dictatorship, if democracy, more than an institutional 
arrangement, is first of all a state of mind, a certain style of relations among citizens, direct 
popular participation in public life, if it is ultimately based on the State’s respect for free 
opinion and free enterprise, well yes! Lebanon is a democracy.359 
Chehabism understood Lebanon as democracy, if perhaps one which often failed to live up to 
its name. However, the peculiar nature of its democracy brought its own dangers. In particular, 
Chehabists worried that the confessional political system prevented the emergence of truly 
national political parties; this meant that ‘Lebanese democracy’ was only viable through a 
complex system of delegation which ultimately concentrated powers in the presidency.360 
Chehabism, then, was partly a response to a Lebanese form of Caesarism.361  
In Chehabist thought, Lebanon may have been democratic, but it was a fragile, singular 
democracy. These idiosyncrasies continually threatened to pitch the Lebanese system into 
dangerous, anti-democratic disequilibrium. What they wanted was “to make Lebanon an image 
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of a modern European state, or any state based on social justice”, planned development, and 
modern laws.362 
The nature of the Lebanese system 
Chehabism contended that, under certain conditions, Lebanon could be both “governable and 
viable”, but warned that the identification of these conditions required objective self-
criticism.363 What characterised Lebanon’s unusual political system? What allowed it to 
function, and what was it that seemed periodically to obstruct it? Three interrelated factors 
determined Lebanese political life. 
1. The Lebanese parliament is ungovernable  
Chehabists recognised Lebanon as a deeply divided society with little space for interaction 
between the various segments. At the time, they believed, the only way to even partly address 
the problem of a highly segmented society was elite contact within the representative 
assemblies. Therefore, as Naccache explains, bigger is better: “The more the basis of this 
representation is expanded, the more it embraces the sectarian idiosyncrasies and regional 
diversity, the broader the encounter, the more chances to see it reconcile the religious 
antagonisms and political opponents”.364    
According to Naccache, Chehab and his government had doubled the size of the parliament 
ahead of the 1960 general election for precisely this reason. Nonetheless, “It is not the 
expansion or contraction of the parliamentary arena that increases or decreases the 
‘governability’ of Lebanese assemblies. All the Chambers are, in the current state of political 
formations, ungovernable.” A larger Chamber, however, was less ‘ungovernable’ because it 
was harder for individual votes to hold policy hostage.365  
2. The concentration of power 
Although the 1926 Constitution vested Lebanon’s sovereignty in the hands of its elected 
representatives, these were, per the Chehabists, “ungovernable”. Chehabists believed that a 
“quasi-totality of power” had ended up amassing with the president; ever since, this had been 
the only way to actually govern Lebanon.366 The driver of this concentration of power was 
consensus based decision-making, which dislocated power upward. According to Naccache, 
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this contributed to the gradual downward slide of power from representatives into the 
presidency: 
Themselves aware of this impotence, which is congenital to the “system”, the political leaders 
themselves transferred their authority to the only court that could assure the stability and the 
continuity of power and fulfil the highest function of arbitration: that of the Head of State.367 
As an illustration, Naccache recalls President Chehab’s recent attempt to resign from power. 
The panic which seized the country’s politicians after the announcement, Naccache explains, 
was a clear symptom of a ‘Father Complex’ at work: “It was one of the toughest, one of the 
most arrogant among them who let out this terrible cry of distress which was reported by several 
papers: ‘If the Constitution bothers you, Mr. President, rip it up!’”368  
3. Power relies on a multisectarian consensus 
The only kind of governance that worked in Lebanon was when power was concentrated in the 
president. However, this concentration had to be built upon intersegmental consensus. 
Naccache writes, “This power is only conceivable, due to its very importance, if it is a 
genuinely unanimous power: which is to say, in Lebanon, a power born of the broadest 
interconfessional consensus – founded on the widest popular respect”.369 
Naccache illustrates this point through the examples of Khoury and Chamoun, who both rose 
to the presidency on the shoulders of broad multiconfessional coalitions. The men were 
‘unmade’, on the other hand, once they “stopped basing their authority on the necessities of 
confessional coexistence … the uniqueness of their power destroyed itself, that the tacit 
agreement between them and the nation was broken”. 370 
In the case of Chehab, his presidency was based on a ‘negative’ consensus: “if the idea of his 
departure had produced this panic, it was that he appeared to the nation as the last defence 
against anarchy, to politicians themselves as the last guarantee of a regime within which they 
could keep playing their games and pushing through their ambitions”.371   
As long as the Father Complex was based on a president with the trust of all the major sects, 
Lebanon could function. The experience of Khoury and Chamoun demonstrated that systemic 
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stability rested on neutrality; the president must be a credible arbiter. Yet the dangers of 
Lebanese Caesarism had been demonstrated twice in fifteen years. 
Caesarism worked, but precariously. In this spirit, Chehabism “may be nothing other than an 
attempt to make it stop: to rebuild the bases of collective power, to reanimate – or revitalise – 
democracy”.372 But how did the Chehabists intend to effect this transformation? 
Chehabist principles: How to keep Lebanon together 
We have described the characteristics and dysfunction of the existing system, but, “If 
Chehabism is a “new political style”, what makes it novel? What characterises it? What in 
terms of thought, in terms of method, in the whole of his conduct, distinguishes the new Head 
of State from his predecessors?” 373  
In response to these questions, Naccache derives two principles of Chehabist politics:  
1. Lebanon’s head of state cannot simultaneously serve as the head of a political party or 
other partisan organisation. 
Chehabists believed that Lebanon’s Head of State should come from outside the political 
establishment. Aside from issues of partisanship, politicians were accountable to supporters 
and clients, and the Lebanese president must “[owe] his power to everyone: which is to say he 
owes it to no one.”374  
2. Political positions cannot be taken on specific international and regional issues unless 
there exists a consensus across the major Lebanese segments 
As Naccache wrote, “the great rule which must dictate all Lebanese foreign policy is that of 
Non-Alignment”:375  
Our foreign policy must reflect, on the Arab level as on the International level, the very dualism 
of Lebanon. We have neither the right, nor anyways the power, to make choices or undertake 
engagements which, by risking shattering Lebanese unity, undermine the very cause we 
supposedly serve.376 
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The Chehabist Approach 
In terms of approach, political leaders should be ‘Constructive Pessimists’, realist and risk-
averse.377 Describing the Chehab as an ideal, Naccache wrote, “He holds no illusions … but he 
also knows that there is no other choice. It is with the Lebanese, as they are, with these 
politicians, for whatever they are worth, it is with them and through them that he has to build 
a Lebanese state”.378  
The Chehabist approach was grounded in reason, law, and prudence. Experience showed that 
coercive measures and oppression were ineffective tools for statebuilding. Rather, it should be 
approached carefully, methodically, patiently: “This slow way, this fluctuating advance, this 
almost lazy procedure of his action, and which tests the patience of a youth in a hurry to see 
the old political teams swept away, is it not archetypally Chehabist?”379 
Radical changes were needed, but Chehab knew that this ‘revolution’ would take time. In order 
reform institutions, the Chehabists first must reform people’s attitudes and ethics. It was clear 
that “building a modern State atop old confessional structures is a long-term endeavour”.380 
Nonetheless, the change was imperative. Chehabism was rooted in the idea that Lebanon 
needed to do away with its current system: 
[Chehab] knows that, to make Lebanon modern and viable, first we must come to the end of 
the absurdity of a patron class and bourgeois class adamantly opposed to any social 
transformation – and which … keep the country in a structural anachronism which constitutes 
its greatest danger. 381  
A new Lebanese identity, through which “Lebanon is for everyone and everyone for Lebanon” 
must replace religion as the Lebanese people’s primary allegiance.382 
Chehabism vs. Consociationalism 
It is remarkable how much the Chehabist analysis mirrors consociationalism; yet with such 
divergent interpretation. Chehabism recognised that the nature of Lebanon’s system of 
representation meant that true parliamentary majorities could never be formed or reflected in 
government. Unlike the consociationalists, the Chehabists did not understand majoritarianism 
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as ‘anti-democratic’ in the Lebanese context; the fact that it did not work was simply evidence 
that Lebanon’s political system was broken.  
Because legislators were therefore ineffective, they had to refer their authority upwards. This 
style of power-displacement is also a characteristic of consociationalism (and Marxist 
approaches, for that matter), where power is concentrated within the Grand Coalition. As we 
recall, consociational approaches to Lebanon describe power concentrated in an elite cartel 
comprising the government, president, prime minister, and speaker, rather than the president 
alone. While Chehabists believed that power was concentrated in an individual, they did 
acknowledge the importance of a grand coalition: presidential power had to derive from a broad 
intersegmental consensus in his support.  
Chehabism, of course, predated the emergence of consociational democratic theory by about 
seven years. In this context, it may be unsurprising that the Chehabist approach views Lebanon 
as a broken Western-style competitive democracy, as alternative democratic models had yet to 
hit the mainstream. In order to make the Lebanese system more just, modern, and stable, more 
democratic, Chehabism posited that they had to ‘fix’ the major ways in which it diverged from 
the majoritarian ideal. They did not recognise that Lebanon’s political system followed, for 
better or for worse, a different model altogether: Despite the Chehabists’ ambitions, it could 
not be ‘fixed’ into a majoritarian, competitive democracy – it would have to be wholly 
deconstructed and rebuilt. 
While they recognised that it would take a long time to introduce majoritarian democracy, they 
misunderstood the nature of their undertaking. More significantly, they underestimated the 
resilience of the consociational system. Under that system, stability and democracy were 
intrinsically incompatible with the methods they would use to ‘fix’ it. 
A breakdown of analytical criteria 
It is possible at this point to identify a set of criteria, which will be put to use throughout this 
thesis. As Dahl remarks in reference to his own classification schemes, criteria describe an 
ideal system, which cannot be realised:  
The criteria do provide us though with standards against which we can compare the 
achievement and the remaining imperfections of actual political systems and their institutions, 
and they can guide us toward solutions that would bring us closer to the ideal.383 
                                               




With these objectives in mind, the criteria laid out below will structure and inform this thesis 
from chapters four through seven. However, each chapter will not use all of the criteria in its 
analysis. Those criteria which will be assessed in every chapter include:  
• Consociationalism’s ideal outcomes of ‘stability’ and ‘democracy’  
• Chehabism’s ideal outcomes of ‘national unity’, ‘modernisation’ and ‘social justice’, 
which will be developed further in Chapter Three.  
The primary criteria for evaluating a consociational democracy are its constitutive elements 
and its outcomes. The outcomes are defined as follows:  
Political stability denotes a state of continuous political activity that preserves the civil order 
with the tacit support of the population. It is gauged by the following factors: 
• System maintenance 
• Civil order 
• Legitimacy  
• Effectiveness  
Democracy is understood in this thesis as a cognate of Robert Dahl’s polyarchy. A polyarchal 
democracy is measured by the following standards: 
• Elected officials 
• Free, fair, and frequent elections 
• Freedom of expression 
• Alternative sources of information 
• Associational autonomy 
• Inclusive citizenship 
The constitutive elements of a consociational democracy will be used to gauge how 
‘consociational’ the political system really was at key moments in the Chehabist era. They are 
as follows: 
• Power-sharing  
• Proportionality 
• Segmental autonomy  




That analysis will also be informed by secondary criteria which help or hinder consociational 
democracy, as laid out previously in this chapter. 
In the case of Chehabism, we have only outcomes and the progress made towards them to 
consider. The constitutive elements of their ideal competitive, majoritarian democracy 
remained, as they knew, several steps away, and were contingent on these initial outcomes.  
Chehabism sought to ‘correct’ the Lebanese system by working towards the interlinked 
outcomes of ‘national unity’, ‘modernisation’ and a form of social justice referred to by 
Chehabists as ‘le Social’. While these ideas will be elaborated in Chapter Three, they are 
defined as follows: 
• National unity is understood as the opposite state to ‘deeply-divided’, as defined by 
Eric Nordlinger.384 National unity is achieved within a society when national ties hold 
greater political salience than ascriptive ties across a range of issues. In the Chehabist 
context, national unity is predicated upon the sincere belief that Lebanon should exist 
as an independent, democratic country. 
• Modernisation refers the rationalisation of government and society by developing, 
transforming, or replacing traditional institutions and technologies under the influence 
of new science and knowledge.385 
• After Kabbara, Le Social or social justice denotes the elevation of society through the 
elimination of socio-economic disparities across communities and geographic regions 
within the boundaries of a liberal-democratic system.386 
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3.  Chehabism 
I swear by God on the Highest that I will respect the constitution of the Lebanese 
nation, and I will preserve the independence of the Lebanese homeland and the 
integrity of its territories.387  
As Fouad Chehab swore his presidential oath in 1958, Lebanon’s domestic situation was 
at an impasse: the summer conflict had proven that the opposition could no more ‘Arabise’ 
Lebanon than the loyalists could drive it Westward. At the end of August, it was difficult 
to feel optimistic: Middleton wrote, “In the twilight of the Chamoun regime it is difficult 
to believe in a new dawn of restored harmony and prosperity for the country. Only the 
innate capacity of the Lebanese for survival gives one hope.”388 
President Chehab had an almost impossible task ahead of him in a country not yet fully at 
peace, but he tried to signal such hope to the divided masses. Chehab delivered three 
speeches from August through November of that year: One to mark his acceptance of the 
nomination, a second at his inauguration, and a third to mark Independence Day. All three, 
unsurprisingly, emphasised similar themes. Above all, he expressed the urgent need for the 
Lebanese people to recapture the spirit of national unity which had made Independence 
possible, declaring that “[Lebanon]’s greatest strength rest in our National Pact, in our 
union and agreement, in our confidence in ourselves and our total loyalty to our homeland, 
Lebanon”.389 Chehab also stressed the imperative of building a state and society “on the 
pillars of morality, justice, equality, and duty”.390  
Over the course of the following six years, these themes – national unity and the 
construction of a modern state, which Chehab would later refer to as ‘the State of 
Independence’ – would evolve, but they never shifted from the centre of his view. As 
Chehab’s agenda began to take form, both were reinforced with social justice, and came to 
constitute the interwoven core objectives of his approach.  
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Chehabism, as this project came to be known, was a product of Fouad Chehab’s political 
philosophy, but also his temperament and experiences. Chehab readily deferred to experts 
when his knowledge reached its limits, so a raft of advisors, as well as various ideological 
influences, helped to shape Chehabism. 
Two phases mark Fouad Chehab’s presidency: from 1958 through the summer of 1960, as 
we shall see, the president saw himself as an interim chief, working to stabilise the country. 
From late 1960 onwards, however, he embraced his mandate with more vigour and 
ambition; it is then that Chehabism really came to fruition. 
Over the following chapter, we will try to better understand Fouad Chehab and his 
influences, before considering the early evolution of the Chehabist project. At this point, 
we will turn to Chehabism itself, and further articulate its parameters and aims.  
 
General Fouad Chehab  
Countless factors informed the development of Fouad Chehab’s political thought. 
Reflections of his lineage, his upbringing, his education and training, his faith, his personal 
experiences, and even specific members of his inner circle of consultants are visible 
throughout his philosophy. ‘Blueprints’ of Chehabism are observable in the way Chehab 
handled political crises in 1952, ‘56, and ‘58.391  
Like all Lebanese presidents, Chehab was elected by the parliament, but he enjoyed the 
broad approval, if not enthusiastic support, of the population as a whole. Chehab was 
known as the ‘Father of the Army’, and credited with having created a disciplined, 
organised, well-equipped, and cohesive fighting force: qualities which withstood the 
tremendous pressures of 1958.392 In addition to his conduct through the summer’s crisis, 
Chehab also garnered support for “his role of arbiter during the [1952] ‘White Revolution’, 
his refusal to use repression, his illustrious origins as a descendant of Bachir II and his 
disdain for politicians and their games.”393  
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Loyalists had a somewhat dimmer view of Chehab’s actions that summer than the 
opposition. Chehab, after all, had resisted President Chamoun’s instructions to strike rebel 
forces. Former Prime Minister Sami al-Solh accused Chehab of failing “to carry out his 
orders in time,” and blamed him for the country’s ongoing insecurity.394 However, for the 
most part, Chamoun and his followers were grudgingly prepared to support the General as 
the only exit from the crisis. 
While the 1958 crisis did not create “acute material distress to the population” there were 
rampant disputes over dismissals and back wages, especially among those at the lower end 
of the socio-economic spectrum.395 Moreover, those whose attachment to the rebels was in 
part motivated by neglect found themselves no better off at the end of the conflict. For 
Chehab, 
The events revealed the danger arising from the acute social conditions and gaps in the 
country where the have-nots (in terms of regions, classes and sects) were rebelling against 
the haves of the country. Accordingly, at the end of 1958 a new interpretation of the 
Lebanese National Pact and the role of the state was required.396 
Socio-economic grievances would have to be addressed. While some rebels continued to 
carry out acts of violence, by the autumn, there seemed to be among Lebanese Muslims “a 
fairly general feeling that things are worse elsewhere than in the Lebanon, and that the 
sensible course at present is the lie low”397 Although the propaganda campaign by the pro-
Nasser press was ongoing, Nasser’s difficulties elsewhere in the region were drawing his 
attention; and as Lebanese Muslims, by association, began to see Communism as a serious 
threat, their anti-Western positions had tempered.398  
When Chehab assumed office in late September, the summer’s conflict had nearly been 
extinguished, but a Christian counterrevolution was brewing. Crosthwaite recalls that, “For 
the first three weeks of September the situation moved slowly back towards normality; 
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terrorism decreased, the hours of curfew were reduced, the shops remained open longer,” 
but it was not to last. Just days before Chehab’s inauguration, “this trend abruptly reversed” 
with the kidnapping and murder of journalist Fouad Haddad, a member of the Kataeb 
Party.399  
President Chehab faced immense challenges as he attempted to prevent a resurgence of 
Muslim aggression while simultaneously quelling a Christian counterrevolution. This 
particular state of affairs, rooted in both sectarian divisions and socio-economic discontent, 
would dictate his political policy and philosophy for the next six years. This distinctive 
approach would come to be known as Chehabism or al-Nahj. President Chehab faced great 
challenges; he also faced great expectations:   
If anyone thought that with Chehab’s election the crisis was as good as over they were soon 
disillusioned. The General showed himself an admirer of Penelope rather than Alexander. 
The knots of public security and political frustration remained uncut, while he wove 
soothing words of national unity for the ears of his suitors, ruffianly and otherwise.400 
There were no quick fixes to the core problems of sect and class, but Chehab’s temperament 
allowed him to ease both Muslims and then Christians down from the barricades.  Georges 
Corm, in his introduction to Malsagne’s biography, poses the essential question that 
surrounds Fouad Chehab and remains to this day unresolved: 
Was he too cautious, too aristocratic in refusing to come down from his pedestal and dive 
into the political struggle to effect the change necessary to overtake the communal system? 
Or was he a shrewd man, too mindful of the frailty of Lebanese society to go off on the 
adventure of a true revolution which might have undermined the old traditions of the 
Ottoman millet system, as established by the French mandate?401  
Chehab’s origins 
Fouad Chehab was born in 1902 in Ghazir, a Maronite village which hangs off the 
westward slopes of Mount Lebanon over Jounieh Bay. Under the mutasarrifiya for the first 
13 years of Fouad’s life, Ghazir was Kesrouan’s administrative capital; it had long been 
                                               
399 Crosthwaite, Annual Review for 1958, Enclosure I, 24 Apr 1959, FO 371/142208/1011 
400 Middleton to FO, 26 Aug 1958, FO 371/134133/1015/598, p. 2 




established as a centre for Jesuit training and education. 402 Malsagne suggests that 
Chehab’s sense of alienation from Beirut may derive from the fact that, for the duration of 
his childhood, the future capital was part of a different political entity. Similarly, he 
proposes that Chehab’s noted piety and francophilia trace to his formative years as a son 
of Mount Lebanon. 403   
Chehab’s natal region would, of course, remain his polestar. As president, he declined to 
take up residence in the presidential palace, preferring a modest villa in Sarba; his cabinet 
meetings were held in Jounieh rather than Beirut. 
The family came from a noble lineage: As a direct descendant of the older brother of Bachir 
II Chehab, the last ruler of the mutasarrifiya, they were allowed to use the title of ‘emir’, 
or prince. However, this pedigree did not translate into abundance. With two small boys 
and a third on the way, Fouad’s father, Emir Abdallah Chehab joined thousands of his 
countrymen and left for America in search of better work. But after he sailed from Beirut 
Port, no one ever heard from Emir Abdallah again. Other migrants relayed rumours that 
his boat broke apart, that he was killed or drowned in the Nile or the Atlantic or somewhere 
off the Turkish coast. 404  
Fouad’s mother, Badia, suddenly found herself on her own with no husband, no provider, 
and no money. She moved them all back with her two brothers in her family home down 
the mountain in Jounieh.405 Fouad’s uncles registered him at the nearby College des Freres 
Maristes, but this accident of geography was formative in the development of Fouad’s 
character. The French Maristes in Lebanon found their vocation in elementary education, 
and they produced many young men who would play key roles in the mandate and 
independence eras, including Michel Chiha.406 The Mariste College in Jounieh was 
founded in 1898 on the three principles of “humility, poverty, and divine faith”.407 As 
Malsagne notes, “Education in an environment dedicated to asceticism and devotion … 
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incontestably forged the lasting personality traits of Fouad Chehab, whose modesty and 
piety were perpetually lauded” for the duration of his life. 408   
Fouad Chehab came of age in a period of tremendous change: The First World War, 
famine, the fall of the Ottoman Empire, military occupation, and the declaration of an 
independent Lebanon under French Mandate. Two of Fouad’s maternal relations, 
suspected of conspiring with the French and promoting autonomy, were among the men 
executed by the Porte in 1916. 409  Then, from 1915-16, famine killed more than a third of 
Mount Lebanon’s population.  
Malsagne also links the development of Chehab’s social consciousness to these early days. 
The family remained poor; at just 14 Fouad left school so he could contribute another salary 
the household. Three years later, in 1919, Fouad Chehab enlisted with the Syrian Legion 
of the French auxiliary troops in the Levant. It was a practical decision: Chehab lacked the 
educational qualifications for an administrative position, and he needed a salary to help his 
family: “the army was not a vocation for the young Fouad, but firstly met the need to put 
food on the table”. 410    
At the end of 1921, Chehab enrolled at the French Military Academy in Damascus, which 
had been founded earlier that same year to ensure local recruits received proper training à 
la française.  Over the following two years, Chehab was subject to the strict discipline and 
rigorous academic training of the Academy, studying war, strategy, weapons technology, 
and so forth. Equally important, perhaps, was the general education which complemented 
military and scientific instruction with courses in history, geography, and literature. 411 
After his marriage to a Frenchwoman, in 1929 Captain Chehab was sent to France for a 
year of further training. While abroad, Chehab received technical and strategic training. To 
complement this theoretical instruction, he spent several months training within a French 
infantry detachment. He was immersed in French military culture and his connection to the 
mandatory powers strengthened; he also had the chance to observe, first hand, the 
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operations of large scale factories and industrialisation, and other aspects of ‘modern’ life 
not yet evident in Lebanon. However, France was also in the midst of economic and 
political crises, which he followed attentively.412 
By the time Chehab returned to Lebanon, the Syrian legion had been reorganised into the 
Troupes Spéciales du Levant.  A decade on, in 1939, then Commandant Chehab was once 
again sent to France for still more comprehensive practical training and to enrol at the 
famed L’Ecole Supérieure de Guerre. Over the following years, amidst the Second World 
War and increasingly loud local demands for independence, Chehab continued to progress. 
Malsagne notes that he was “at once a loyal servant of the mandatory power, but also an 
actor and observer of the evolution of a corps” that would become the Lebanese army. 413  
So highly regarded was Chehab within the Troupes Spéciales, he even earned a brief 
mention in Charles De Gaulle’s war memoirs as an example of the high caliber of Lebanese 
officers.414 Chehab progressed rapidly through the ranks. With the outbreak of the Second 
World War, he was integrated more deeply into the French structure, and in 1940, he was 
promoted to be the youngest general in the entire French Army.415 
Over the course of the 1930s, Chehab once again worked in diverse regions with highly 
variable levels of socio-economic attainment. From 1937-38, he worked almost exclusively 
in the marginalised peripheral regions which had been annexed to create Greater Lebanon. 
Through his engagement with the local populations in the North, South, and East of 
Lebanon, he developed a more nuanced understanding of social issues in Lebanon as well 
as the tenuousness of the connection these people felt to the Lebanese State. 416   
Chehab was one of the officers tasked with reorganizing the Troupes Spéciales, preparing 
them for both local defence and deployment to other Allied theatres.417 It was opposition 
against the latter practice that pushed many senior Lebanese officers, including Chehab, to 
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show solidarity with the nationalist cause.418 Chehab did not oppose the French –in fact, 
he continued to follow orders – but he expected them to live up to their promise that 
Lebanon would be independent after the war. Chehab put his name to a joint declaration to 
this effect in July 1941. Although the declaration’s impact is limited, it is viewed as a 
founding document of the Lebanese army.419 
Chehab supported the nationalists, but his level of involvement in the struggle for 
independence is unclear; indeed, it was unclear at the time. The French began to worry that 
Chehab was colluding directly with the British. In 1943, the Délégation Générale de la 
France au Levant reported that then-Colonel Chehab had publicly declared his support for 
the Destour, and was pressuring his officers to pressure their soldiers to pressure their 
families to vote Destour in the upcoming election.420 A month later, they reported that 
Lebanese public opinion was “stupefied” by the appearance of an officer of what was still 
technically French Army adopting such a position. This, in turn, had sparked rumours that 
Chehab would be promoted to Commander of a post-independence Lebanese army; the 
author, the Director of Army General Security, noted that this was not the first time Chehab 
had seemed preoccupied by local politics.421 While there is no evidence to substantiate this 
claim, Chehab’s subsequent appointment as army commander lends some credence to the 
theory.422 
However, it is unlikely that Chehab took such an active role in independence, and it was 
not long before French suspicions largely passed as they found the descriptions of Chehab’s 
anti-French activities were completely at odds with their impressions of him as a measured, 
moderate francophile. The French were somewhat reassured to discover that the British 
were also spying on him. In an apparent attempt to gather information about the Lieutenant-
Colonel, the British even planted a rumour within the Sureté Générale that Chehab plotting 
with Defense Minister Majid Arslan transfer the Chasseurs Libanais to local, Lebanese 
authority. If the French resisted, Chehab would lead a mutiny against them. As the French 
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reported, “this information appeared, to say the least, strange…”.423 It is much more likely 
that Chehab played a fairly passive role. 
In the months after independence, Chehab continued to ascend in the ranks, to the apparent 
satisfaction of the new Lebanese government.424 During the transitional period that 
followed, Chehab acted as the primary liaison between the Lebanese and the French 
regarding the military handover. 425 Chehab maintained positive, productive relations with 
the French throughout the handover, a fact reflected by the French decision to award him 
the Legion d’Honneur in 1946.426 
On 1 August 1945, the Troupes Spéciales were fully transferred to the Lebanese, with 
General Chehab as their commander (although the last French troops would not depart until 
the following year). Chehab would continue in this post until his inauguration as president 
in 1958. 
Malsagne observes that the media only began to toss Chehab’s name around as a candidate 
in the summer of 1945; his nomination only came after a meeting between Chehab and 
President Khoury on 26 July.427 Although Prime Minister Riad al-Solh was not in 
attendance, he is rumoured to have personally persuaded Chehab to accept the command.428 
Chehab was determined to instil the 3,000-odd troops of the new Lebanese army with the 
discipline and coherence it lacked. One of his first moves was to set up an officer training 
facility, and he refused to allow anyone to ascend to the rank of officer without training 
either there or at the old French academy in Damascus. Although he attempted to enforce 
a strict meritocracy, Article 95 of the constitution complicated the effort by enforcing 
sectarian distribution.429 In January of the following year, an army intelligence branch, the 
Deuxième Bureau, was established, reporting directly to the army commander.430  
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The regime inherited from the mandatory period a tradition of seeing political activity 
being exercised through the Deuxième Bureau of the French army. The Lebanese 
armed forces … were cast in the French mould. Nothing more natural therefore than 
that the Deuxième Bureau (by which name it is still known) of the Lebanese army 
should retain power and functions not always associated in peacetime with a country’s 
armed forces. 431 
It was this branch in particular, and its perception as a parallel power, that would later come 
to be associated with Chehab himself.  
In 1952, a bloodless ‘White Revolution’ took place against Bechara al-Khoury after he 
renewed his own mandate. Chehab was tasked, once again, with mediation.432 With the 
warring sides at a total impasse, Chehab agreed to temporarily step in as head of state, 
assuming the role of Prime Minister. But despite assurances of near-unanimous support 
within parliament and the backing Michel Chiha, the French ambassador, and Khoury 
himself, Chehab refused to stand as a candidate. 433  
Chehab did, however, hold political opinions, which he would share away from the 
spotlight. After his performance in 1952, the major western ambassadors would regularly 
seek his opinions on regional issues, almost “as though he were Head of State. Through his 
analyses, the general struck even those interlocutors who saw him firmly under the 
authority of Chamoun as an uncircumventable force on the Lebanese scene.”434 In 1954, 
Chehab threatened to resign over an order to put down a revolt in the tribal regions of the 
Bekaa, arguing for a lighter “social and economic response” to the crisis. Similar episodes 
were to follow through which the army under Chehab emerged as a source of power 
removed from the government, and one with its own distinctive social vision;435 “By 
privileging development over repression, Fouad Chehab and the Lebanese army laid down 
the bases of Chehabism well before 1958”.436 
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Chehab was keenly worried about the Communist threat to Lebanon.437 In 1955, Chehab 
told Lt-Col. Carlot, France’s military attaché in Lebanon, that his main regional concerns 
were communism and pan-Islamism, which he believed was driven by the failure to resolve 
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. On the subject of local politics, Chehab predicted that, 
barring radical changes in his behavior, President Chamoun was unlikely to survive in his 
post much longer. He suggested that the best replacement would be Hamid Frangieh; 
however, he acknowledged that his own name was also mentioned. He explained that he 
was unwilling to jeopardise the army’s stability, as “the Army, [standing] above the parties 
and religions, is the surest guarantor of the State.”438 While replacing the president mid-
term might prompt fresh Muslim demands for a referendum on the distribution of power, 
Chehab saw little danger in such actions as long as the Arabs generally opposed them.439 
The French Ambassador Louis Roche, after a long meeting with Chehab in 195, also noted 
that Chehab spoke with great concern about the advance of both Communism and Islamism 
in the region, driven by the failure to resolve the Palestinian issue. 440 
After the Suez crisis, Chehab accepted the position of Minister of Defense, but he resigned 
as soon as he felt the security threat to Lebanon had abated.441 His behaviour, once again, 
suggested to the public that he held office only as his patriotic duty, and that his primary 
commitment was to an impartial army. 
 
The Lead up to the 1958 Election 
For all the myriad causes and catalysts of the 1958 crisis, the fundamental source of 
contention was the presidency of Camille Chamoun. The charismatic President Chamoun 
came to office amid widespread popularity, as a leader of the movement that forced his 
predecessor, Bechara al-Khoury, out of office. Incidentally, Chamoun’s role in ousting al-
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Khoury initially won him broad support among Muslims, many of whom would later 
become his fiercest opponents.  
At first, the Chamoun presidency seemed to deliver: economic prosperity made the 
Lebanese standard of living the highest among the Arab world, the government introduced 
reforms, including as universal suffrage.442 By 1955, however, internal divisions began to 
overtly manifest themselves in Lebanon, reflecting changes across the Arab world. The 
rise of Gamal Abdel Nasser stirred Lebanese Muslims to aspire for something better than 
the Christian-dominated status quo. 443 The ‘Arab Cold War’ rift deepened between pro-
Western and pro-Nasserist factions on the domestic and regional front with the declaration 
of the Baghdad Pact in February and the opposing Nasserist Arab Tripartite Pact a few 
months later.444  Both the pro-Western and Nasserist camps—led by Iraq and Egypt, 
respectively— attempted to draw Lebanon in their alliances, and Chamoun’s stubborn 
‘neutrality’ angered and alienated figures at home and abroad.445 The turning point, 
however, came with the Suez crisis the following year.   
Nasser’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company in July 1956 prompted massive 
popular demonstrations across the Arab world, including Lebanon’s Muslim centers, in 
celebration of Egypt’s—and Arab Nationalism’s— victory over Western imperialism.  
Pro-Egyptian Lebanese politicians were quick to extend their congratulations, and the 
parliament passed a decree commending the action.  Nasser’s surge in popularity was only 
increased when France, Britain, and Israel attacked Egypt later that year in an attempt to 
regain control of the canal.  Again, Chamoun’s refusal to take sides inflamed the emotions 
of Lebanese Nasserists. After the President refused to sever ties with Britain and France, 
Prime Minister Abdallah al-Yafi and Minister of State Sa’eb Salam both resigned in 
protest.446  After the resignations, Chamoun began to lean more explicitly towards the 
Western camp.447 This Western turn, combined with Chamoun’s personal Anglophilia, 
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prompted charges that he was a ‘British agent’ and violating the National Pact.448 Anti-
Chamoun rhetoric at home and abroad concentrated to a great extent on the President’s 
increasingly pro-Western policy. 
Egypt was likewise offended by Chamoun’s policy, and in early 1957, began a series of 
political and propaganda offenses against the Lebanese regime.  In particular, Egypt 
cultivated closer ties with pro-Egypt and generally anti-Chamoun figures in Lebanon, 
including prominent Christians.449  
Chamoun’s opponents saw their fears confirmed in March of 1957, when Lebanon became 
the first and only Arab state to formally accept the Eisenhower Doctrine.450  The 
Eisenhower Doctrine offered US economic and military aid to Middle Eastern countries as 
protection against the threat of ‘international communism.’ 451 The controversy it provoked 
came in no small part from the assessment that it was directed more towards Arab 
nationalism, which the US continued to take-for-granted as a Soviet tool. As Charles 
Kupchan writes,  
the Eisenhower administration’s policy initiatives in 1957-1958 were not reacting to 
Soviet behavior per se, but to the potential for the Soviets to benefit from changing 
political orientations and regional alignments of power.  The Eisenhower Doctrine was 
a response to the growing appeal of Nasserism and Arab nationalism, not to Soviet 
adventurism.452 
Even without Nasser’s propaganda campaign, the general consensus among many 
Lebanese Muslims and much of the Arab world was that Chamoun had violated the 
National Pact by accepting the Eisenhower doctrine.453  At this point, many figures opposed 
to Chamoun in Lebanon coalesced into a unitary opposition movement, the National Front.  
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A final blow to Chamoun’s credibility came in the form of the 1957 parliamentary 
elections.  Politicians generally campaigned as pro-Eisenhower doctrine or pro-Nasserist, 
exacerbating the tense political climate. Chamoun feared that Syria and Egypt would use 
their money and sway to manipulate the outcome of the elections, and thus had his foreign 
minister issue an urgent plea to the US for similar assistance.454  The US agreed, and 
provided extensive CIA funds in order to ensure a pro-Western victory.455 While it is 
unclear who, precisely, wrote the strategy, the 1957 elections were manipulated in order to 
unseat a number of the zu’ama, primarily from the Opposition camp, both through the use 
of funds and a gerrymandered electoral law.  
By early 1958, rumors were spreading that Chamoun sought to amend the constitution to 
extend his presidential mandate. Low-level violence was on the rise in the country, and 
government had grown increasingly restrictive.  The formation of the UAR, moreover, in 
February 1958, was seen as a victory for Arab nationalism.456  On the eve of the 1958 
Crisis, the National Pact had crumbled: while many Sunnis and pan-Arabists clamored to 
join the UAR, the Christians and nationalists desperately entreated the West to protect 
Lebanon from being swallowed up in the Nasserist tide. 
While personal ambition undoubtedly factored in, the British suggest that Chamoun “was 
right in thinking that there was no alternative candidate equally determined to pursue a 
policy of alignment with the West and defence of Christian established positions here. … 
Where he proved wrong was in thinking that he could impose this policy on the 
Lebanon”.457 Along these lines, the US supported Chamoun as a bulwark against the rising 
tide of Arab nationalism.  On 4 May, in a cable to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, 
the US Ambassdor to Lebanon Robert McClintock reported, 
We shall have to support Chamoun despite known risks. … His success or failure must 
be judged in much wider context than mere internal Lebanese politics. Once he has 
announced his intentions western failure to support him will have repercussions among 
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all most moderate and responsible friends and allies of west in ME area.  Chamoun 
has come to symbolize to them forces of resistance to Nasser.458 
The tipping point for the Lebanese crisis was the assassination of a prominent anti-
Chamoun journalist in Beirut on 8 May 1958.  The opposition immediately demanded the 
resignation of the President, Prime Minister, and Foreign minister, and called for a general 
strike across Lebanon.459  Riots broke out across the country, causing massive destruction 
and high casualties rates.  Shortly thereafter, Syria announced that the province of North 
Lebanon had applied to join the UAR.  The country was falling apart. Chamoun’s demands 
that Chehab crack down on the rebels went unheeded, despite the intervention of a 
contemptuous US Ambassador McClintock in support of Chamoun’s position. 460 
Within a few days, Raymond Edde was proposing a resolution along the lines of 1952: 
replacing the al-Solh cabinet with a three-man government presided over by General 
Chehab. Once again, the expectation was that Muslims would tolerate a violation of the 
National Pact as long as the Premier was a man like Chehab. Edde’s proposal gained 
traction, even earning the support of Nasser himself and, conditionally, Chehab. However, 
neither side was prepared to compromise on the fundamental question of whether Chamoun 
would stay or go. 461 Despite the tensions between Chehab and Chamoun, the former was 
adamant that the latter serve out his full term in accordance with the constitution.   
The Lebanese government filed complaints against the UAR with the UN and the Arab 
League, accusing it of interference in Lebanese internal affairs.  Specifically, the 
government believed that the UAR was providing substantial material support to the 
Opposition, in the form of arms and fighters.462 In early June, the Arab League Council 
adopted a draft proposal on the Lebanese complaint; however, the resolution was not seen 
as adequately critical of Egypt, and talks fell apart. The UN, which had deferred its 
discussion of the complaint till after the Arab League could attempt to deal with it, now 
                                               
458 McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 3674, Top Secret, Department of State Central 
Files, 783A.00, 4 May 1958, qtd in Attié, (2004), p.164. 
459 Attie (2004), pp 170-172 
460 Malsagne (2011), p. 185 
461 Malsagne (2011), pp. 177-81 




convened a session on the situation in Lebanon and passed a resolution to send observers 
to gauge the level of UAR interference.  The first observers arrived in Lebanon the 
following day.463 
Meanwhile, the crisis flared as rebels attempted to attack the Presidential Palace.  Although 
the army managed to repulse them, coordinated groups were successful in looting then 
burning down the Beirut home of the Lebanese Prime Minister. Over the next few days, 
the Lebanese government publicly accused the UAR of attempting to destroy Lebanon, 
stating that Syria and Egypt had been subversively working to oust the regime ever since 
Suez.464 
By June, Chamoun was already seeking foreign intervention in the fight. Chehab relayed 
his strong opposition to such a move, warning Western diplomats that he would resign as 
army chief should it come to pass.465 According to Malsagne, Chehab feared that all his 
hard work to build a neutral, unified Lebanese army would be jeopardised by foreign 
intervention against the rebels.466  At the same time, he stated that the Lebanese Army 
would be unable to bring about a speedy resolution to the conflict. The Americans 
disagreed with this assessment, and began to consider Chehab’s replacement. Sir George 
Middleton writes, the US Embassy believed “that if the Lebanese forces were led with 
determination they could put down the civil war, albeit at a price. Under General Chehab, 
they never would.” 467 
Chamoun agreed with the US assessment, and said that Chehab would have to go. 
However, he believed that the dismissal should take place after any foreign intervention. 
Chamoun worried that “the army would be demoralized for a period of 24 hours at the time 
for dismissal, and that during this period the mob might gain ascendancy. … If he were 
removed first, Anglo-United States forces might face anarchy on landing.” 468 
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On the eve of the US intervention, Chamoun grudgingly conceded to the US Ambassador 
that, if a presidential election were held at the end of the month, the only candidate who 
could garner enough votes would be general General Chehab. 469 In a similar conversation 
with the UK Charge d’Affaires, Chamoun reportedly said that “he was not sure whether 
the General was not too much in with the opposition and might favour a solution acceptable 
to them, such as a temporary Government under a “Head of State”, dissolution of the 
Chamber and a new general election.”470 Later in the telegram, Scott describes his 
response, 
I said that it seemed to me out of the question for there to be a general election … for 
at least a year, considering what the country was going through, and that it would need 
at least that length of time to clean it up, recover arms and let normal life and 
confidence return. This might be a semi-military operation; I asked if this was why he 
was willing to support the General as his successor. He nodded agreement to this and 
added that any other President would have to rely on the army; experience of the past 
two months had made it doubtful how far he would be able to do so. The General 
would obviously … be in the best position to command the allegiance of the army if 
he were President. 471 
The following day, the US, UK, and French ambassadors met, and agreed to take a common 
stance in support of Chehab.472 However, as late as 13 July, Chehab remained “non-
committal in his reply” to a proposed nomination. 473 
In the early hours of 14 July 1958, army detachments surrounded the Iraqi royal palace 
under the command of General Abdul Karim Qassem. By the time the rest of the world 
woke up, a new regime was in place, with no word as to the fate of the former. President 
Chamoun was alerted to the news at 6:15 AM, and soon radio transmissions came in with 
reports that the corpses of the royal family were being dragged through the streets of 
Baghdad, among celebratory crowds allegedly made up of Communists and Nasserists. 
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Transmissions from Cairo likewise implied a Nasserist hand in the coup, declaring it a 
victory for Nasser and a step towards the ultimate dream of Arab unification.  In his 
memoirs, Chamoun writes that had a vision of what could happen in Lebanon in the 
immediate future: rather than the small, secretive UAR infiltration he had dealt with thus 
far, hostile crowds of rebels and terrorists inspired by the events in Iraq might suddenly 
cross over from Syria en masse. In the minds of the predominantly Christian loyalist camp, 
Lebanon was now in existential danger.474 
At 8:30 AM—just a little more than two hours after learning of the events in Iraq—
Chamoun summoned the American, British, and French ambassadors, and demanded they 
live up to their previous commitments to protect Lebanon. Chamoun informed the US 
ambassador that he expected an affirmative answer with 24 hours, not through words, but 
through actions.475 Chamoun told the men that “he expected new developments in Iraq 
would result in immediate and fairly large-scale desertion in Moslem elements of the 
Lebanese army.” Meanwhile, if the Syrians seized upon the opportunity to attack, the army 
would be unable to resist them.476 To the ambassadors, Chamoun’s reliance, in his 
assessment of the threat to Lebanon, on rebel radio broadcasts suggested that he “may 
regard this opportunity as his last card to play to bring about friendly military intervention 
in Lebanon.” 477 While the UK and France felt they needed more information to make a 
decision, by the next day, US Marines had landed on the beaches south of Beirut.   
Meanwhile, the Iraqi coup prompted a flurry of negotiations on the presidency: “More and 
more people are coming to believe that only General Chehab can save the situation, and 
there is even some talk of a bloodless coup d’etat to enable him to take over power before 
July 24”.478 This prospect frightened Chamoun, who requested (and was denied) a US 
Marine guard in response.479 However, the US Ambassador did make a point of informing 
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Chamoun, in front of Chehab, “that he had a powerful marine unit at his residence ready 
to go instantly to President Chamoun’s personal assistance”.480 
Scott observed, “If indeed a coup d’etat were attempted and the President were forced to 
call upon the United States marines to defend him, this would have deplorable effects 
politically … and it would make it virtually impossible to consider a successor to President 
Chamoun in the immediate future.” 481 
The Lebanese army, which had thus far remained neutral in the conflict, veered 
dangerously close to defecting to the side of the opposition in the wake of the US 
intervention. While General Chehab did not resign, as he had previously threatened, he 
made it clear that he would not fully cooperate with the American forces.482 In a dispute 
over a deployment to the Port of Beirut, the US Marines “had just reached the point of 
deciding to shoot their way to the port when agreement had been finally reached. They 
have already more fire-power ashore than the entire Lebanese army possesses…”483 Scott 
notes that the US Ambassador “said that he was now so fed up with General Chehab for 
his equivocal behavior during the advance of the marines to the port that he was looking 
round for another candidate as President…”484 However, the UK maintained that “it would 
be impossible to elect anyone with American bayonets in the streets except perhaps General 
Chehab, whose position had been unaffected … by the American intervention.” However, 
Scott assumed that if Chehab would agree to stand, he would certainly make it conditional 
on a speedy US withdrawal.485 On 21 July, the UK Ambassador reported that Chehab 
seemed to have suffered a loss of prestige, and seemed out of the running for the imminent 
elections. 486 Various new names – Emile Tyan, Jawad Boulos, and Joseph Hitti among 
them – were tossed around as new compromise candidates. 487 Then, on 24 July – the 
original date for the election, now pushed back by a week – Chamoun came to US officials: 
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“He said that on mature consideration he had come once more to the conclusion that 
General Chehab was the best presidential candidate despite his known shortcomings”, and 
urged the Western powers to help convince Chehab to stand. 488 The US, French and UK 
ambassadors met immediately to discuss the pivot:  
We are unable to analyze his motives in reverting to candidature of Chehab but are 
agreed, with some reluctance born of past experience, that the General still remains 
the most likely person to common widest support among all sections of opinion. No 
one else can count on full loyalty of the army, which will be essential during the post-
electoral period of pacification and disarmament of the population. Moreover the 
General alone is immune from the accusation that he has been elected with help of 
American bayonets, he has recently lost some popularity but could quickly regain 
ground and other candidates are at best second-class material. 489 
By 24 July, 12,000 US Marines had landed on Lebanese soil.490  As relations between the 
LAF and the US Marines gradually improved, Chehab tried to stall decisive kinetic action 
by US forces. In particular, he promised to come up with a plan to control or oust the rebels 
in Basta, but Chamoun and the UK ambassador predicted “that the Lebanese army will 
never engage in all-out operations against the rebels.”491 Indeed, Chehab’s ultimate 
solution for Basta was to convince the Syrians to withdraw their rebel commandos from 
the area. 
Interestingly, after the fact, the new British ambassador suggested that “without the prompt 
response by the United States Government to the appeal which President Chamoun then 
made for help … a pro-Nasser regime would, in the circumstances prevailing in July, have 
been imposed on the Lebanon,” although the autumn counterrevolution indicates “how 
little this would have answered the wishes of the Lebanese as a whole.” 492 
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Chehab was elected president on 31 July 1958, with 48 votes (well clear of the two-thirds 
majority threshold); his only opponent, Raymond Edde, received seven, and one paper was 
left blank. By Middleton’s assessment, this ‘improbable’ event “came about, paradoxically, 
because the very completeness of the political stalemate … revealed with sudden clarity 
the disagreeable alternatives facing the various parties.” Chamoun worried that further 
delay would allow his old rival Bechara al-Khoury time to curry support; the Opposition 
was loath to prolong Chamoun’s time in office any further.493 Ambassador Middleton 
expressed disappointment with Chehab’s ‘inaction’ on the rebels as president-elect. The 
one security measure he took – civilian disarmament – in practice only applied to those 
under the army’s remit, i.e. loyalists.494 By Middleton’s assessment, this inaction was 
resulted in a spike in lawlessness in the second part of August: “Murder, kidnapping, 
ransom, torture, theft, arson, mutilation and protection money rackets flourished in Beirut 
and in the mountain villages, where the absence of effective control allowed the 
discontented, the vengeful, the fanatical and the mercenary to achieve their various ends 
with impunity. These sinister vendettas were accompanied by a new outbreak of terrorism 
in Beirut.” 495   
Middleton continues: “In one of the few sound conclusions it has made since its arrival in 
Lebanon”, UNOGIL had suggested that this lawlessness was unrelated to the political 
struggle, but rather that “many of these lawless acts (were) motivated by economic 
considerations”. But even if the crime wave was apolitical, Middleton feared it would 
undermine Chehab’s “precarious unity”: “His inactivity thus seems to me a double-edged 
weapon which could easily slice off his own hopes for peaceful compromise.”496 
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The British military attache in 1958, Colonel Brodie, described Chehab in his annual 
report:  
The Commander-in-Chief, General de Brigade FOUAD CHEHAB, openly despised 
CAMILLE CHAMOUN, then President of the Republic, and all LEBANESE 
Politicians. He told them, and also foreign Military Attaches, that, if troubles came, a 
political solution must be found, and that he would not let the Army be used to impose 
a solution by force. So great was the General’s prestige in the Army and in the country, 
that President CHAMOUN could neither make him obey instructions – indeed, he 
hardly dared to give him any – nor get rid of him. Whether the General … acted as an 
ambitious rogue or a far sighted patriot is outside my scope, though I consider that the 
balance of conflicting evidence is on the side of his good intentions. But, at this critical 
time in LEBANESE history, the Commander-in-Chief did not act as a loyal soldier.497 
In judging the character of the man, we must primarily rely on other people’s accounts and 
the evidence provided by his actions and decisions. Chehab operated outside of the 
spotlight. He only rarely made public speeches; as he himself explained to the nation in 
May 1960, “I was and I remain someone who has chosen to accomplish his mission in 
silence.”498 However, there is a notable consistency in accounts of Fouad Chehab’s 
personality and temperament among those who met him. The same core traits like humility, 
introversion, neutrality, and caution tend to be emphasised in both laudatory and critical 
accounts – what varies is how they are cast. The question of whether a particular trait was 
positive or negative is not, of course, a zero sum proposition – not least because of how 
little insight we have into Chehab’s own mind. These personal contradictions would 
eventually take their toll: In his final years, Corm describes Chehab as a ‘quasi-
Shakespearean character’, isolated, bitter, and tortured.499 
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Chehab was calm, quiet, and preferred solitude. He had little taste for ostentation, and 
openly despised politics and politicians. But was he a humble, disciplined ascetic, or an 
aloof, dismissive aristocrat?  
By all accounts, Chehab’s distaste for politics and politicians was genuine. Despite – or 
perhaps because of – this aversion, by 1958 he was already widely known as a man who 
could help negotiate, and mediate, among the elite factions.500 This reputation for even-
handedness undoubtedly played a role in his election. French Ambassador Louis Roche, 
after a long meeting with Chehab in 1956, expressed a deep affection and respect for the 
General:  
General Chehab is not an ordinary military chief; he almost comes across as a former 
head of state, because he played, several years ago, the role of defender of the 
Constitution, guardian of the Lebanese state. After the forced resignation of President 
Bechara al-Khoury, it was he who held power and preserved order while awaiting the 
normal election of a new President of the Republic. His prestige is even greater 
because – an incredible thing in the Orient – he did not seek to profit from the 
circumstances to carve out a personal success. His task complete, he almost returned 
to the shadows. He rarely shows himself.501 
Yet Chehab’s ostensibly positive apoliticism engendered a condescension towards what he 
viewed as corrupt, feudal, backward practices. Chehab was so dismissive of Lebanon’s so-
called ‘fromagiste’ elite that he isolated himself at times when the country may have been 
served better through cooperation. Moreover, Chehab often bypassed consultation with the 
country’s democratic institutions and representatives in favour of his own inner circle of 
experts and confidantes.502 Indeed, as the British noted, Chehab “prides himself on not 
being a politician at all”.503  
Boutros relates that Chehab constantly expressed astonishment at how irresponsible and 
self-interested some politicians seemed to be. The president felt that far too many of 
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Lebanon’s politicians focused on maintaining the approval of their followers, even at the 
expense of what he saw as the national interest. According to Boutros, the President voiced 
a profound sense “of not having been cut from the same cloth” as the other elite.504 Boutros 
relates the following encounter, when Chehab called him into his office after a particularly 
difficult cabinet meeting: 
I found him standing in the centre of the room, with a very aggravated look. When he 
saw me, he told me – in French, the language he used with me when we were alone – 
“As someone who understands me, can you tell me what there is in common between 
those people and me? What is there in common between these people that are today 
called deputies and ministers and me? What am I doing here?” I felt the depth of the 
pain that gripped his heart, and I tried to reassure him. I told him: “Monsieur le 
President de la Republique, it is Lebanon, Lebanon in its diversity. People are 
different, communities are different from one another. You know and you understand 
that it is these very differences which constitute both Lebanon’s strength and its 
weakness. The important thing is that they know how to come together and fill in what 
they lack. It seems to me that your role is precisely this: to teach them how to get along 
and make up for their deficiencies”.505 
Chehab, as we will see, would haemorrhage support from his fellow Maronites as his 
presidential term progressed, but he was determined to pursue the best interests of the 
Lebanese Christians “despite them”, whether they liked it or not.506 It is easy to see why 
this patronizing attitude would not win many converts over to Chehabism. On the other 
hand, others suggest that he may not have been so aloof after all. Ambassador Roche 
describes Chehab as “completely devoid of the affectations that men “who do not deign” 
sometimes have”.507  
The French chargé d’affaires, recounting Chehab’s inauguration, recalls a warm, smiling, 
and affable new President – yet one who nonetheless snuck out of the festivities early to 
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return home to Jounieh.508 Chehab disliked the capital, and spent as much time as possible 
away from it in Kesrouan. Boutros describes both Chehab’s personal residence in Sarba 
and his presidential office in Jounieh as modest, simple, and spartan.  He recalls his surprise 
to discover, the first time he visited Chehab’s office, that there were just three items on the 
president’s desk: his pen, his glasses, and a picture of the Virgin Mary.509  
If Chehab was, at times, haughty, he did not attempt to leverage this aristocratic pedigree. 
While Chehab’s noble lineage was well known to the public, he never attempted to use it 
as a justification or source of legitimacy for his rule.510 Chehab’s public identity was not 
grounded in his Shihabi forebears, but rather in the military. The British Charge d’Affaires 
describes an encounter with Chehab in 1958, at a reception for heads of mission held jointly 
with Chamoun: 
I asked him whether he intended to call himself Mr. Chehab or continue to use his 
military title, to which he said: “Oh please call me General Chehab, it gives me much 
more confidence.” This is of course because the Army has been his whole life and he 
is more conscious than another distinguished General elsewhere of the selfishness and 
ambitions of the politicians among whom he now has to move.511 
While in the army, Chehab had made a positive impression on the French before and after 
independence. Malsagne highlights how the same phrases appear again and again in French 
military reports on Chehab from the 1930s, highlighting “his intelligence, his zeal, his 
seriousness and diligence, his mastery of the French language, his strong Francophile 
sentiments, his extensive knowledge and his irreproachable conduct”.512  
Yet for all his rebuke of the political game, Chehab did on occasion take part. For example, 
explaining Chehab’s reluctance to carry out a certain arrest in mid-July 1958, Scott asserted 
that “General Chehab has an arrangement with Jumblatt laying down certain rules for 
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playing this game and mutual forbearance (except in an extremity) is one of them”.513 This 
account, while unverified, is supported by the events of that summer. 
Chehab, as General and as President, rarely rushed into action. Was he a patient, clear-eyed 
man who wanted to do things right, or lazy and indecisive? Did he keep his troops on the 
sidelines of civil conflict prudently, to preserve the army’s unity, or because he was weak, 
spineless, and craven? Far from the ‘strong man’ promised in the summer’s debate over 
his candidacy, the British came to see Chehab as weak. However, his integrity provided 
another form of control:  “The President who is a decent and sensible man, if not a strong 
one, has in a quiet way exercised a restraining influence”.514  
A common criticism of Chehab, as both General and President, was his apparent hesitancy 
to act decisively. In particular, it was felt that in his reluctance to use force, he missed 
opportunities to solve various crises.515 On President-elect Chehab’s failure to clear out the 
rebel-held Basta neighbourhood of Beirut at the end of the summer, Middleton explained 
to London that,  
His inertia was due more to his own character and to deliberate policy than to the ambiguity 
of his status. By nature lazy and no trouble-shooter, he believed that so long as President 
Chamoun remained in office any action he himself might take in order to re-establish order, 
for whatever impartial reasons of security, would associate him in opposition eyes with 
Chamoun’s previous attempt to do the same thing for partial political reasons. 516  
Despite the epithets, the explanation for Chehab’s rationale is fairly convincing, and does 
nothing to substantiate claims of ‘laziness’. As Middleton continues, Chehab feared that if 
he took action between his election and his inauguration, “He would thus become a wedge 
and not a bridge between the opposing factions, whose reconciliation he believed would 
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come about slow, surely and of its own accord once foreign influence could be 
removed”.517 
In any case, another UK dispatch five years later seems corrective. Discussing Chehab’s 
“curiously detached attitude towards government” and sparing use of president powers, it 
specifically rejects the suggestion that this behaviour derives from “a congenitally lazy 
disposition” as his critics claim.518 Moreover, the charges of laziness and lack of will were 
not solely foreign critiques. Naccache also dismisses this line of criticism from within 
Lebanese public opinion: 
Sometimes we criticise President Chehab for his slowness, his excessive patience, this 
hesitation in front of obstacles – which some take for a lack of spine. That is to 
misunderstand, I believe, the person. There is no will more stubborn than his, but he 
also knows that nothing sound comes from coercion and tension: that the pursuit of an 
endeavour requires a slow advance. What seem to be oscillations in his policy, these 
are oscillations of the human subject, which he manipulates and which he is trying to 
master.519 
In their later missive, the UK offer a similar explanation, and explain that much of his work 
takes place away from the public eye.520 Chehab may not have been lazy, but he was slow, 
stubborn, and non-confrontational. 
We cannot judge the intentions which informed Chehab’s core characteristics, but their 
effects are observable in the Chehabist approach and its emergence. Chehab’s disdain for 
both politics and luxury made him a less corruptible, more even-handed arbiter at 
Lebanon’s summit. He deferred to experts in policy development, rather than cronies or 
his own self-interest. However, we see that Chehab’s penchant for solitude and privacy as 
the ‘Monk of Sarba’ entailed a significant loss of transparency and democracy in his 
governance. This would later lend fodder to accusations that the President was moving 
away from democracy towards authoritarianism. 
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The emergence and evolution of ‘Chehabist’ thought 
For the first two years of President Chehab’s tenure, he focused on stabilizing the country, 
socially, politically, and economically. As during his previous forays into Lebanese politics 
in 1952 and ’56, his intention had been to resign from political office as soon as the 
imminent threat to the nation had passed. In 1958, however, he knew from the outset that 
it was going to take a little longer: it would be months at least before the last foreign troops 
left Lebanese soil, and the depth and intensity of the country’s psychic wounds needed still 
longer to remedy. He had to repair badly-damaged relations with Lebanon’s neighbour, the 
UAR, in order to lessen the chances of any fresh threat from that direction. He also was 
going to have to facilitate the reconciliation of the Lebanese elite so that fresh 
parliamentary elections could be held to undo the harm of the rigged 1957 vote under 
Chamoun. 
Chehab’s first two years as president, while he pursued these goals, were tinged with a kind 
of hesitation. This modesty of political ambitions was clarified when he announced, in July 
1960, that he was resigning: Now that fair, free, and peaceful parliamentary elections had 
been held, Chehab assumed the country could be returned to civilian control. 
After much public outcry, the President withdrew his resignation. But something 
fundamental had shifted in the course of those hours. As Rizk recalls, “a unique political 
event had just taken place: over the heads of the confessional leaders, between the soldier 
and the silent, dignified crowd, a link was forged, a contract signed, to the detriment of 
traditional parliamentary politics”.521 
Thus began the second phase of Chehab’s presidency. No longer viewing himself as an 
interim head of state, Chehab adopted a far more ambitious approach to building a stronger, 
more cohesive state. It is this robust version of Chehab’s state building project that is 
properly called ‘Chehabism’. 
Ideological influences 
What specific forces informed and transformed Chehab’s political philosophy? In in 
addition to church doctrine, Chehab was chiefly influenced by Michel Chiha’s 
                                               




constitutionalist, inclusive Lebanism, and Father Louis-Joseph Lebret’s radical faith-based 
approach to socio-economic development. 
President Chehab placed tremendous effort on the need for “objectivity and respect for the 
spirit … of the Constitution. He was famous for his strict fidelity “to what the book says”.522 
We reviewed Chiha and ‘Lebanism’ previously, as well as Chehab’s links to the 
constitutionalist Destour movement  of Bechara al-Khoury. 523 Destour, which led the way 
to independence in 1943 through National Pact, was firmly rooted in Chiha’s 
philosophy;524 indeed, Chiha and Khoury were brothers-in-law, and until his death, Chiha 
had been one of the former president’s closest counsel. As Kabbara explains, Chehab’s 
adherence to Chihism implied a “belief in the National Pact of 1943, the double identity of 
Lebanon as Arabic and western, the democratic style of government and finally, the liberal 
economic system”.525 However, there were also differences between Chehab’s approach 
and the Chihist view. In particular, Chehabism privileged unity over sectarian interests, 
and approached the problem from a more inclusive angle more accepting of Lebanon’s 
Arabness. 526 and Chehab was committed to dialogue, cooperation, and above all, 
democracy. In a speech in May 1960, he told the Lebanese people that, 
National Dialogue constitutes the inescapable means, the only means, of organizing 
collective civic life. This is particularly true in a country like Lebanon, where democracy 
has an essential role between diverse communities and diverse associations. It is under the 
guarantee of this democratic order that the equality of all citizens is realised, in the exercise 
of their rights and the accomplishment of their obligations. No tyranny can then be imposed 
by one group upon another. Within the democratic framework, it is not possible to 
monopolise patriotism and establish degrees among citizens according to their loyalty to 
the nation. Thanks to this democratic order, national unity is built on a foundation that 
guarantees its perpetuity.527 
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Rizk refers to Chehabism as a kind of ‘neo-Destour’.528 Chehab was firmly committed to 
the Constitution. A life in the military had instilled in him especially strong respect for the 
law: In 1960, as Chehabism really took form, Chehab declared, “I have an absolute faith 
in the parliamentary regime, convinced that it is the only one compatible with our country 
despite the faults one finds with it at times and of which, in the end, it is innocent. I cannot 
conceive of an alternative form of government for Lebanon.” 529 
From the beginning of his time in office, Chehab had a special interest in promoting 
balanced development across the Lebanese regions.530 His preliminary ideas took new 
vigour and direction, however, upon meeting Father Louis-Joseph Lebret and IRFED, the 
Institut International de recherche et de formation en vue du développement harmonisé, or 
the International Institute for Research and Training for harmonised development. Chehab 
“unequivocally adopted Lebret’s philosophy of ‘economie humaine’, the need for 
integrated harmonious development and … in the priority of socio-economic 
contradictions over all other forms of cleavages”.531  
Chehab had long been aware that Lebanon suffered from endemic inequalities, and 
suspected they had their own role to play in the summer’s troubles. However, he “lacked a 
rational and scientific image of the socio-economic realities of the country”.532 So as things 
began to settle down after his election in 1958, Chehab “gathered his consultants and close 
associates and asked them to pinpoint on a map of Lebanon what facilities existed in the 
different Lebanese regions. No one could give an accurate picture because there were no 
adequate statistics or data”.533 Bishop Jean Maroun, who was a friend of Father Lebret, 
suggested that Chehab remedy the problem by engaging the newly-established IRFED to 
undertake a survey of socio-economic conditions in Lebanon.534  
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Father Louis-Joseph Lebret was a French Dominican priest and development economist, 
who in 1941 founded the ‘Economy and Humanism’ movement, “an attempt to create an 
alternative conception of economics through dialogue with philosophy, theology and the 
social sciences, but also built from below, with ethnographic work as its basis”.535  
Lebret had a significant impact on the development philosophy of the Catholic Church. He 
was the primary ‘ghostwriter’ of Pope Paul VI’s famous Populorum Progressio. As 
McNeill and St Clair write, Lebret was “apparently the first thinker to speak explicitly 
about ‘human development’ and to relate this to a particular conception of ‘economics’, 
closely linked to ethics and values”.536 
Although Lebret, who died in 1966, did not live to see Populorum Progressio published, 
it would go on to inspire the development of ‘liberation theology’. Liberation theology 
emerged as a radical current in Latin American Catholic thought, which proposed that true 
Christian faith must be rooted in solidarity with the most marginalised members of society. 
Christianity, it argues, should be a force for social justice. The man credited with coining 
the term ‘liberation theology’ in 1970, Gustavo Gutierrez, explicitly cites Lebret in that 
founding document. In his discussion of humanist approaches to development, he writes 
that, 
Fr. L. J. Lebret strove constantly in that direction. For him, developmental economics is 
"the discipline covering the passage from a less human to a more human phase." The same 
notion is contained in that other definition of development: "having more in order to be 
more." This humanistic view places the notion of development in a broader context: a 
historical vision, in which humanity takes charge of its own destiny. But that involves a 
change of perspective, which we prefer to call "liberation."”537 
Lebret’s radical, humanistic ideas resonated with many, including Fouad Chehab, and he 
left a profound legacy. Yet because so little of Lebret’s work exists in English translation 
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and “most secondary literature on his life, work and legacy is in French and Spanish”, 
Lebret’s influence remains broadly uncredited.538 
The most tangible artefacts of that legacy come from Lebret’s work through IRFED. Lebret 
founded IRFED in 1958 to put his development philosophy into practice. IRFED worked 
with governments across the world, such as Brazil, Senegal, and Timor Leste, to develop 
culturally-appropriate, ethical, and ‘humane’ development plans. However, their very first 
mission was in Lebanon under Chehab. 
Father Lebret’s trip to meet the president in 1959 was not his first visit to Lebanon. As a 
young man, he had been deployed to Greater Lebanon within the French Mandatory forces. 
Lebret’s transition from soldier to priest would unfold in the country: his personal journals 
show that Lebret pledged his life to God and the church in the central Lebanese city of 
Zahle in February 1922. While he left Lebanon shortly thereafter, he carried a special 
affection for the country.539 
When Lebret returned in 1959, he met with Chehab, the cabinet, and officials from the 
Ministry of planning; a contract was signed in September of that year, and the IRFED 
mission launched in November, with the task of “a systematic study of requirements and 
capabilities in Lebanon”. 540 As Lebret and Chehab developed personal and professional 
links, Lebret became “the summit of the pyramid of advisers at the highest summit of the 
state”.541 At the time of his return to Lebanon, Lebret was particularly consumed by “the 
deep conviction … that development and economic growth were well and truly two very 
different concepts. … In the sole and ultimate pursuit of economic growth, he only saw the 
potential for social, humane, and spatial inequalities.”542  
Lebret understood development to mean “the passage of a defined population from a less-
human state to a more  human state”, as quickly and inexpensively as possible while taking 
into account social solidarity. 543 vision for how elevate societies was based on several 
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principles: ‘harmonised development’ should be directed, proportional, coherent, 
consistent, and sustainable.544 His concept was based on the idea of ‘development poles’, 
population and administrative centres which foster economic, technical and cultural 
innovations. There were four levels of ‘poles’ in Lebanon: primary poles including the 
major urban centres to quaternary poles made up of agglomerations of villages. Each level 
of pole played the same role, but on a different scale.545 In the case of Lebanon, Beirut was 
the sole ‘primary pole’; the secondary poles included the country’s eight major cities; and 
the tertiary poles corresponded to Lebanon’s administrative cazas. These were 
complemented quaternary poles in 41 village clusters. 546 
Lebret and Chehab had very similar visions of development, the former based in rational, 
‘scientific’ theory, and the latter based in lived experience. Malsagne notes that “[Chehab] 
was nonetheless in accord with Lebret’s definition of ‘human economy’, of development 
and what the Dominican called true democracy, which is to say, not merely the workings 
of democratic policy, but “the ascension of a people in the march towards justice, the justice 
that they demand and they establish.”” 547 
The content of presidential speeches and ministerial statements under Chehab shows a 
marked shift, accelerated by Lebret’s arrival: Whereas previously, these texts focused on 
“the necessity of consolidating national unity, preserving the liberal economic system, the 
parliamentary regime, and the confessional equilibrium. After 1959, the new leitmotiv is 
the linkage between the construction of a modern State and the emergence of a 
development policy”. 548 
Does this commitment to social justice proof that Chehab was really a Marxist with a 
Christian veneer, as some critics charged? A strong Marxist influence is clear in the 
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writings of Father Lebret, whom Jumblatt affectionately referred to as the Red Priest.549 
Chehab’s thinking was broadly socialist, and he is certainly the most socialist figure to lead 
Lebanon.550  
Yet Chehab described himself as both anti-Communist and anti-Socialist; the way to defeat 
these ideologies, he believed, “was by promoting social justice”.551 It is, at times, a fine 
line, but Boutros confirms earlier diplomatic reports that Chehab was adamantly anti-
communist, in large part due to its incompatibility with his religious faith.552 This assertion 
is substantiated by both French and British diplomatic records of conversations with 
Chehab. As noted previously, he often expressed concern about communism in his 
discussions with diplomats, before and after his election. In his valedictory dispatch, 
Ambassador Crosthwaite went so far as to describe Chehab as “an anti-communist of the 
purest water”.553 
Chehabist principles and objectives 
From 1959 onwards, President Fouad Chehab’s experiences, temperament, personal 
convictions, and ideological influences coalesced into the Chehabist project for Lebanon. 
Kabbara writes, “If the main objective of the 1943 National Pact …. Was the 
‘Lebanisation’ of the Muslims and the ‘Arabisation’ of the ‘Christians’, the main objective 
of Shehabism was the Lebanisation of both the Muslims and Christians alike”.554 In 
practice, he explains, this ‘Lebanisation’ meant getting Muslims on board by granting them 
more of a stake in Lebanon and its independence, and persuading Christians that they 
needed a more inclusive national idea if the country was to survive. 
In September 1959, Chehab asked for an audience with Fouad Boutros, a young lawyer 
who would go on to serve as minister and confidante to the president. In his memoirs, 
Boutros describes himself as a lifelong Chehabist, “a combatant on the front lines, with an 
intense desire to carry the standard of the project which he believed in and had thoroughly 
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convinced us of and had passed on the torch”. 555 On that  day, Chehab first explained that 
project to Boutros: He wanted to build a strong, just, and democratic state for all the 
Lebanese, upon which they could then build a cohesive Lebanese nation. Boutros writes,  
President Fouad Chehab did not come into office with a fully worked-out plan, but he 
had a broad vision of what he was going to do for Lebanon. From the beginning, I 
sensed, he had faith in two things: method and objective. The former, in his mind, was 
the surest way to arrive at the latter: genuine citizenship and a strong, just State which 
would no longer be disturbed by confessional, regional, or tribal sensibilities.  
This required building the State on modern principles, with agencies that were independent, 
supervised, accountable, and where recruitment was based on the criteria of merit and 
public interest, far from the clientelism and quotas which held the citizen hostage to 
traditional and confessional leadership, and civil servants liable to the leaderships which 
had arranged their employment. He estimated that the construction of this Lebanon of 
tomorrow, a stable and prosperous Lebanon, required taking account of the existing 
equilibria, but not to the detriment of fundamental national principles. 556 
This passage encompasses the essentials of the Chehabist project; it is somewhat trickier, 
however, to define the term itself. 
Definitions of Chehabism 
Chehabism was never an ‘official’ political ideology or political party. However, by the 
early 1960s, the term was widely used. Below is how the British Chargé d’Affaires in 
Beirut attempted to explain ‘Chehabism’ to his colleagues back in London: 
The Lebanon has often assumed the role in the Middle East of introducing, in a form 
modified to suit local conditions, ideas born in the West. What has been termed 
“Chehabisme” by Georges Naccache, the politically prominent editor of the French 
newspaper l’Orient, has now emerged as a further example of this tendency, and its success 
here could conceivably be of value as a model even in the very different conditions 
prevailing in other Middle East countries. “Chehabisme” is essentially the practice by 
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which the President has placed himself above religious and political disputes which, if 
further embittered by his participation, and fostered by the violent emotive forces from 
over the frontiers, could tear the country apart.557  
Naccache, as we saw previously presented Chehabism as “a new political style”. He 
explained that the impetus for this shift was the need to prevent another national 
fragmentation along the lines of 1958. As we recall, Naccache wrote that the fundamental 
problem was “to know if we can rise to the challenge; if it can finally be proven that liberty 
is not a negation of the State”. As such, Chehabism was “nothing other than the ultimate 
attempt to prove this case – to establish a shared orientation for the nation that would not 
be anarchy.558  
Through its dispassionate, methodical investigation of conditions in the country and a 
robust state-of-the-art response, Naccache explained, Chehabism would show how a multi-
communal Lebanon could be “governable and viable” as a liberal democracy.559 A similar 
explanation comes from another self-professed Chehabist writing during in the midst of 
the era, Charles Rizk: 
Chehabism exists precisely in the observation or affirmation that the country’s 
confessional divide is not the only nor indeed the principal reason for 1958; that it is 
but one aspect, a consequence or side-effect of a cleavage of another order and another 
nature, economic and social. And we must repair this cleavage to avoid a new ‘58 and 
reduce our confessional divisions. This could not be accomplished by the confessional 
“system”.560 
While these in-the-moment explanations are the most instructive, some value can be added 
by considering Chehabism from a more distant vantage point. From his perch in the 1980s, 
Hudson wrote that “Chehabism – Lebanon’s equivalent of the New Deal – was basically a 
moderate welfare ideology tailored to the Lebanese situation”, and represented “the first 
                                               
557 Hankey to Earl of Home, 29 Jul 1963, FO 371/170343/1015/6, pp. 6-7  
558 Naccache (1960), p. 27 
559 Naccache (1960), pp. 6-7 




time the Presidency became the source of a national political philosophy”.561 Kabbara 
approaches Chehabism in his doctoral thesis with the benefit of both insider and ‘outsider’ 
knowledge. He defines Chehabism as “a hegemonic project that has failed”:  
A project concerned to create a Lebanese national identity based on certain strategies 
and programmes … directed towards modernising the state machinery, developing the 
rural areas in the country, reorganising the economy and introducing a social 
programme to minimise the level of poverty and the discrepancy in the distribution of 
income and wealth among the different social classes. 562  
According to Kabbara, Chehab believed Lebanon’s confessional political balance would 
not last indefinitely.563 In order to guarantee the country’s future, it would be necessary to 
cultivate a “collective will” around a “new vision of Lebanon and Lebanese society as a 
modern, rational, fair state and society.” 564 As such, “The main task for Shehab was first, 
to form the new vision; second, to construct the basic infrastructure for its realisation 
including reforming the administration and creating necessary developmental bodies; and 
finally, to rally enough political and popular support around it”.565 
Nothing in Kabbara’s understanding is incompatible with the explanations of the 
Chehabists themselves. The primary difference is a shift in emphasis: like Hudson, 
Kabbara’s definition focuses more on process than outcome. Rizk and Naccache both 
provide more emphasis on the philosophy of Chehabism and less on explanations of its 
actual processes – gaps which the later writers may help to fill. While Naccache, Rizk, and 
other contemporary accounts stress the need to avoid a replay of 1958, Kabbara and 
Hudson in 1980s viewed Chehabism from the midst of the very war the Chehabists had 
feared.  
Even if the Chehabist mission failed, it remains key to understanding the dynamics of that 
process. In particular, this mission for Lebanon – to avoid war and possible annihilation – 
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was the primary incentive on offer for the Maronite elite, who were less concerned about 
national development. Errors in the design of both mission and process, of course, 
contributed to Chehabism’s failure overall. As such, our definition attempts to encompass 
both: 
Chehabism was a radical political project designed to transition Lebanon from a precarious, 
divided society into a stable, cohesive whole under a ‘new National Pact’. The primary 
indicators of this new Pact’s success would be the achievement of national unity and 
equality, through 1) The formation of a universal, inclusive Lebanese identity; and 2) Even 
socio-economic development and modernisation across Lebanon’s communities and 
regions. These aims could only be achieved through a rational, balanced, scientific, 
sustained, and ethical approach. 
The first desired outcome of the Chehabist approach, thus, was national unity: a cohesive 
state built by unifying Lebanon’s disparate segments. In order to achieve this, of course, 
the cleavages dividing those segments had to be stripped of their political salience. This 
would require the elimination of segmental autonomy: If people were to feel Lebanese first, 
Lebanon had to be accountable to them in turn.  
But If Lebanon’s institutions were going to effectively serve all its people, they would need 
to be rationalised, reformed, and expanded. This would require our second outcome, 
modernisation. And neither unity nor a ‘modern’ state could be built without a foundation 
of social justice and equality.566 These outcomes, in the eyes of Chehab, were closely 
correlated with each other as well as effective governance; there could be no unity without 
true equality. 567  
Modernisation and Le Social  
The term ‘Le Social’ was coined by Chehab personally, and represents his own social 
philosophy, developed under the influence of Father Lebret. The premise at the heart of Le 
Social was this: If the socio-economic gaps between communities and geographic regions 
could be narrowed, and wealth more evenly distributed (while remaining within the bounds 
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of a liberal-democratic system), future political and social upheavals would be far less 
likely to occur.568  
IRFED suggested that development had several objectives, notably to quantify and better 
exploit the human and material resources of underdeveloped countries; to enable more 
robust and accurate planning; to improve administration and encourage production in 
response to new imperatives; to redirect scientific and technological innovation towards 
the problems of low-income countries; to increase exports from under-developed nations; 
and “to grow the volume and regularity of the flow of capital introduced under conditions 
suitable in under-developed countries”.569 
Through his interactions with the IRFED mission and Lebret, Chehab had grown 
increasingly convinced that socioeconomics were the true sources of Lebanon’s 
superficially ‘sectarian’ conflict. His reluctance to intervene in 1958 was grounded in a 
suspicion that the state’s own failures had pushed Lebanese Muslims into the arms of 
Nasser: “For him, the solution must come from a new social policy, not arms.” 570 
As such, he launched a raft of measures “all with the same purpose of improving efficiency 
and minimizing the harmful impact on administration of personal disputes and 
prejudices.”571 The Foreign Office expresses surprise in 1963 at the uncharacteristic 
enthusiasm the usually reserved Chehab demonstrated for the project. A man famous for 
working slowly, carefully, and subtly was determined to see development and social reform 
be achieved as soon as possible.572 
A key component, or complement, to Le Social was modernisation. Chehab’s interest in 
efficient, less corrupt, and more meritocratic governance predisposed him towards 
modernisation efforts to begin with. However, he also believed that modernisation was 
essential for the achievement of true communal equality and social justice, as well as 
fostering a sense of national pride. With such a daunting task, General Chehab believe it 
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was necessary to implement what Verdeil calls “authoritarian modernisation”, the top-
down imposition of new norms and practices on society.573 
In the ‘Chehabist’ context, modernisation should be understood as the rationalisation of 
government and society by developing, transforming, or replacing traditional institutions 
and technologies under the influence of new science and knowledge.574 Chehab was 
convinced of the need to ‘rationalise’ Lebanese capitalism in particular. Lebanon’s 
economic system had grown ever more anarchic in the years since independence, but this 
shift had been masked by its ability to create tremendous wealth.575 As Naccache describes, 
The conclusions of the IRFED Mission’s investigation… show that we are on the brink 
of rupturing our equilibrium. They are enough of a blow to silence our champions of 
liberalism, the theoreticians of unlimited laissez faire whose only demand of the state 
is that it be perpetually absent. This anarchy, built as a system, would inevitably drive 
us into catastrophe.  
The whole Lebanese economy, our whole system of investments, our entire fiscal 
policy, all our social legislation has to be completely rethought and redone. This means 
a collective effort by the nation, and firstly a collection of burdens and sacrifices which 
the privileged classes must be the first to accept. 576  
The Chehabists believed that the economy had to be diversified if there was any hope of 
maintaining stability in the near to medium term. The Lebanese population was expected 
to double over the next decade and a half, reaching 2.5 million inhabitants by 1975. 
Although Lebanon was reasonably prosperous in the late 1950s and early ‘60s, that 
prosperity derived largely from the banking and services sectors. Such a narrow base 
supplied a dubious foundation for population growth on such a dramatic scale.577  
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While modernisation was a key instrument of social justice and a more balanced economy, 
Chehab also believed that these shifts were necessary in order to foster national unity. On 
Independence Day, 1962, the president explained, 
The work of development which takes place in the economic and social domains does 
not only look to raise each person’s quality of life, but to dissolve all Lebanese in the 
melting pot of a single society whose national unity must be based not so much on 
coexistence or the partnership of different categories of the population as upon the 
conviction of every citizen to be an integral part of a single people and to be strictly 
loyal to a single homeland. This is the only way national unity can take on its noblest 
meaning and its most spirited force. 578   
Coexistence was no longer enough to ensure Lebanon’s future. President Chehab did not 
want to see Muslims and Christians living peacefully side by side, their elite cooperating 
to make sure everyone’s voice was reflected in policy. He wanted the political salience of 
sect to be stripped away all together, so that Muslims and Christians lived together as 
equals, and believed that modernisation and social justice were the only means of achieving 
this end.  
National Unity 
In his very first speech in August 1958, with the conflict still active, Chehab praised the 
Pact as the guarantor of Lebanon’s prosperity and success and vowed to apply all of his 
energy to securing its restoration. 579 Similarly, in his inaugural address a month later, 
Chehab specifically referred to the National Pact as Lebanon’s “unwritten Constitution” 
and called upon the public to respect it.580 As his position evolved over the following 
months and years, Chehab would come to question the enduring value of the Pact’s content, 
if not its symbolic worth. After all, the Pact – a consociational act founding Lebanon’s 
consociational political system – was incompatible with his vision of non-segmented 
national unity.  
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Before his contact with IRFED, Chehab, much like his predecessors, understood ‘national 
unity’ as “basically the need of the Lebanese to live together in one nation.”581 However, 
even then, there was a distance between Chehab’s view and the mainstream. This may be 
illustrated by comparing Chehab’s inaugural address with Charles Helou’s understanding 
of National Unity, articulated one month later. Chehab spoke of closing the gap between 
“different members of the Lebanese family”, 582  whereas Helou repeatedly stresses that 
Lebanon cannot escape its differences. Helou’s unity is essentially consociational: what 
matters is separating the natural differences from the false, and how so much more unites 
the country than separates it. Helou writes, “We can no more escape from our differences 
than our solidarity or our union. In Lebanon – among so many different opinions – this is 
what unifies: here is the political truth. Among so many paths, the route which leads to 
reconciliation is the right one.” 583 
However, as Lebret’s message of social justice and equality seeped in, Chehab’s thinking 
evolved: Living together was not enough; the Lebanese needed to be a single people if the 
country were to flourish and avoid further bloodshed. In turn, he came to believe that “the 
1943 Pact was not viable without the achievement of social justice”.584 According to 
Kabbara, the Chehabist approach viewed national unity as the end result of a new National 
Pact, which would support the “citizenship and fusion of all the Lebanese in one nation as 
the ultimate discursive nature of the Pact.”585 
In public addresses later on in his presidency, Chehab would employ the 1958 crisis 
rhetorically, not to discuss the perils of division but to celebrate the unity which allowed 
the country to find an exit. He cast the crisis as a harrowing shared national experience, 
only overcome the country’s unanimous will to preserve their shared way of life. 586 
In a speech shortly before the 1960 general elections, Chehab stressed the power of 
democracy and urged citizens to cast their votes on the basis of integrity, competence, 
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dedication, and intelligence. However, he warned, even these qualities were insufficient if 
candidates did not meet the “primordial condition” of “unshakeable faith in national unity”. 
587 National unity, he explained, was what enabled a country to preserve its independence:  
No country’s history more than Lebanon’s demonstrates that this unity is the first 
foundation and the sole lasting guarantee of its independence. Without the unity of the 
Lebanese people, Lebanon would not have known independence; and without unity, 
nothing of this independence would remain.588 
Over his six-year tenure, Chehab repeatedly emphasised that every person shared in a 
collective responsibility; if unity and equality were to be achieved, everyone had to help, 
and many people would have to make sacrifices. He frequently called out the youth in 
particular to engage themselves in his project. While the message did not resonate with 
everyone, Chehab was able to mobilise many young people among a new, reform-oriented 
generation, whose lucid patriotism was based on his vision of the ‘State of 
Independence’.589 
Chehab’s project in his own words 
On 21 November 1960, Chehab delivered an Independence Day address which was rather 
different from his previous speeches. It was his first public address since withdrawing his 
resignation the previous summer, and demonstrates the more robust plan Chehab adopted 
as he moved into the second phase of his presidency; indeed, this speech may be seen as 
the public “initiation” of that second phase.590 The latter half of Chehab’s speech, which 
outlines his vision for the country at the start of this new era, is worth reproducing in full: 
The State has been engaged in this phase for some time, with the aim of providing the 
Lebanese nation with principles of modern organisation in the social, economic and 
cultural domains, in a spirit of perfect impartiality on the part of those who shoulder 
the major responsibilities of this work.  
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The independence which we enjoy would lose much of its splendour and its sacred 
character is we came to see it as a pure symbol, if we accepted it as a simple end and 
if we did not use it for the public good. 
 The administrative reform whose foundations we consolidated these past two years 
and which will soon bear fruits, cannot be accomplished without another more 
important and more necessary reform – which is more difficult to achieve because it 
bears directly on Lebanese public life – to establish itself on a basis worthy of an 
advanced people in a century when the fundamental problem is the problem of the 
social.  
All administrative reform would be of a limited value if it were not accompanied by 
comprehensive social reform.  
Economic prosperity must not mask the deficiencies, the privations, the poverty that 
diminishes its reality and benefits. All the Lebanese must understand the necessity of 
efforts to raise up their less-developed brothers and to put an end to a misery which is 
legally inadmissible in an advanced, prosperous society, and to move to help one 
another to end it by assuming complete and total responsibility. 
The phase through which the country is moving – in order to build a new society, a 
phase which implies a narrow cooperation between people and authorities, which 
requires the sacrifices on the part of some and patience on the part of others – this 
phase is no less important than that which led to independence. 
The path is hard, but is it not true that the path to the summit is always the hardest? 
We all wish for a better Lebanon, with an honourable government in the realms of 
justice, discipline, and security. 
But this hope cannot be realised unless every Lebanese acts in a spirit of solidarity, 
convinced that every effort in the interest of all is in the end a profitable venture for 
himself. 
Recognizing deprivation already gets us halfway there, the other half being made up 




Lebanese, on this anniversary of the independence which it has been said was taken 
for itself rather than granted, as I see myself expressing the hopes and aspirations of 
Lebanon, I say that true independence is built – after belief in God – upon effort, 
exhaustion, patience, sacrifices, virtue, knowledge, discipline, on all these civic 
qualities without which there is neither independence nor state. 
Lebanese, Lebanism involves no distinction nor privilege. One Lebanese is not 
superior to another, except by means of honest labour. Your love and your sincerity 
for Lebanon and the protection of your independence are an ongoing endeavour. Your 
independence is a task for every one of you, every day.  
Long live Lebanon! 591 
The above represents the best account we have of the Chehabist project as it shifted into 
full gear: Chehabism sought to modernise and reform the country so it could be just, secure, 
efficient, and truly free. However, this could only be done, in the president’s view, by 
ensuring that everyone shared in Lebanon’s prosperity and freedom. In order to narrow the 
socio-economic divide and promote meaningful equality, real solidarity – rooted in work, 
commitment, and sacrifice – was needed. To preserve and honour Lebanon and its 
independence, the better off members of society had to genuinely accept other groups as 
equally Lebanese and entitled to the privileges that implies.  
For Chehab, national unity, development, and social justice were symbiotic, with full 
realisation of each aim contingent upon the others; all were linked to “the most precious 
Lebanese value”, the preservation of liberty.592 
Conclusions 
As we shall see over the course of this thesis, one of Chehabism’s greatest flaws is the 
extent to which the project relied upon the personal leadership of Fouad Chehab. In 
addition to Chehab’s perceived wisdom, power, and patriotism, as Naccache effuses, his 
identity itself could be a unifying factor: 
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Few Maronites walk our streets who have such pure Arab blood in their veins. This 
Arab Prince who governs us, whose father was named Toufic and grandfather Hassan, 
who is at the same time a pure sheikh of Kesrouan, full of humour and reason, is he 
not the perfect symbiosis of Islam and Christianity? Does he not represent, physically 
speaking, the transconfessionalism of the Lebanese problem? 593  
At the same time, Naccache warns that “the fault that would be fatal would be to assume 
that a man can indefinitely stand in for a nation”.594 Yet he offers no solutions for 
dislocating Chehabism away from the man himself, and indeed, none was ever found. 
Chehab’s character and background allowed him to lead such a disruptive project because 
he, to an extent, became Lebanon’s factor of cohesion.  
Moreover, even in the midst of the Chehabist era, some felt the project did not go far 
enough. Charles Rizk was an ardent Chehabist, but he was highly critical of what he 
perceived as Chehab’s unwillingness to take the project to its logical conclusion and effect 
true political reform.595 He believed that Chehabism “carries the seeds of a political 
program which can, and must, become a national doctrine”; once politicised, according to 
Rizk, Chehabism would return a sense of purpose to the Lebanese that they had lacked 
since independence. “Chehabism is, in a way, a ‘new frontier’”.596 
Naccache connects this reluctance to tackle political reform to Chehab’s commitment to 
Lebanon’s constitutional documents, as part of what he calls “the dialectic of the Chehabist 
project”: 
On the one hand, a strict concern with constitutional legality, a deep conviction that a 
parliamentary regime in Lebanon is necessary. On the other hand, this repulsion for 
political wheeling and dealing, this bitter recognition of the necessity, in order to 
succeed to the end, to go through the very men who have debased Authority and 
degraded Power.597  
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In a similar vein, Kabbara suggests that the abolition of political sectarianism was beyond 
the scope of Chehab’s “constitutionalist approach”. Rather, he sought to “correct the 
failures of the sectarian system by injecting it with large doses of economic and social 
justice.”598 Others, however, take Chehab’s failure to challenge the system more cynically: 
in the end, political sectarianism could work in his advantage. Beshara describes the 
Chehab regime as “guided by the desire to exploit the confessional system for its own ends 
rather than challenge its legitimacy”.599 
There is another, simpler explanation for Chehab’s reluctance to radically alter Lebanon’s 
political system: he felt that the groundwork had not yet been laid for such a transition. 
Chehab’s speeches demonstrate a clear will to see the confessional system dismantled and 
a new national pact brought into being; given that the written constitution presented 
political confessionalism as a stop-gap solution, this goal would not have been at odds with 
a ‘constitutionalist approach’. 
But Rizk was perhaps a revolutionary at heart– a man ready to tear the consociational 
system down and build something new. Chehab, in his misplaced belief he could ‘reform’ 
a consociation into a majoritarian democracy, saw a different, less-confrontational route to 
the realisation of his vision of a modern, stable, egalitarian, and proud new Lebanon. 
‘Ni vainqueur, ni vaincu’— ‘no victor, no vanquished’: as we shall see in the following 
chapter, this was the slogan Chehab adopted in his second attempt to form a government 
in 1958, after the first provoked a brief but chilling counterrevolution. Christians felt that 
the first line-up effectively granted ‘victory’ to the rebels at their expense; after several 
ugly weeks, a solution was found through compromise and the even division of portfolios 
among the super-elite. 
The philosophy of ‘no victor, no vanquished’ underpinned Chehab’s approach to politics 
thereafter. But it is notably another consociational act. Thus, from the very outset of Fouad 
Chehab’s presidency, we see consociationalism and Chehabism clash, with conflict the 
inevitable result. 
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4.  Phase One: Reform, Recovery, and Reconciliation 
In his first address to the nation in August 1958, President-Elect Fouad Chehab vowed that 
Lebanon would emerge from the dark days of that summer “more confident in itself, more 
solidly established, and with its position reinforced”. His priority, he explained, would be 
the restoration of unity and stability in line with the 1943 National Pact, to ensure a 
peaceful, prosperous, and dignified existence for Lebanon. Even in that early speech, he 
stressed that “science, order, and equality” must prevail across Lebanese society in order 
to secure that better future.600 
From the outset President Chehab had in mind a specific framework for his obligations to 
the country. Two years later, on 20 July 1960, Chehab announced his resignation as the 
final piece of that mission came into place. A new, expanded, more representative 
Lebanese parliament had been elected by popular vote; two days prior, this new chamber 
had convened and elected a Speaker of House. This meant, by Chehab’s rationale, that the 
parliament was ready to elect a new, civilian president to take his place. His services were 
no longer required. 
These core objectives were articulated by Chehab in his resignation address. They 
included: 
1. Recovery from the 1958 crisis, involving: 
a. The withdrawal of all foreign troops from Lebanese soil 
b. Re-establishing a spirit of harmony, unity, and cooperation among the 
Lebanese communities 
c. Repairing strained relations with Arab states 
d. Restarting the Lebanese economy 
2. Introducing a strong legislative foundation for efficient, clean, and effective 
governance  
3. Creating a larger, more representative parliament, and holding elections as soon as the 
domestic climate allowed them to take place freely and fairly.601 
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Chehab’s ‘mission’ in the first phase of his presidency, from his election until the 
resignation attempt, was dominated by specific targets in Lebanon’s post-1958 recovery. 
Yet these objectives, with their emphasis on national unity, harmony, and modern reform, 
represent the first manifestation of Chehabism. During this period of crisis and its 
aftermath, Chehab time and again grudgingly accepted consociational solutions. As we will 
see over the following pages, the Chehabist-Consociational dualism generated significant 
tension, as Chehab’s imperative to reconcile Lebanon’s communities conflicted with his 
vision for Lebanon’s future.  
In this chapter, we will examine how the phase unfolded, explore the key moments when 




Although considerable attention has been paid to Lebanon’s 1958 civil war, less is paid to 
the brief ‘counter-revolution’ which followed it in September and October. This is 
understandable: the unrest was shorter, the body count lower. But the counter-revolution 
was, in some ways, more ominous, as it took on a more overtly sectarian tenor. The counter-
revolution was the early stirrings of the conflict everyone had been desperate to keep the 
summer’s crisis from devolving into, but inverted: now, Christians were the rebels, and 
Muslims attempted to defend the status quo. The counter-revolution, moreover, was a 
predictable consociational outcome of a coalition that failed to encompass a broad enough 
cross section of the elite. 
Before the counter-revolution got underway, Lebanon had been slowly inching back 
toward normal life, but not all signals were auspicious. While “military hostilities” had 
largely ceased, the British Embassy reports that lawlessness and terrorism continued 
unabated for much of August.602 
In late August 1958, with an eye to the imminent arrival of a new president, both the 
Opposition and Loyalist camps issued incompatible ‘manifestoes’: The Opposition 
                                               




demanded that a new government be formed from the rebel leaders and supporters, while 
Loyalists announced that they would boycott any government which included any members 
of the Opposition whatsoever.603  
Relief came, albeit briefly, when the Opposition finally lifted its general strike. For the 
duration of the summer, the strike – as much as any actual fighting – had paralyzed 
commercial activity in Lebanon. The strike was lifted from 11am on the morning of 4 
September. Since Chehab’s election, this was the clearest sign that the summer’s crisis 
really was coming to an end, and the immediate resurgence of public life boosted morale 
nation-wide. The moment was charged with optimistic symbolism: The British chargé 
d’affaires at the time reported that, 
The souks suddenly overflowed, not only with would-be purchasers, but with 
sightseers also; the newspapers were filled with photographs of smiling merchants 
sweeping out their shops, laying out their wares, hanging out their signs, or wrestling 
with huge padlocks, ostensibly rusted through four-months’ disuse.604 
The optimism continued apace as shortly thereafter, the loyalist Christian Kataeb forces 
accepted – in principle – to surrender their weapons to the government, “and actually went 
so far as to hand in one or two of their more obsolete or defective firing-pieces”.605 As 
September progressed, the end of the summer’s civil war seemed within reach.   
Another sign that things were moving forward came when President Camille Chamoun 
registered a new political party in order to consolidate the Loyalist parliamentary strength 
ahead of the change in regime.606 Although Chehab entered the presidency with broad 
popular support, he was always going to be at a disadvantage to Chamoun among 
Maronites. As intensely as the opposition despised the outgoing president, many Christians 
saw Chamoun as Lebanon’s greatest champion. In his final address as president, Chamoun 
promised his supporters that this was, by no means, a farewell address: From now on, he 
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would fight alongside them.607 The French chargé d’affaires recalls how a throng of 
Christian protestors swarmed his motorcade en route to Chehab’s inauguration, cheering 
France and crying out, “We don’t want Chehab! Down with Chehab! Long live 
Chamoun!”608  
As Commander-in-Chief of the army, all summer Chehab had resisted Chamoun’s desire 
to supress the insurrection by force. As we have seen, relations between the men were 
fraught, as Chamoun oscillated between wanting to give Chehab the presidency or a 
demotion. The Loyalist Christian public was similarly ambivalent, but like everyone in the 
country, they wanted the crisis to be over. They wanted to support the army chief. If Chehab 
had assuaged Christian fears with a “good faith” first government, perhaps he could have 
eventually edged out Chamoun as a Christian leader. But it was not to be. 
On 19 September, armed men seized the taxi carrying Fouad Haddad, a forty-something 
journalist and prominent Kataeb member, on his way home from the office. Haddad, who 
wrote for the Kataeb mouthpiece al-Amal and regularly edited Pierre Gemayel’s speeches 
and declarations, had pseudonymously published a biting satire of Gamal Abdel Nasser the 
previous day.609 
As news of the kidnapping spread, Gemayel demanded that the rebel leaders take 
responsibility for Haddad’s safe return. However, they protested that while they regretted 
the incident, they knew nothing about it and could not help. With little recourse, Christians 
attempted to gain leverage by kidnapping several Muslims, but this move only provoked a 
spiral of tit for tat partisan abductions. After a final appeal by Raymond Edde, the Christian 
leadership saw no option other than to go to the streets.610 
The Kataeb called for a fresh general strike, and re-erected the barricades that had only so 
recently come down. After word came in that Haddad had been murdered, Christian 
protestors congregated in Beirut, in the mountains, and at the Patriarchate; they angrily 
defaced posters of Chehab in Jounieh; and soon, they began to confront those perceived as 
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members of the Muslim opposition.611 “Their anger,” wrote the French embassy, “has 
pushed them out of their apathy; they are finally finding the courage to assert themselves 
in the face of the insurgents”. 612 
The conflict had entered a new phase: “In the short history of the Lebanese Republic the 
Christians had not before resorted to violence of this kind”.613 Over the following days, 
“the steadily-increasing number of kidnappings of Christians by Moslems and of Moslems 
by Christians indicated that sectarian strife, of a kind which had on the whole been averted 
during preceding months, was making its first serious appearance”.614 
It was against this backdrop that President Chehab formally assumed office. Despite Saeb 
Salam’s insistent denials, the Kataeb continued to hold the opposition responsible for 
Haddad’s murder, and Gemayel threatened to invade and destroy the rebel stronghold of 
Basta.615 In the face of mounting violence, the army command re-imposed a national 
curfew and declared that they would shoot anyone carrying weapons on sight.616 The 
situation had gotten so thoroughly out of hand that the British chargé d’affaires believed 
martial law would be necessary if Chehab failed to quickly form an acceptable unity 
government.617 
Chehab formed a cabinet, but it was arguably not a ‘unity’ government and it was 
manifestly not acceptable to all sides. His choice for prime minster was Rachid Karami, 
the outspoken Sunni opposition leader from Tripoli who had held the post earlier in the 
decade. He was one of a number of major communal leaders who had lost his parliamentary 
seat in the previous year’s rigged elections. As an active rebel leader during the summer’s 
crisis, the Loyalists at first categorically opposed Karami’s nomination. However, in the 
weeks leading up to his appointment, Karami moderated his public positions; this, 
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combined with intensive behind-the-scenes negotiations promising a balanced cabinet, had 
persuaded the Christians to remove their veto.618  
Karami’s first government was composed of eight men: four Christians, three Muslims, 
and one Druze. Although Chehab had successfully convinced Karami to exclude the more 
radical rebel factions, the cabinet’s political composition strongly favoured the former 
opposition, with three leading opposition members, two moderate opposition members, 
and three independents.619 In retrospect, it seems obvious that the Loyalists, who had 
already compromised on Karami, would reject the line-up, but the UK at the time described 
it as “non-provocative” and a “pretty satisfactory peace-making cabinet”.620 
To the angry Loyalist forces already in the streets, this first government seemed to grant a 
retroactive and unjustified victory to the rebels. Meanwhile, before the new government 
had even been approved by the Chamber, it embarked on a purge of top-ranking security 
officials who had been loyal to Chamoun.621 The Christians felt “not merely deceived and 
disappointed, but betrayed”.622 
The ex-Loyalists targeted their anger at the Christian members of Karami’s cabinet, 
pressuring them to resign their posts. This strategy was moderately effective, and coincided 
with one of the independent ministers, Charles Helou, suddenly finding himself ‘too sick’ 
to carry on with his ministerial duties.623 Karami, meanwhile, attempted to defend his 
cabinet in increasingly desperate public statements, and to portray the former Loyalists as 
working against the restoration of peace.624 By early October, his language was almost 
threatening, promising to “crack down on all subversive activity and every violation of 
public order”; after months of Muslim-led rebellion and civil disobedience, Karami’s 
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newfound commitment to law and order struck many Christians as fairly rich, and the 
number of strikers swelled.625  
Pierre Gemayel asserted that the Loyalists, despite being the true ‘victors’ of the summer’s 
war, had agreed to the ‘no victor, no vanquished’ formula as a means towards peace. This 
conciliatory gesture, in his opinion, had been rather poorly repaid. By early October, the 
Kataeb’s Al-Amal, one of the only papers still being distributed, stated that “eighty percent” 
of the country’s population believed the cabinet should resign or be expanded to include 
former Loyalists.626  
While President Chehab indicated a willingness to do the latter, he insisted that any 
enlargement take place after the vote of confidence.627 The former Loyalists, in the 
meantime, refused to vote until changes had been madae. As explained by Loyalist MP 
Jean Aziz, reconciliation had to come first because, without it, the government would have 
failed in its first and most important task – a state of affairs that was not very ‘confidence’-
inspiring.628 
As Kataeb ran the militant dimension of the counter-revolution, Chamoun ran its political 
side from his home in the mountains.629 Normal travel in and out of Beirut was impeded 
by the reinforcement of Christian barricades and various forms of civil disobedience: 
elderly Christian women lying prostrate on the road,630 and “gangs of children armed with 
sacks of stones”.631 
In the first week of October, Helou, who was the new (infirm) Information Minister under 
Karami, penned two editorials, which were published by every major paper across the 
French and Arabic-language press.632 Helou cites this act of solidarity and reconciliation 
among Lebanese journalists as an inspiration for the country as a whole, and calls for unity: 
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We are, based on our structure, a country of inevitable divergences and necessary 
Union. We have only the choice between fraternity and death. It is this shared 
conviction among the Lebanese that explains the last presidential election and the 
choice of the man who had become, for all of us, the very symbol of National Unity 
and the natural arbiter of our conflicts and our difficulties. 633 
President Chehab engaged in intensive negotiations between the ex-Loyalists and the ex-
Opposition, whose roles had now reversed. The negotiations were just beginning to yield 
fruit on both sides when, suddenly, the crisis reignited: On 8 October, the mutilated corpses 
of two Muslims, who had been abducted several days prior, were left in front of a Beirut 
mosque near the home of Saeb Salam. Upon the discovery, “an angry crowd of over a 
thousand gathered at once, most of them armed, and were with difficulty restrained by Saeb 
Salam in person” from storming the neighbouring Christian district of Achrafieh.634 A fresh 
spiral of kidnappings, murders, and acts of terror was underway. 
Sectarian killings “became almost daily events”, reaching a crescendo on 12 October when, 
in addition to half a dozen other murders, “seven milk vendors in a car were stopped by 
Christian thugs near Tripoli; the only Christian among them was told to take the car and 
drive off; the six Moslems were shot dead on the spot”. 635 
People were angry, and they were exasperated. By this time, the UK Ambassador reports 
that “there is a general feeling that things have reached the point where any decision by 
[Chehab] would be acceptable…. It remains to be seen whether General Chehab will make 
up his mind to act”.636 His French counterpart likewise records his impression that the 
Lebanese public losing faith that ‘national unity’ could be restored at all without “rapid 
action” on the part of the president. Even Prime Minister Karami informed the media that, 
“From this point on, the situation is entirely in the hands of the Chief of State.”637 
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Karami attempted to resign, and it later emerged that Chehab had, at that point, sought to 
form something along the lines of a military government (albeit under the stewardship of 
a civilian prime minister, Nazim Akkari). But Karami’s supporters, hearing the news, 
deemed their leader’s resignation wholly unacceptable and went to the street to 
demonstrate as much.638 “Here was another occasion on which decisive action by President 
Chehab might have solved the crisis,” writes the UK ambassador: 
 If he had immediately and publicly accepted M. Karame’s resignation as soon as it 
was offered, and personally announced the formation of his military “Government of 
Public Safety”, it would almost certainly have met with little or no opposition. His 
twenty-four hours hesitation gave time for the supporters of the Karame government 
to regroup themselves.639 
As the president slowly proceeded, decisive action came from an unexpected quarter: The 
Council of Trade Unions announced that it would call a general strike from 15 October if 
the crisis had not been resolved, a move that threatened to paralyse what remained of the 
country’s public services and commerce.640 Under this immense pressure, the key players 
gathered at Chehab’s home in Jounieh on the night of 14-15 October. Chehab later told 
Ambassador Crosthwaite that an agreement was only reached “after he had threatened in 
the event of failure to broadcast an account of the difficulties they had put in his way”.641  
Early in the morning, Chehab and Karami emerged to announce a new government with 
just four ministers, two Sunni and two Maronite: Rachid Karami, Hussein Oueini, 
Raymond Edde, and Pierre Gemayel. If the resolution was good enough for the five of 
them, it was good enough for most of the country; and just like that, the counterrevolution 
was effectively over. Its effects transformed the capital in a matter of hours. The Christian-
led strike was lifted, and by noon on the day of the announcement, the Beirut souks were 
once again open for business and “cinemas and cabarets prepared to reopen, after five 
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months.”642 Shortly thereafter, the new government received a unanimous vote of 
confidence from the Chamber.643  
 
The fragile detente 
In early November, as the détente finally seemed to take hold, the four-man ‘no victor, no 
vanquished’ cabinet requested and was granted special powers by the parliament.644 For 
six months, the government would have extraordinary powers to unilaterally pass 
legislative decrees, as part of Chehab’s broader vision for administrative overhaul, as well 
as matters of finance and security. These special powers would be essential in allowing 
Chehab to bypass a stacked parliament and implement reform. 
Yet even before his government was in place, Chehab moved forward with “reorganising 
the internal forces and the office of public security and imposing the tight control of the 
army over these institutions”.645 Later, the government would use its special powers to 
inscribe the reorganisation, as well as modernisation of training and equipment, into law.646 
Friction between army and internal forces had been a significant issue during the ‘58 war. 
After Chehab and Chamoun’s impasse on the use of military force in 1954, Chamoun had 
worked to make his internal security forces independent of army. This meant that, in 1958, 
he was able to deploy them against rebels when Chehab refused to send in the army.647 
Upon assuming the presidency, Chehab immediately set out to correct this state of affairs 
and unify the country’s coercive instruments.  
In early October, PM-designate Karami announced new appointments to three key security 
posts: The Chief of Police (Commandant Aziz Ahdab), Commander-in-Chief of the 
Gendarmerie (Col. Joseph Simaan), and the Director of General Security (Capt. Toufiq 
Jalbout). All three new appointees were “military men”, and their training and 
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appointments would thereafter be subject to the army.648 Although the UK Embassy at the 
time reported that these specific appointments did not appear to be political, the decision 
to transfer power away from civilian control was manifestly a political act.649 Ultimately, 
in late May 1959, the government would form “a special administrative branch in the 
Ministry of Interior” tasked with supervising the internal security forces. The branch would 
have tremendous power, and it would be dominated by army officers.650 
Meanwhile, as US and UNOGIL forces withdrew from Lebanese territory and the US 
announced a change towards accommodation in its policy towards Nasser,651 Chehab 
began to pursue his circumscribed policy interests in earnest. From the start of 1959, it was 
evident that Chehab’s immediate objectives were administrative reform and repairing 
Lebanon’s relations with the UAR. He quickly abandoned the Eisenhower Doctrine, and 
announced that henceforth, Lebanon would follow a foreign policy of ‘positive 
neutrality’.652 While Karami asserted Lebanon’s regional nonalignment between Cairo and 
Baghdad, in practice, he and Chehab found it more expedient to lean towards Egypt. 
Formal economic talks between Lebanon and the UAR got underway. Then, in February, 
the domestic climate threatened to incinerate their progress. 
First, a string of inauspicious events took place: though none was explicitly sectarian, they 
all took on a sectarian colour. Three monks were attacked by Jaafari tribesmen in Akkar, 
an interfaith parking dispute in Tripoli escalated into manslaughter, and notable figures 
were murdered in Tripoli and Saida.653 The Parliament was furious over the surge in 
violence, and blamed the government for failing to protect the citizens it served; deputies 
called upon the government to either “govern or leave”.654 In response to the outcry, 
Minister Edde put forward a law which strengthened penalties in cases of premeditated 
murder which was swiftly passed by the chamber.655 In several regions, including Beirut, 
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the army had to be deployed to maintain order, but for most February they were able to 
perform this task.656  
In February 1959, the government also announced a three-stage plan for the gradual 
disarmament of the population: First, every village and urban district would be asked to 
turn over a certain quantity of arms (According to Edde, the government had very detailed 
intelligence on what weapons were held by members of the public, although the French 
ambassador deemed this claim ‘dubious’). 657 After an agreed deadline, those which failed 
to do so would be fined double the value of the missing weapons. If any villages or districts 
still failed to obey the order, the government would have recourse “to all other means of 
disarming the population”.658 
Nonetheless, things came to a head later in the month with the first anniversary of Syria 
and Egypt’s union as the United Arab Republic. To mark the event, Nasser had travelled 
to Syria for celebrations.659 Spirits and tensions in Lebanon were high, and fed a slow rise 
of Muslim-Christian clashes over Nasser. Finally, the skirmishes escalated a point where 
the army had to be deployed to contain them. 
The first major incident took place after Lebanese Nasserists vandalised a Basta-to-
Gemmayze tramcar with celebratory pro-Nasser graffiti. When it returned later in the day 
from the predominantly Christian Gemmayze, the Nasserists were outraged to find their 
graffiti (arguably predictably) defaced and replaced with pro-Chamoun slogans. They set 
the offending tram alight at Riad al-Solh square in central Beirut, wrecked several other 
tramcars, and blocked the Beirut fire brigade from extinguishing the blaze. In the 
meantime, rumours of exaggerated slights spread among fighters from both sides of the 
previous summer’s conflict. Ex-Loyalist and ex-Opposition partisans descended en masse 
upon the city centre, where they brawled with “stones and knives” until the army finally 
intervened.660  
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To great public contempt, the government attempted to play down the incident as an 
adolescent row blown out of proportion.661  However, they were unable to maintain their 
denials when a still-more serious incident took place the following week.  
At the cinema one evening, Muslims audience members were horrified when Christians 
burst into applause at Charles de Gaulle’s appearance on the newsreel. They had their 
chance a few moments later, applauding Nasser to Christian ire. A verbal dispute escalated 
when a man attacked the person sitting in front of him with a chisel – a ‘weapon’ obviously 
not included in the government’s disarmament campaign.662 The following day, the 
cinema’s inadequate solution was to delete the newsreel footage of de Gaulle, but not 
Nasser, and a more violent scene erupted: 
Trouble started in a cinema after the appearance of Nasser in a newsreel was applauded by 
some of the audience and jeered at by others. The fighting spread to the pavement outside 
and within half an hour armed toughs from both Christian and Moslem quarters were out 
in strength. The army was again called and order was soon restored, but not before two 
demonstrators had been killed, nine wounded, and three more tramcars destroyed. 663 
Most disturbing, of course, was how easily these flare-ups were provoked; they emphasised 
the precariousness of the relative peace which had ensued since the government of four 
came into power. This is not to say, however, that progress had not been made: by February 
1959, communal leaders seemed more able to control and talk down their followers.664 Yet 
their authority had its limits, and the tensions did not subside. Several days later after the 
incident at the cinema, three Christians were kidnapped, seemingly at random, and brutally 
murdered. In response, Interior Minister Edde called out the incompetence of the security 
forces as well as his own ministry’s officials; the other Christian minister, Gemayel, 
attempted to resign, and was only persuaded to stay on by Chehab’s assurance that the 
perpetrators of this latest crime would be “brought to justice within 48 hours”.665   
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Gemayel’s ‘ultimatum’ seems to have shocked the government into action: by the 
following morning, 35 arrest warrants had been issued in the kidnapping case and parts of 
Basta were encircled by security forces. These measures were largely achievable due to the 
cooperation of the Muslim and Nasserist leadership.666 The actual kidnapper, Ibrahim 
Nabulsi, was turned over to the government by his own Popular Resistance Committee, 
promptly sentenced to death, and hung just six weeks after his crime took place.667 For his 
part, Nabulsi had insisted that he was working on the instructions of the Popular Resistance 
Committee leadership – an allegation the government showed little interest in pursuing.668 
After Nabulsi’s trial and sentencing, his wife was also put in prison, “ostensibly for making 
a demonstration; it is thought that she has threatened to expose the instigators of the 
murder”.669 Raymond Edde came in for much criticism and reproach as interior minister 
after the events of late February. However, he defended his choice to not use more 
repressive measures.670  
By mid-March, word was buzzing that Presidents Chehab and Nasser would soon hold a 
long-awaited summit. While the Lebanese Arab nationalists hoped that they would use the 
opportunity to develop regional policy, especially in respect to Israel and Iraq, Christians 
and moderates mostly wanted the talks limited to bilateral economic issues.671 
Chehab and the Karami government were dedicated to reaching some kind of economic 
accord with the UAR. This was not chiefly as a means to consolidate good relations, but 
rather because Lebanon’s economy was so dependent and Syria and, to a lesser degree, 
Egypt. In particular, Lebanese traders needed to pass through Syria to gain access to the 
broader Arab transit trade market. Since half of the government – Karami and Oueini – 
supported Nasser, in 1959, the Lebanese aim was to stay neutral enough in the Nasser’s 
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feud with Qassem in Iraq to not alienate the latter, but not so neutral as to alienate the 
former.672  
The two presidents finally met on 25 March 1959, in a tent planted in the no-man’s-land 
between Lebanon and Syria. To the great relief of many observers, Nasser did not seem to 
press the Lebanese president on the issue of his dispute with Qassem. They issued a joint 
communiqué which emphasised the following “principles”: keenness on strengthening and 
expanding cooperation “in everything that would consolidate their independence, 
sovereignty and entity” within the Arab League and UN Charters; strengthening solidarity 
on ‘Arab causes’; and a desire to resolve their outstanding economic issues. This final 
principle, moreover, noted that Chehab and Nasser had already told their respective 
governments to move forward “without delay”, “in the same spirit of cordiality and 
understanding which prevailed during the meeting of the two Presidents”.673 This latter 
instruction was taken by the UK ambassador as a “mildly encouraging” signal; he also 
noted that the Lebanese press seemed to appreciate the de facto recognition of their 
country’s sovereignty. 674  
While the government had some success in its foreign and economic policy, when it came 
to the subject of disarming the population, the government was ill equipped to do so even 
with its special powers.675 Although security improved, a catalogue of crimes during 1959 
“[show] that the administration of justice in this country neither commands nor deserves 
much respect”.676  
Throughout the spring and summer, Raymond Edde in his capacity as interior minister 
showed considerable strength in the face of disobedience, and did much to return a sense 
of law and order to daily life.677 While Edde did not dare to take on the more powerful 
disturbers of the peace, he did successfully used military force to put a stop to civil unrest 
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and other disturbances.678 Crosthwaite conceded, “Whatever the moral drawbacks of a 
policy of being weak with the strong and strong with the weak, there is no doubt that there 
has on the surface been a great improvement in security and stability in the country as a 
whole”.679 
Nonetheless, lawlessness appeared to be on the rise again from early June. There were 
several high-profile-adjacent murders, including the headman of Arsal and Rene 
Mouawad’s driver. Additionally, 
There have also been several acts of wilful terrorism, such as the placing of small 
bombs outside two Beirut cinemas and the throwing of others indiscriminately from 
moving cars at night. … The most extraordinary case of all occurred … when an 
argument between two drivers on the main Damascus Road caused each to draw his 
gun and fire wildly (though ineffectually) at the other.680 
While few of the attacks seemed politically-motivated, they put the population on edge – 
especially after the murder of MP Naim Moughabghab in late July. Moughabghab, a close 
ally of Chamoun, was killed en route to the presidential summer palace in Beiteddine by 
supporters of Kamal Jumblatt. Records suggest that the killing was likely not premeditated, 
but rather the result of a traffic dispute that escalated into violence (in support of this theory, 
Saunders notes that Moughabghab was “a tough whose megalomania probably caused the 
incident”).681 Nonetheless, many people immediately read it as a political killing.  
Despite a swift government response, the Moughabghab incident put the government’s 
credibility on the line. This high-profile ‘assassination’ amidst an atmosphere of general 
lawlessness was taken by many Christians “as proof that the Government is incapable of 
maintaining law and order in the country -- a view which is corroborated they think by the 
obvious inability or reluctance on the part of the authorities to bring Kemal Jumblatt to 
heel”.682 The Moughabghab family brought a case against Jumblatt personally for 
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“incitement to murder”.683 Jumblatt attended the hearing and rejected the charges; he also 
brought a suit of his own against several right-wing papers for similar accusations.684 
Kesrouan Labaki, a journalist at Le Soir who had written that Jumblatt was “morally 
responsible” for the murder, was himself the victim of a minor attack in early September, 
which was seen as a ‘warning’ from Jumblatt supporters.685 Despite these tensions, 




The earliest evidence of the Chehabist approach may be found in the reform drive instituted 
by President Chehab shortly after he came to office. As Bashir writes, the instability of 
1958 propelled Chehab’s reforms: “Because of these strong prevailing conditions, it was 
then thought by the new regime that an honest, strong, and efficient administrative system 
organised on a sound scientific basis would act as an effective unifying factor in restoring 
order to a chaotic situation”.686 The first period of Chehab’s presidency, with its theme of 
‘laying the groundwork’, focused on implementing measures that would pave the way for 
later social and economic developments. 
Lebanon’s administrative structure in the Chehabist era included three kinds of institutions: 
ministries and public agencies; administrative territorial units; and independent agencies 
and public utilities.687 All were wracked by endemic problems, which, according to Bashir, 
could only be resolved through “social and political maturity”: “Administrative action in 
itself is no more than a reflection of what the role of the state in society looks like. If in the 
first place that role is misconceived, then improvements in the administrative machinery 
may not yield significant results”.688  Bashir cited several major administrative problems 
in Lebanon, including the public’s lack of trust in government; an “obsolete concept of 
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public office” which cast office as a concession; an “undemocratic concept of authority” 
among public servants; and an overly legalistic concept of administration.689 
Three further areas merit a brief discussion. First, the over-centralisation of Lebanon’s 
bureaucracy made its work highly inefficient. The system offered little leeway for local or 
even regional authorities to make independent decisions. Aside from the logistical 
constraints, this also bogged down the administrative leadership: “Centralisation limits the 
delegation of authority and assures that the man at the top will have to do much of the 
paperwork, while he is left with little time to do the kind of thinking, planning, and 
administering which his post requires”.690  
Another arguably more critical problem was the lack of qualified personnel within the 
administration. Because public office was so often viewed by its holders as a source of 
patronage, many unqualified employees were hired as political favours. In some cases, 
these people did not even show up for work, simply collecting a paycheck every month.691 
A similar issue was presented by legally mandated sectarian quotas, which led to many 
strong candidates being rejected in favour of weaker ones. Ultimately, the Lebanese 
administration was understaffed by employees lacking the right qualifications, including 
the near-absence of administrative specialists.692 
A third major issue cited by Bashir was the tendency to copy formal institutions and 
practices from the West “without due regard to their applicability” in the Lebanese context. 
Bashir writes of the contemporary practices in the 1960s, “There is a fallacious belief 
prevailing in the Lebanese government that new modern institutions and techniques, since 
they are working properly in the Western societies, should give similar results if they are 
transferred to other societies”.693 
Whereas Chehab’s initial administrative reforms were largely drawn up by local experts 
and consultants, when it came to socio-economic development Chehab was keen to import 
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expertise from abroad.694 According to the IRFED philosophy, less-developed countries 
needed to learn from the example of the more advanced countries: foreign experts should 
consult on institution-building, while ensuring that local experts were trained to 
subsequently assume control.695 Particularly in light of the aforementioned personnel 
shortcomings, Chehab brought over foreign, mainly French experts to advise him on a 
variety of matters related to development. Not only did he recruit consultants from the top 
of their field, he also found people who were equally committed to social justice – such as 
Michel Ecochard, the urban planner who developed a Chehabist plan for Beirut.696 
The UK ambassador notes that initial scepticism over the potential of Chehab’s 
‘committees’ to get much done gave way as people watched them get to work drafting 
legislation and advice.697 In the new year, the administrative reform committees set about 
preparing and drafting a large number of administrative decree-laws for the government. 
Bashir describes four levels of communication at work:  
The task forces were mainly responsible for gathering data and conducting the 
necessary research. The Central Committee and the Preparatory Committees were 
mainly responsible for studying the findings and the recommendations of the task 
forces and then submitting their opinions in projects of legislative decrees to the 
Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers was mainly responsible for studying 
and adopting the projects of legislative decrees.698 
By April, however, the opacity of the process was a source of public concern, and various 
rumblings obliged the government to break its “long silence” on administrative reform in 
a weekly press conference. PM Karami tried to reassure sceptics that everything was 
moving along according to plan, “and affirmed that the government would keep its 
promises before the expiration of its extraordinary powers”.699  
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And indeed, the ‘government of four’ issued 162 decree-laws on the final day before its 
special powers expired in June. These decrees were “basic laws about the administration 
from the point of view of definition of objectives, scopes, functions, major units, channels 
of communication, accountability, and responsibility”.700 Sixty-two of the decrees, “each 
one long and detailed”, pertained specifically to the organisation of ministries and 
government agencies. “Ministries were reorganised, new offices were set up, the rights of 
civil servants were defined; in fact a blue print for the administration of the whole country 
was laid down”.701  
The administrative measures taken during the first period of Chehab’s presidency may be 
summarised as “the reorganisation of the present administrative machine, the redefinition 
of the status and necessary qualifications of a civil servant, the creation of certain new 
bodies with an advisory and inspectoral capacity, and personnel changes.”702 Two new 
institutions were particularly important. Firstly, the Civil Service Commission, which had 
two major areas of responsibility: the “administration of personnel laws regarding matters 
of recruitment, selection, promotion and transfer” and improving “the standard and the 
equality of public personnel by holding pre- and post-entry training programs in public 
administration”.703 The second key institution was the Central Inspection Commission, 
which was responsible for the inspection of all public agencies except the Internal Security 
Forces and the Ministries of Justice and Defence; and promoting interdepartmental 
coordination, and commissioning public tenders and administrative studies.704 
The primary aim of the new legislation was apparently “to re-organise the administrative 
services in such a way as to make them more independent of politics”.705 While ever 
cynical, the UK adopted a more positive outlook: 
It remains to be seen, as these reforms are put into effect, how far they will go to 
remove corruption, nepotism and pluralism in the administrative machine. But this is 
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the goal, and the government deserves credit for making it so, instead of contenting 
itself with replacing the supporters of the former regime with its own friends. It has 
been strongly encouraged in this by President Chehab, who is honest himself and has 
honest men round him.706 
While the summer decree-laws did not directly address personnel issues, they set those 
reforms in motion: civil servants were given a month during which they could retire with 
their pensions, to be followed by a two-month period when the government could dismiss 
at will. The government also granted itself the right to transfer civil servants for six 
months.707 However, events conspired to mostly nullify the dismissal option, as Karami 
was abroad and Oueini seriously ill for much of the period. “It was out of the question for 
the two remaining Ministers (both Christian) to take drastic action”, especially as their 
mutual acrimony grew. 708 
After the expiry of its special powers in mid-June, the government had neither resigned nor 
expanded its number. At least in part, this was due to Chehab’s concern that expansion 
could only slow the government’s policy progress, and create fresh grievances as some 
were included at the expense of others.709  
Chehab was satisfied with his government of four, supplemented by expert consultants, 
and he would have preferred to continue his reform drive with the same team indefinitely, 
“but the reorganisation of Lebanese administrative services has for long been opposed by 
influential interested parties, and we should not expect the reforms to go through without 
further intrigues and possible trouble”.710 Finally, in October, Raymond Edde made good 
on his longstanding threat to resign; with this move, alongside Oueini’s continuing illness, 
Chehab had to concede that the government simply could no longer function.711  
A new, expanded Karami government was formed, representing a broad enough coalition 
to finally make the kinds of decisions demanded by the personnel decrees. In late October, 
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they announced new appointments to the posts of all five regional governors (muhafiz), 
who would also have greater powers as a part of a broad drive to decentralise Lebanon’s 
administration.712 Up until that point, 
[P]eople living in remote villages were obliged, for the slightest formalities, to present 
themselves first at the headquarters of their sub-district, then at the seat of the mohafez, 
and finally, in all probability, in Beirut. Under the new legislation the Mohafez and 
the Caimacams, (administrators of the sub-districts) will have not only the power to 
decide themselves the vast majority of administrative questions, but will also have the 
means to enforce their decisions. The Mohafez, for example, who will be obliged to 
reside permanently in their districts… will represent all the Ministries except those of 
Justice and National Defence and will have complete authority over all Government 
officers in their area.713 
All five men had good reputations for honesty and conscientiousness.714 While less 
administratively significant, the new slate of qa’imaqams at sub-district level had profound 
confessional implications – for the first time, it gave Shia Muslims an even share of posts 
with Sunnis:  
Their increased representation among the Caimacams is perhaps due in some measure 
to the efforts of M. Ali Bazzi, the new Shia Minister of the Interior, but perhaps also 
to the intervention of President Chehab, who has on several occasions promised the 
Shias that their claims will be examined.715 
In the final hours before the last of their special powers expired in December 1959, the 
government issued “a new flood of decrees” transferring departmental directors-general 
and other high-ranking civil servants.716  
President Chehab knew he had one more reform to tackle before his mission was complete: 
Repairing the gerrymandered electoral law. He had refused to even discuss the subject of 
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parliamentary elections before the government’s special powers expired; and in any case, 
Edde and Gemayel had rejected any vote before the population was disarmed.717 For 
Chehab, the successful, orderly vote in the autumn’s by-election – despite the dizzyingly 
high tensions around the Moughabghab affair in general – had been sufficient evidence 
that fresh general elections need not wait till disarmament.718 So as 1959 moved into 1960, 
he decided to move forward with electoral reform. 
The most intense parliamentary debates concerned how the new electoral law would 
partition Beirut: Should it be divided? If so, along rough Muslim/Christian lines, or by 
some other rubric?719 More specifically, should Beirut be divvied up in a way that would 
make it impossible for Sami al-Solh to retain his seat? While the mainstream Sunni leaders, 
such as Yafi and Salam, were very much in favour of this latter proposition, Minister Pierre 
Gemayel “obstinately resisted” it. Once again, it fell to Chehab to broker a compromise 
between the rivals, dividing Beirut in three electoral districts (which were not, incidentally, 
very favourable to Solh).720 Despite the Beirut debate, “gerrymandering was on the whole 
avoided” in the law’s drafting.721 
The draft electoral law was presented to the parliament as ‘urgent’, which gave Chehab 
special powers to implement it by decree if a majority in parliament had neither passed nor 
vetoed it after 40 days. Chehab was set on May elections, but the ex-Loyalists and others 
who benefited in 1957 scrambled to find reasons to postpone, and they nearly secured 
enough votes to do so. However, a compromise was reached by dropping a provision 
requiring electoral cards.722 The new electoral law finally passed on 21 April, and included 
three major reforms: voting secrecy was adopted; the chamber increased in size from 66 
seats to 99; and constituencies (with the exceptions of Tripoli and Beirut) were drawn on 
objective administrative boundaries.723 Another novel factor, of course, was the head of 
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state’s apparent lack of interest in manipulating election results. The French ambassador 
wrote that, 
Even if the electoral law is thus partly stripped of the ‘honest’ character that the 
President of the Republic had wanted to give it, an important innovation lies in the fact 
that, for the first time in the political history of Lebanon, power, which is to say the 
Chief of State, will refrain from intervening to direct the elections.724  
Of course, this did not mean that the election was going to be clean. Boisseson describes 
the marketplace for votes which would spring up outside polling stations: he reported that 
prices of a vote ranged, depending on the region and the number of candidates, from LL 5 
to LL 30.725 This ‘market’ had a strong political impact, as some candidates were able to 
self-fund while others had to seek out wealthier and more powerful patrons. In past 
elections, including 1957, external parties had been deeply involved in support of both pro-
Nasser and pro-Chamoun Lebanese forces. There were several reasons, however, to hope 
that the 1960 vote might be less vulnerable to international interests. 
True to his word, in early May, Chehab dissolved the parliament and formed an eight-man 
extra-parliamentary caretaker government under Ahmad Daouk to oversee elections.  The 
UK ambassador reports that many Christians appeared “depressed” as the elections neared 
and they realized that Western powers were not going to intervene on their behalf: “This 
is, I think, the first time that the pro-Western elements have had to fight an election without 
some kind of backing, and they are not unnaturally nervous of their ability to stand up to 
the Arab nationalists, with the help they expect these to be given from Cairo and 
Damascus”.726 Christians lamented to their erstwhile patrons that UAR interference would 
lead to a strongly pro-Arab parliament, which could present an existential threat if it 
decided to merge Lebanon with the UAR.727 However, their fears were clearly exaggerated, 
as the distribution of seats made such an outcome virtually impossible. 
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In particular, Christian ire was directed at their recent champions, the United States. They 
suspected its lack of support this time around was a signal that the Americans had written 
Lebanon off in favour of accommodating Nasser.728 Both the UK and France report that 
the Christians had even asked the Vatican for financial assistance, but the papal nuncio 
refused on grounds of both morality and poverty.729 
Ambassador Crosthwaite wrote that he had met with Chehab and told him “in the most 
categorical terms that we were keeping right out of the whole thing. I think he believes 
this”.730 France had also determined that it was probably best not to intervene, although the 
French ambassador confided to Crosthwaite that they always provided “petits appuis” to a 
few faithful friends, and he felt “it would be awkward to refuse them something this time 
too”. However, as they did not intend to use this support to manipulate election results, the 
French did not feel it counted as ‘intervention’.731 
Despite its decision to stay (mostly) above the fray, France did worry about the UAR: they 
did not know how the UAR planned to assist its clients, but they were certain that Nasser 
would be spending considerable sums.732 UK intelligence, however, found little indication 
of Egyptian interference in the run up to the election. The suggestion was that Nasser may 
not believe that vote-rigging would work in his advantage: He was satisfied with the current 
regime, and did not want to embarrass Chehab or Karami and the other ex-rebels, and in 
so doing empower Chamoun.733  
The French military attaché argued against this logic in a report to Defence Intelligence. 
Even if Nasser was no longer acting hostile toward Lebanon, he argued, and benefitted 
from their improved relationship, the UAR nonetheless had an even stronger interest in 
boosting Lebanon’s ‘internal contradictions’. Thus, inevitably, the UAR would intervene 
                                               
728 Crosthwaite to Beith, 12 May 1960, FO 371/151140/1015/13 
729 Crosthwaite to Beith, 12 May 1960, FO 371/151140/1015/13, p. 3 
730 Crosthwaite to Beith, 12 May 1960, FO 371/151140/1015/13, p. 2 
731 Crosthwaite to Beith, 12 May 1960, FO 371/151140/1015/13, p. 2 
732 Boisseson to French Foreign Minister, 25 Mar 1960, CADN 91PO/B/111, No. 449, p. 3 




in the elections: “The will to interfere in Lebanese affairs is too deeply engrained in the 
Egyptian and above all the Syrian Special Services for it to not be powerfully apparent”.734  
Nonetheless, it seems that the UAR’s interference was largely limited to the formation of 
lists.735 Much like today, Lebanese voters in the independence era would cast their vote for 
a slate of candidates rather than individuals. The lists generally included candidates for all 
seats in the constituency, and while it was possible to write in alternatives, “Past experience 
has shewn that although cross-voting is allowed, it is not practiced on any great scale”.736   
The list system obviously influences electoral alliances, especially for candidates with 
smaller independent bases of support. As Lijphart noted, it also potentially violates 
consociational practices, as the list system tends to favour moderate candidates.737 
However, while such moderation may influence which names are put further down the list, 
those at the top will typically represent politicians with strong popular support. 
Furthermore, while moderates may make the cut, politicians are reluctant to add figures to 
their lists who are actively unpopular with their own communities. 
The nature of the list system likely influenced Camille Chamoun’s last-minute decision to 
run for a parliamentary seat in the Metn. In the midst of a feud with Pierre Gemayel – and 
always eager to irritate President Chehab – Chamoun hoped that his list would knock out 
Gemayel’s, eliminating a rival while positioning himself as the dominant Christian voice 
in the chamber.738 Almost everyone was worried about electoral violence, especially in 
mixed constituencies. President Chehab, however, was unwavering in his confidence that 
the vote would go off smoothly.739 
The elections were held over four successive Sundays in June and July 1960. Despite fears, 
there was no significant violence, perhaps due to “a judicious display of force which 
discouraged lawlessness”.740 With little indication of fraud, the 1960 general elections were 
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assessed as free and fair.741 External interference was minimal, with “no overt intervention 
from the United Arab Republic, and such covert action as was taken on behalf of selected 
candidates seemed to meet with small success.”742 Indeed, several notable candidates 
supported by the UAR lost, including Rashid al-Solh whom Syrians had given their 
strongest support.743 Just two years on from the 1958 crisis, the vote was an astonishing 
success. 
After the first round of elections for Mount Lebanon on 12 June, it became apparent that 
the voting secrecy law was encouraging much more cross-voting. This meant that races 
were closer than ever before, and that figures heading rival lists could both win election. 
Only two districts in Mount Lebanon saw lists elected in their entirety.744 Instead of 
displacing Gemayel, Chamoun split the vote – he and one other name from his list were 
elected, but the district’s other three seats went to Kataeb candidates. The election of both 
Chamoun and Gemayel prompted frenzied, last minute shifts of alliance among the Arab 
nationalists who would be voting the following Sunday in Beirut.745 
 In the capital, the three-way division of constituencies combined with the secret ballot 
“allowed full play to popular Christian and Moslem sentiment and favoured candidates 
with a strong sectarian appeal”.746 These “extremist trends”, however, were not repeated in 
the North the following week.747 The final vote in the Bekaa also confirmed “the 
effectiveness of the secret vote in encouraging the expression of personal preferences”.748 
In the end, names from multiple lists were elected in a majority of constituencies 
nationwide. The secret ballot also discouraged corruption: for example, in Zahle, “it was 
reported that this time the price of a vote had fallen from LL 300 to LL 100, and that money 
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was being paid more as a reward for faithful support than as a stimulus to a change in 
allegiance”.749  
Almost all of the major Christian leaders were returned to parliament, including Chamoun; 
this time, however, most of the Muslims leaders pushed out in ‘57 won seats as well.750 
Moreover, the scale of election results confirmed that Karami and Saeb Salam were “the 
two outstanding Sunni Moslem leaders” of the era.751 
It was generally thought that after his success in Beirut M. Salam would be asked to form 
the new government. He was in a most accommodating mood, and political bargaining of 
a hectic but unimpassioned kind was in full swing when an event took place which brought 
out that there is no ground for complacency in the political life of the Lebanon. This was 
the resignation of President Chehab on the 20th of July.752   
 
Chehab’s surprise resignation 
The first phase of Fouad Chehab’s presidency, the first stage of Chehabism, came to an 
end on the morning of 20 July 1960. Ahead of a scheduled meeting of the acting 
government, Chehab called Prime Minister Daouk and asked him to come in early so they 
could discuss “a personal matter”. Daouk, who apparently thought Chehab wanted to talk 
his government’s tenure, was left “stupefied”.753 Chehab had kept his plan to resign secret 
from almost everyone. While he had made several remarks about having had enough of 
politics and wanting to retire, these kinds of expressions were typical of the General, and 
even his close aides dismissed them as idle comments.754 He had also apparently been 
asking some unusual questions for a president around the office, such as the particulars on 
how to buy a car.755 
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As the cabinet members arrived for the meeting in Sarba, they desperately urged Chehab 
to reconsider. He replied with the same explanation he would employ a few hours later in 
his public address: He had taken on the presidency out of a sense of obligation, and that 
obligation had been fulfilled.756 Soon, the newly-elected speaker, Sabri Hamade, joined the 
government in urging the president to stay, but Chehab was unmoved, and at 1pm he 
addressed the nation: 
I only agreed to accede to the presidency because I was convinced to respond to the 
call of duty and take on an arduous mission in the darkest days and the bitterest 
circumstances our country had ever known. From the very first day, I set a limit on the 
remit and duration of my mission. Then I fully devoted myself, with all my heart and 
all my soul, relying on divine grace and working with faith and sincerity with the 
Chamber of Deputies and the Governments. 
Providence rightly demanded that the hopes of our people not be disappointed; today, 
the clouds of the crisis have dissipated and the traces of this difficult trial have been 
erased more rapidly than anyone expected. … Now that all the conditions necessary 
for a return to the normal exercise of power have been fulfilled, I believe I have 
accomplished the mission for which the Nation gave me its confidence and that I 
completed the task which I took on.757 
Chehab’s broadcast was immediately followed by one from Hamade, describing the 
morning’s events and the government’s dismay at the resignation.758 Hamade called 
deputies back to the capital from their summer retreats for an emergency meeting of 
parliament to draft a petition.759 It read as follows: 
To His Excellency the General Emir Fouad Chehab: 
The news of your resignation is a painful surprise for all the Lebanese people who 
recognise in you the upright conduct and the spirit of sacrifice necessary to the 
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achievement of national duty. These qualities are clear from your military and political 
life. 
The country as a whole, in these grave circumstances, is unanimous in refusing your 
departure from a post that you hold with such integrity and sincerity. 
In our capacity as national deputies, we call upon your patriotism and ask you 
reconsider your decision and continue your peaceful mission towards Lebanon’s 
political, economic, and social renaissance, thus allowing the country, still in such 
delicate circumstances, to avoid a crisis which you do not wish for it.  
Please accept this expression of our highest consideration.760 
Popular demonstrations had begun across the country. At this point, “almost all” of 
Lebanon’s political elite descended upon Sarba, where they joined several thousand 
citizens already gathered around the president’s house. Despite his staff’s insistence that 
Chehab was not home, the crowd refused to disperse; finally, a reluctant President emerged 
and grudgingly admitted the leadership into his home.761  
The electricity was out in Sarba, so the men argued by candlelight. Sabri Hamade, in a 
moment of symbolic theatre, seized a candle and burned Chehab’s letter of resignation to 
ash. After hours of futile debate, Chehab finally caved: he withdrew his resignation, albeit 
supposedly only after his wife urged him to do so. Later, Chehab would say he regretted 
having not immediately left the country, as then they would have been unable to “catch” 
him.762 
The French ambassador was struck by the intensity of the Lebanese reaction to Chehab’s 
resignation, and the panic and disarray it sparked across the country:  
This reaction cannot be explained simply by the fear of a new [1958-style] crisis… On 
all sides, the impression seems to have been that, under present circumstances, General 
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Chehab was irreplaceable at the head of the Lebanese state, because only he was 
capable of maintaining intercommunal equilibrium and the cohesion of the country.763  
Chehab told Boisseson that he suspected that, once the initial shock had worn off, plenty 
of presidential hopefuls would have emerged.764 Chehab and Boisseson both indicate that 
the most likely successor was former president Bechara al-Khoury, a view apparently 
shared by the public: even as the crowd marched towards Chehab’s house in Sarba, a 
smaller grouping had assembled around Khoury’s home in Kaslik.765 
After the whirlwind of resignation and withdrawal, observers searched for explanations. In 
the mind of Ambassador Crosthwaite, it was actually rather simple: Chehab “found his 
political role increasingly repugnant and decided that the interval between the first meeting 
of the new Chamber and the appointment of a new Government offered the most suitable 
opportunity to get out, but that he had underestimated the pressure that would be brought 
on him to return”.766  
Yet the choice of interval is not necessarily as intuitive as Crosthwaite implies: Chehab 
would be leaving the country with neither a president nor a government. According to 
Intendant Jean Lay, one of Chehab’s closest confidantes, the timing was down to a desire 
to appear impartial and allow his successor to build his own government.767 The French 
embassy similarly judged Chehab’s resignation address as the “authentic expression of its 
author’s feelings”.768 However, they noted the possibility that his resignation may have 
been moved up by the unpalatable prospect for Chehab, as a man of the army, of appointing 
Saeb Salam the new prime minister.  
Yet not everyone was convinced by the official story. Boisseson reports various theories 
circulating at the time, which all saw the army involved in one or another insidious fashion: 
Chehab’s resignation was a ruse so he could return more forcefully, bringing the military 
into politics; conversely, that it was the only way for the general to escape distasteful 
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collusion with the Deuxième Bureau; or that it was the pressure of the army, rather than 
politicians, the public, or his wife, that convinced Chehab to withdraw his resignation.769 
Kabbara describes the situation in such terms, writing that Chehab resigned in protest at 
the army’s intervention in politics: “The President began to realise the danger, to both the 
army and the country, in the continuation of such a state of affairs”.770 
In any case, regardless of Chehab’s intentions, the effect of his resignation and its 
subsequent withdrawal unequivocally strengthened his authority. Lebanon now knew that 
its stability was at the mercy of an apparently irreplaceable president.771 Yet Chehab did 
not take immediately take advantage of his new-found power: He respected the outcome 
of the election, and grudgingly appointed Saeb Salam as his premier.  
Georges Naccache, as one of the men at the centre of the fray in Sarba, had only this to 
say:  
[Chehab] knows that history, alas, does not move forward without impurities. But what 
he refuses, is to make impurity a condition of history. The 20 July affair, it was 
essentially that: the projection of his internal drama, the revolt, from the depths of his 
being, of the honest man against the statesman.  
How he overcame this – by what new tearing away from himself he returned to his 
post – all the Lebanese were, that evening, the witnesses. He was helped by a personal 
philosophy and, I believe, simply by a religious sense of duty that ordered him to carry 
out – even without hope – his task until the end.772  
From July 1960 onwards, Chehab recalibrated his presidential ‘task’ in line with longer-
term goals. In his remaining four years, he would pursue a comprehensive reform program, 
national cooperation and reconciliation, economic diversification, and social justice. It was 
in this second period that ‘Chehabism’ would truly come to fruition as a political approach. 
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The first period of Fouad Chehab’s presidency is characterised in part by its grudging 
accommodation of consociational principles alongside Chehabist imperatives. As Chehab 
came into office, Lebanon was still in the throes of crisis, and in those moments of 
emergency the consociational outcomes of stability and democracy were more urgent that 
the Chehabist outcomes of national unity, modernisation, and social justice.  
Chehab and his government were reasonably successful at meeting their circumscribed 
ambitions for the transition away from crisis. Disarmament, though excluded from 
Chehab’s account of his ‘mission’, was one key area where little progress was made. It is 
difficult not to wonder whether, had a more robust effort been made towards disarmament, 
the late 1960s might have taken a different path in Lebanon. 
Consociationalism and Chehabism 
The counter-revolution came out of consociational disarray. Chehab and Karami’s first 
government violated Lebanon’s consociational agreement. Although it technically 
included Christian members, they were not representative of the community at large. In a 
competitive democracy, this might have forced the loyalists into opposition. In 
consociational Lebanon, a minority – albeit a large one – was able to hold the entire country 
hostage for three weeks. Chehab resisted at first, but he eventually accepted that in that 
moment, Lebanon’s equilibrium could only be restored by giving in to consociational 
pressure. 
Karami’s first ministerial statement in October 1958 essentially committed to upholding 
the precepts laid out in Chehab’s inaugural address. Yet the UK ambassador notes that both 
of the Christian ministers, Gemayel and Edde, expressed concerns to him over the terms of 
the settlement shortly after their appointment. In large part, their apprehension was lodged 
in the fact that both of their Muslim counterparts, Karami and Oueini, had “repeatedly 
asserted their belief in the future of the Lebanon as an Arab state”.773 
In the fifteen years since Lebanon’s National Pact was agreed, it had failed to adapt to 
internal and external developments. The counterrevolution also may have reflected 
                                               




Christian fears that their control over “the national life” was being broken by Muslim 
segments: “The result has been a desperate effort to preserve as much of the Christian 
position in the State as possible, in the knowledge that if the Christians do not put forth 
their maximum effort before the new framework hardens they may never again be able to 
alter it to their advantage”.774  
As the crisis came to an end, Gemayel stated that true national reconciliation could only 
take place on the basis of a ‘real’ equilibrium which reflected the country’s segments and 
sentiments. Otherwise, he warned, the a still more dangerous iteration of the crisis would 
simply ignite in a matter of days or weeks.775 
Government formation in Lebanon always offers a view of the consociational process at 
work. For example, another interesting point emerges in 1959 from the debates over when 
and whether to expand the government of four. Aside from the logistical burdens placed 
on the ministers, it only included Maronites and Sunnis, and thus excluded all the other 
sects. This “exceptional and emergency arrangement” was seen as a stabilising influence 
during moments of crisis, but no longer appropriate as normal life returned to the country 
in 1959.776  
Tensions in the four-man government, moreover, escalated by the month: By late summer 
1959, with Oueini ill and abroad, and Karami off to the Arab Summit in Casablanca, the 
dispute between Ministers Edde and Gemayel as to who should serve as acting PM reached 
such a height that Chehab, ever the nation’s parent, declared there would be no interim 
premier at all.777 A government of four, reduced to an effective government of two, both 
Maronites, was proving problematic: “This incident reveals… the fragility of the governing 
team’s cohesion, and once more draws attention to the unusually narrow dimensions of the 
cabinet”.778 When a new, eight-man line up was announced in October, it was “less starkly 
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characteristic of the country’s basic polarity and more representative of the overlying 
complexities.” 779 
Another instructive example of consociational bargaining occurred in July 1959, when 
former prime minister and Chamoun loyalist Sami al-Solh returned to Lebanon from self-
imposed exile. In addition to the expected chatter and controversy, the Sunni-led, ex-
opposition Popular Resistance Front declared “they did not wish to disturb law and order 
during the tourist season but they could not remain silent in face of a man who could have 
avoided the incidents of last year; they would pursue him whatever the sacrifice”. As 
rumours circulated that the PRF’s leader, Rashid Chehabeddine, would be subject to 
judicial review for the statement, other Sunni leaders including Saeb Salam and Karami 
quickly declared their support for Chehabeddine and his refusal to stand in court. For all 
its apparent power, the mainstream Sunni elite was accountable to the street, and thus 
politically unable to take a stand when a notorious criminal threatened the life of a former 
premier.  
Despite outrage among the former loyalists, including several ministers, the government 
declined to pursue any charges against Chehabeddine, a decision they justified on the basis 
that the PRF was unlikely to act upon its threat, and “efforts are being made by moderate 
elements to damp the whole thing down, both by checking hostile criticism in the press and 
by discouraging M. Solh’s friends from raising the matter in the Chamber”.780 The Sunni 
community was not strong enough on its own to get away with actually killing or exiling 
Solh, so a compromise was struck. 
Thus, Solh’s return also signalled further progress in Lebanon’s recovery despite the 
tensions it provoked. Similar conclusions can be drawn from Edde’s failure to pursue 
charges or indeed further investigation of Chehabeddine in the Nabulsi kidnap-and-murder 
affair earlier in the year. 
Yet it was precisely this kind of bargaining that Chehab sought to root out. The drive for 
reform initiated by Chehab almost immediately upon taking office is our earliest hard 
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evidence of the Chehabist approach at work. It was propelled by Chehab’s own vision for 
Lebanon, but also his distaste for the existing system:  
The spoils system is tradition in this country, and when President Chamoun laid down 
office it was inevitable that there would be many changes in the Civil Service. As a soldier, 
however, the new President had suffered from the inefficiency of the governmental 
machine and had developed a pronounced distaste for politicians. Helped, no doubt, by the 
balance of power within Monsieur Kerame’s four-man government, he was therefore 
anxious that the changes should amount to more than replacing as many as possible of the 
“ins” by the “outs”. 781 
Many of even these preliminary reforms, however, came up against resistance from the 
system. For example, when the government issued decrees transferring high ranking civil 
service personnel in December 1959, the changes went over rather poorly in parliament. 
Some of Lebanon’s elite were upset that it did not go far enough, while others were bitter 
because their kin or clients had been excluded. Once again, Lebanon’s elite were obliged 
to bargain: the government conceded and grant a post to Speaker Sabri Hamade’s nephew, 
in order win their vote of confidence from the parliament. Saunders, in a covering note, 
writes: “This is a splendid example of the Lebanese ‘flair for compromise’, particularly if 
we bear in mind that the Speaker (Sabri Hamade) who was only recently elected, is one of 
the principal elements the reforms have wanted to remove!”782 
Chehab did what he could to complicate and challenge these consociational compromises. 
But he ultimately conceded, time and again, because it was more important – for the 
moment – to keep the country stable. In his resignation address, President Chehab called 
upon all Lebanese at home and abroad “to close their ranks, unify their spirits and abide in 
all circumstances by the National Pact, which is the tacit charter of their state, and to respect 
it and strictly apply it”.783 Yet as Ambassador Crosthwaite observes, the resignation itself 
laid bare some of the Pact’s underlying weaknesses.  
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The sectarian allocation of posts within Lebanon’s elite cartel inherently limited the range 
of qualified candidates. Among the Sunni, choices were limited; the Shia had no strong 
leader at all. The Druze and the smaller Christian communities had to accept their exclusion 
from key roles.  
The Maronites, Ambassador Crosthwaite judged, had produced three good, qualified 
presidents since independence, and their Patriarch and leading clergy were of “outstanding 
ability”. Yet, he warned, “the supply of presidential timber from one quarter of this small 
country is not inexhaustible, and there is no satisfactory successor to General Chehab in 
sight”. Crosthwaite, in the same dispatch, expressed concern that Chehab might try to 
resign again before his mandate expired.784   
When Chehab resigned in July 1960, he expected it to be the end of his presidency. So 
when he acquiesced to popular demands to stay in office, Chehab had before him a blank 
slate. He could now build upon his own careful preparations, and he had four years to bring 
as much of his vision as possible to light. This transition also marked the end of Chehab’s 
reluctant consociational compromising: now that the country was out of danger, he would 
move ahead with a principled, muscular Chehabist approach. 
What Chehab failed to recognise, however, was that the country was built upon these 
institutions he despised, and they could not be ‘reformed’ away. In a note written on the 
UK’s Annual Review of Lebanon for 1960, Saunders recognises this from a normative 
perspective:   
The Report might give the impression that the present disorderly way of Lebanese life 
can and should be put right and that the country could perhaps be better governed by 
references to appropriate chapter and verse as occasions arise. Any such order and 
regimentation is contrary to Lebanese character. The whole Lebanese structure 
depends on a balancing act not only between Christian and Muslim, East and West, 
Arab and Arab but also on individual issues. To aim at a wholly efficient 
administrative machine would deprive the Lebanese of the elasticity which now 
permits them to stimulate quarrels amongst themselves on soi-disant points of 
                                               




principle, but which at the same time permits them to portray themselves as contestants 
who are tolerant of their rivals’ views and beliefs and therefore prepared to reach some 
compromise.785 
Chehab, surely, had heard arguments along these lines. But framing Lebanon’s 
consociational system as a reflection of some intrinsic ‘national character’ implies that, 
were this ‘character’ to mature, so might the political system. In 1960, Chehab still believed 
that Lebanon could become a different kind of democracy through the will of the Lebanese 
people. This ambition could only fail, however, because it got the causality backwards.  
Consociational outcomes 
The most significant consociational feature of Lebanon during the first phase of Fouad 
Chehab’s presidency was the strategic installation of coalition government based upon the 
premise of ‘no victor, no vanquished’.  
Members of every sect supported both sides in the 1958 conflict. However, the majority of 
Loyalists and their leaders were Christian, advocating a Maronite Lebanist ideology; 
whereas the majority of Opposition forces and their leaders were Muslim, and their ideas 
informed by a predominantly Sunni Pan-Arabism. Other segments in the country were 
either less invested in the outcome of the dispute, or satisfied to have another group 
represent their broad interests. For these reasons, while the country lingered in crisis-mode, 
a coalition made up of two Sunni Opposition leaders and two Maronite Loyalist leaders 
was an effective stabilising force, as it brought both sides into the same government and 
gave them each veto power. The ‘bare majority’ line-up of Karami’s first government had 
not sufficiently represented Loyalist interests, and as such was hugely destabilising. Over 
time, as the country returned to relative calm, the Christian/Muslim divide gave way to 
more nuanced differentiation among sects, and the government of four ceased to be 
sufficiently representative. At this point, representatives of four additional sects were added 
to the grand coalition. 
                                               
785 Lebanon – Annual Review 1960, 10 Jan 1961, FO 371/158939/1011/1, Covering Note (A. Saunders, 




Throughout the crisis, segmental autonomy was high; if anything, it eclipsed central 
authority. One mistake made by Fouad Chehab was to see this as a flaw that needed 
correcting, rather than a stabilising factor. While the precariousness of the détente led 
Chehab to tread lightly, much of his reform program directly threatened the ability of 
segmental leaders to organise their own affairs. 
Political stability 
In September and October 1958, political stability in Lebanon was marginal, although 
election of Chehab as president had offered some restoration of peace. In this context, 
‘conflict regulation’ is a useful measure of political stability: as we recall, the conflict-
regulation spectrum laid out by Nordlinger essentially gauges violence and regime 
repression.786 This is the dilemma Chehab faced that summer when deciding whether or 
not to employ the army against the rebels: If he could successfully quash them and end the 
widespread violence, the crackdown would increase stability. However, if it failed to do so 
– as it likely would have, given sectarian divisions and the strength of the foreign-supported 
rebels – it would have deepened the conflict past the point of no return. 
Based on the decisions made by Chehab as army commander, Lebanon in the autumn of 
1958 was closer to the middle of the ‘conflict regulation’ spectrum than its brutal extreme 
despite the summer’s civil war.  
Another pro-stability factor in deeply-divided societies may be purposive depoliticisation, 
where the most contentious issues are removed from public debate. We find several notable 
examples of this in the first phase of Chehab’s presidency. It may be observed in the 
selection of an apolitical candidate in Chehab himself, as well as in the extraordinary 
powers requested by his first government to implement reforms. At a time when segmental 
divisions were particularly salient – and the parliament not necessarily representative – it 
would have been nearly impossible to advance any significant policy decisions if they had 
been subject to a broader debate than the one offered within the coalition government. The 
adoption of a neutral foreign policy is also a move towards depoliticisation, especially 
given the domestic implications of the Arab political divide. 
                                               




Consociational theory suggests that heavy external loads will have a deleterious effect on 
stability. Here, we find the corollary is equally true: the UK Ambassador describes the 
distraction of the Nasser-Qassem feud as a stabilising influence on Lebanon in 1959.787 By 
the turn of 1960, the government had “come near to tacit acceptance of Egyptian leadership 
under Nasser of the Arab World”, without significant Christian outcry. This was possible 
in large part because Nasser had been true to his word on non-interference, and had mostly 
left Lebanon alone since Chehab came to power.788 
One of Arendt Lijphart’s complaints about Lebanon’s consociational system, interestingly, 
is that elections operate in a way that encourages moderate candidates, rather than the 
communal exemplars who can truly represent their segment’s interests. One consequence 
of Lebanon’s transition to voting secrecy in 1960 was the ensuing shift from moderate 
candidates towards extremes. While this move would actually strengthen a consociational 
democracy, its counter-intuitiveness meant that it was taken broadly as a negative sign. The 
UK embassy states that the shift was clearly the opposite of what Chehab wanted, and was 
“bound to make his task more difficult”; they clearly see it as a worrying development 
themselves. However, in more consociational fashion, the British speculate that maybe the 
extremes will all balance each other out and better to keep them on the inside.789 Similarly, 
the French suggest that the elections will reflect the present balance of forces – but that it 
is not necessarily reassuring.790 
Democracy 
The summer’s rebellion and the brief autumn counter-rebellion both help substantiate the 
claim that majoritarianism may be anti-democratic in deeply-divided societies like 
Lebanon. These events demonstrate the power of key minority segments to disrupt political 
and socio-economic life, as well as intransitive nature of core segmental interests. Lebanon 
under Chamoun made many Muslims feel disenfranchised, as they were powerless to stop 
major policy decisions which they strongly opposed. The reverse was true in the autumn, 
with Karami’s first government marginalising Loyalist Christians. Over the course of this 
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period, from the establishment of the government of four up until Chehab’s resignation, 
there were very few instances of ‘majoritarian’ democratic practices. However, as we have 
seen previously, Chehab saw this state of affairs as regrettable, and something to be fixed 
once the communities were reconciled. 
At the outset of Chehab’s term, Lebanon did not meet the full criteria for polyarchy, but it 
was not far off. Even amidst the crisis, free expression and association was permitted and 
many alternative sources of information available (although Chehab, interestingly, did not 
always see this as a good thing: in 1959, he complained to the UK ambassador that the 
Lebanese press was irresponsible and insufficiently accountable, and Lebanon would be 
better off if the number of newspapers was drastically cut).791 While limited censorship 
was applied during the crisis, it was not fully adhered to and lifted shortly thereafter. 
Citizenship was also broadly inclusive – members of different segments enjoyed the same 
civil rights. Where Lebanon was most lacking democratic credentials in 1958 was in its 
representation: the 1957 elections had been neither free nor fair, which meant that the 
current parliament was heavily skewed towards the Loyalists. 
Mindful of this issue, Chehab attempted to bypass the parliament as much as possible 
through the more representative government’s special powers. While this may have been a 
better solution than relying on a non-representative parliament, it was insufficiently 
democratic. Recognition of this is likely why Chehab pushed to hold new parliamentary 
elections as quickly as possible. Chehab’s immediate interest in promoting a fairer, more 
proportional sectarian distribution of posts in security and administration also helped 
bolster the country’s democratic credentials. 
While the parliament was not sufficiently representative, leaders were still accountable to 
their constituents, as illustrated by the case of Pierre Gemayel in February 1959: Amidst 
the sectarian-tinged disorder over Nasser’s visit to Damascus, he was effectively forced to 
resign from the government by the Kataeb, on pain of losing control over the party he 
                                               




founded.792 This resignation, moreover, triggered further consociational bargaining, as the 
Sunni ministers, Karami and Oueini, sought a compromise to keep Gemayel on board. 
Chehabist outcomes 
National Unity 
Given the depth of the abyss separating Lebanon’s communities as he came to office, it is 
unsurprising that Chehab made the greatest advances towards cultivating ‘national unity’ 
in the first phase of his presidency. His careful management of former opposition 
politicians, especially his favoured prime minister Rachid Karami, helped reframe 
Lebanese sovereignty and independence as advantageous to Muslims as well as Christians. 
Nasser’s acknowledgement of Lebanon’s sovereignty, in both word and deed, further 
reinforced the trend. Over these 22 months, communal relations improved significantly. 
Chehab, as we saw when he attempted to resign from office, was himself a unifying figure 
for many Lebanese across different sects. 
During this period, the country became more united, and people moved away from the 
extreme polarisation of ascriptive ties. Yet it is difficult to argue that significant progress 
was made towards the Chehabist goal of transcending ascriptive, communal ties through a 
shift in primary allegiance towards the nation. In fairness, that sort of transcendence was 
not one of the short-term objectives Chehab sought to fulfil before he could resign. Rather, 
his intention was to begin laying the foundation for a more robust national identity to 
develop. 
Le Social/Modernisation 
Similarly, Chehab’s actions in this first phase were designed to facilitate modernisation, 
rationalisation, and social justice in the future more than the present. For example, rather 
than attempt to move past the allocation of posts on a sectarian basis, he simply tried to 
make that allocation fairer, and to make the recruitment process within each quota more 
meritocratic.793   
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Chehab told Ambassador Crosthwaite that he “devoted one day a week to the problem 
since he had taken office, and he was determined that some progress should be made. It 
was not a question of changing a few senior officials; the whole system had to be 
overhauled to improve efficiency and check abuse.” 794 
In the first stage of Chehab’s presidency, the most significant step towards overhauling that 
system and furthering development and social justice was undoubtedly the IRFED surveys. 
Chehab and his government invested considerable time, effort, and resources so that the 
Mission could plan and execute a robust, scientific survey of socio-economic conditions 
across the country. To date, this remains the most comprehensive study of its kind on 
Lebanon. His hope was that the next administration, armed with reliable data, would be 
able to institute a modernisation and development agenda that recognised where need was 
greatest, and in time promote equality across Lebanon’s communities and regions.   
However, during this time, we also see some early warnings of the problems that 
modernisation could present. 1959 and 1960 saw widespread strike action. One of the 
thorniest labour disputes concerned Lebanon’s many thousands of textile workers, who 
saw their livelihoods threatened by technological innovation and the inexpensive foreign 
imports a more efficient global system facilitated.  
 
Conclusions 
While Chehab’s stated objectives and priorities over the first phase of his presidency show 
a nascent ‘Chehabist’ ideology, many of his actions were in practice still consociational. 
In moments of acute crisis, Chehab favoured stability and security, and he was able to 
achieve it through traditional consociational mechanisms. Moreover, because his focus 
from 1958-60 was on ‘laying the groundwork’ rather than achieving the Chehabist 
outcomes of social justice, unity, and modernisation, his principles had far fewer 
opportunities to clash with the consociational system and reveal their fundamental 
incompatibility. 
                                               




The 1958-1960 period also consolidated Chehab’s rule and authority, allowing him to 
move ahead more aggressively in the second phase of his presidential term. However, as 
the country returned to peace, his broader Chehabist vision began to threaten Lebanon’s 
consociational framework. Yet observers, as well as Chehab himself, continued to 
misdiagnose which of Chehab’s characteristics and positions were dangerous: 
I have mentioned more than once in this report the reluctance of President Chehab to 
give a strong lead in political matters. This reluctance has not diminished since his 
attempted resignation in July 1960; and there is no doubt that he finds his task 
distasteful. It does not follow that his presence is not continuously felt. He remains a 
potent symbol of national reconciliation; his influence is constantly at work 
straightening out minor political tangles; and he is actively devoted to the 
improvement of the country’s administrative machinery. The impetus behind such 
efforts as are made in the fields of economic development and social betterment is 
largely his. And if he leaves political initiative to the politicians, he does so 
deliberately because (unlike his predecessors) he believes that in the long run the 
stability of the Lebanon and its survival as a democratic entity in the Arab world 
require this.795 
This essentially Chehabist view would inform Chehab’s policy making for the next four 
years, and lead him to pursue an agenda that undermined Lebanon’s stability and 
democratic character. 
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5.  Phase Two: Muscular Chehabism 
In July 1960, General Fouad Chehab declared his intention to step down from the 
presidency. In what was surely Lebanon’s strongest show of unity since the 1952 White 
Revolution, friends and foes alike descended en masse to demand the president stay in 
office. Seven long hours later, Chehab acceded to these demands, and in so doing accepted 
to continue his presidency into a second phase. With the country out of immediate danger, 
during this phase, he would be free to privilege an agenda of his own; and the spectacular 
show of support provoked by his resignation gave him a newfound authority and 
legitimacy. The French Ambassador again reminds us that this sort of politics would feel 
out of character for Chehab, 
If he had the modesty to conclude, during our meeting yesterday, that this was a 
worrying sign of Lebanon’s fragility, his political sense is sure enough to make him 
aware of the advantages he could, if he so wishes, take from this situation he created 
through his own initiative. Doubtless, his temperament will not allow him to govern 
authoritatively. But despite certain comments he made yesterday, he cannot ignore that 
he is now well positioned to impose his will on the deputies.796  
And indeed, Chehab did not seize the opportunity to ‘impose his will’ in the way one might 
expect: For example, he proceeded to name Saeb Salam as premier, despite his personal 
dislike for the man, in accordance with the results of the elections. However, Chehab did 
use his newly-empowered position to pursue a more aggressive Chehabist approach to 
Lebanese politics and development. 
In September 1960, the British ambassador found Chehab “in a gloomy mood about the 
world situation as a whole” in light of recent communist advances. Crosthwaite relates 
Chehab’s explanation for his worry: “As a totalitarian country the Soviet Union was at an 
advantage over the democracies in its dealings with the under-developed countries, since 
trade and aid were more easily coordinated to suit policy”. Chehab dismissed Crosthwaite’s 
suggestion that the Russians may end up doing themselves more harm than good in their 
                                               




new launch adventures. In the midst of the of the Chehabist project, Chehab lamented that 
in Lebanon “even the Christians were not yet sufficiently alive to the dangers of 
Communism, and with the Moslems, without the Vatican to call them to order from time 
to time, things were worse, though it was true that Nasser was now engaged in a bitter 
struggle with Communism”.797 
In this chapter, we will consider the evolution of the Chehabist project, and how 
unanticipated events – in particular, 1961’s abortive coup – altered its trajectory. From that 
time forward, security assumed a far more prominent position in Chehab’s agenda. We will 
also take a closer look at the presidential campaign of 1964, a crucial turning point when 
the future of the Chehabist project – and consociational stability – were set in motion. 
Finally, the chapter will look at the struggle between consociational and Chehabist 
imperatives over the course of the four-year period. 
The Chehabist drive for socio-economic reforms 
Whereas reform in the first stage of the Chehab presidency had focused on legislation, the 
second stage rapidly progressed on to actual implementation – while adjusting the 
regulatory decrees as necessary and correcting previous mistakes.798 This was because “it 
was realized at that time that a number of the provisions of the legislative and regulatory 
decrees had caused administrative hardships, and that in a number of areas jurisdictional 
conflicts had arisen”.799 In terms of specific administrative achievements, efforts were 
focused on specialist training, and developing job descriptions; Chehab also devolved 
authority down to field offices, and created more robust measures for inspection and 
guidance.800 
The Lebanese economy had weathered the 1958 crisis surprisingly well, in large part 
because both the government and rebels went out of their way to avoid unnecessary 
economic disruption.801 All major stakeholders were keen to preserve their country’s 
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remarkable prosperity. Beirut had emerged as a regional economic hub with the foundation 
of the mutasarrifiya in Mount Lebanon. However, it was under the careful and purposive 
cultivation of French mandatory authorities and their local partners that it was transformed 
from an Ottoman provincial city to a major national capital.802 This position was 
consolidated after WWII through industrial expansion and Lebanon’s rise as middleman in 
international trade.803 Starting in the 1950s, Lebanon also became a destination for the 
capital pouring out from the oil producing countries of the Gulf.804 Strict banking secrecy 
legislation appealed to investors, while 
Lebanon’s weak central government, a government not inclined to impose radical 
measures of any sort, has provided an added attraction for investment. In the past and 
today the government has posed no nationalisation threat, no potential scare of control 
to repel the new and insecurely rich barons of the Arab East. 805   
Tourism, moreover, was ever expanding, based on two main categories of visitors to 
Lebanon: “rich Arabs … who take villas on Mount Lebanon for the summer season” and 
“Europeans or Americans, often from cruise ships”.806 Yet for all its success, Lebanon’s 
economy was highly dependent on commercial and banking services. Agriculture and 
industry were sorely underdeveloped. The Lebanese periphery suffered in particular, as 
“the absence of large-scale industry minimizes work opportunities and discourages 
mobility. Industry is constrained by the paucity of natural resources”.807 Meanwhile, the 
traditional guild system which had structured Lebanese industry was in decline, but unions 
had yet to properly fill that void.808 By 1963, the UK reports “sign of malaise”, as 
unresolved issues surrounding transit trade and a saturated Lebanese market discouraged 
Arab investment.809 
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Economic disparities across religious confessions and geographic regions made both 
sectarian and socio-economic disputes more volatile. Chamoun had not been wholly 
unsympathetic to the need for development in Lebanon. From the 1950s onwards, public 
works projects had taken place on a limited scale. The first major long-term project of this 
kind was the Litani Power and Irrigation scheme.810 According to Sheikh Najib 
Alamuddine, who sat on the original Litani Board, the project stalled due to external 
interference: “Powerful foreign interests were determined to sabotage it and deprive 
Lebanon of the waters of the Litani river”.811 The Planning and Development Board under 
Chamoun also submitted a five-year plan for economic development in February 1958, but 
it fell apart along with Chamoun’s presidency.812 In 1962, the Planning Ministry announced 
that it had asked the IRFED team to prepare a new Five-Year Plan for 1964-1968.813 
Chehab’s administrative reforms were more effective than any which came before him, but 
the effort had its shortcomings; Salem writes that under Chehab, “planning was encouraged 
personally, but the Ministry lacked the data, experience, personnel, and the extensive 
political and bureaucratic support needed to be effective”.814 Another issue was that, at 
every new phase of the reform project, brand new committees and instruments were 
established to design and oversee progress, resulting in redundancy and inefficiency. 
Chehab’s reform programme also arguably placed too much emphasis on “administrative 
and financial controls”, which upset progress towards devolution by making the system 
highly rigid.815 In the second phase of Chehab’s presidency, this rigidity complicated 
reform implementation. Nonetheless, the year of Chehab’s attempted resignation was 
largely “quiet and prosperous”.816  
Public works were sluggish during the first Chehabist phase. With the second phase of 
Chehab’s presidency, public works spending soared: In 1962, the government spent LL 
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144,815,000 on public works versus LL 53,150,000 in 1961, and just shy of combined total 
of public works spending for the past three years.817 The 1963 budget would add an 
additional LL 20 million to the Ministry of Public Works alone.818 In both years, the lions’ 
share of public works spending went towards the expansion and improvement of roads, 
and rural water and electricity supplies. Although the increase in spending would inevitably 
strain Lebanon’s reserves, as the UK First Commerical Secretary in Lebanon commented 
in 1963, “with public debt at less than £4 a head there seems little cause for immediate 
worry on that score”.819 Meanwhile, the cost of living remained fairly stable, although the 
government made moves to reduce it. For example, in 1962, new regulations lowered the 
retail price of pharmaceuticals by 20 to 60%.820 In 1963, Chehab presided over 
consultations with local and French experts on how the country’s tax structure might be 
amended “to shift part of the burden of taxation from the poor to the rich”.821 
With this in mind, the projects pursued by the government during this phase included a 
long-overdue reform of the outdated Labour Law, a rise in the minimum wage to reflect 
increasing cost of living, and various infrastructural projects to connect and modernise 
remote villages.822 As the power of trade unions slowly grew, the Director-General of the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, Dr. Rida Wahid, pushed through a law allowing 
Collective Agreements and began to ratify long-neglected ILO conventions.823  
It is evident that the unions are treated with more consideration by Dr. Rida Wahid, who is 
the protégé of President Chehab, than by his predecessors… Strengthening of trade 
unionism is a pre-requisite of the social reforms desired by the President, and Dr. Wahid 
and secured ILO agreement to the despatch of an expert to train and develop Lebanese 
unions.824 
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In anticipation of growing energy needs, the Litani River project was revived, though 
progress remained slow.825 The government also moved forward with its plan for a new 
law governing Social Security, which after much delay would enter into effect on 1 May 
1965. Among other provisions, the Social Security Law would “[provide] for sickness and 
maternity benefits, workmen’s compensation, family allowances and termination 
grants”.826  
There were two “main” development plans underway during this phase: The Plan Vert, or 
Green Plan, and a popular housing scheme.827 The Plan Vert was designed to advance land 
reclamation and reforestation, while mitigating social issues including internal migration. 
In the early 1960s, technological advancements and cheap foreign imports meant that many 
rural Lebanese could no longer support themselves on the income they gained from their 
land. This had spurred mass urbanisation as young people in particular moved to the cities 
in search of work. Meanwhile, the land they left behind suffered from neglect, erosion, and 
environment degradation. The situation was self-perpetuating, as the initial costs of repairs 
were beyond the means of most small farmers.828 Moreover, as Salem notes, “Agriculture 
in Lebanon remains under strong traditional influences, which impede its efficiency and 
restrict its productive capacity. Apparently, few farmers know of the possibility of 
government support and most distrust government”. 829 
To address these issues, in early 1962 Chehab launched a ten-year program, the Plan Vert, 
to revitalise these agricultural lands, farms and orchards as part of a strategy of rural 
development. With the assistance of the UN and FAO, the project would train Lebanese 
experts in ‘modern techniques’ and best practices to combat deforestation, over-grazing, 
and other agricultural issues. The idea was that the local trainees would then go out and 
offer assistance to Lebanese farmers, assessing the work necessary to repair their land and 
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offering help in the form of technical assistance, consultation, and subsidized equipment 
and plant stocks.830  
While Chehab’s agricultural reforms in general yielded mixed results, the Green Plan was 
fairly successful in its efforts “to help the farmer utilize new land, reclaim formerly arable 
land, build agricultural roads, and undertake reforestation on a major scale.”831  
The other key development goal in the second phase of Chehab’s presidency was a public 
housing project. In the autumn of 1962, the government passed strong legislation to provide 
low-cost housing to low income Lebanese, with the first new constructions set to break 
ground in 1964.832 By mid-1963, little progress had been made towards implementation, 
and the project had “not gone beyond the stage of a bill said to be under study by a “Housing 
Council” set up for the purpose in September 1962.”833 Sure enough, 1964 came and went, 
and the law was “substantially revised” in 1965.834 According to Salem, the housing project 
was stymied by the failure to develop robust data collection stymied in Lebanon.835 In 
August 1963, the Monetary and Credit Act was promulgated, which included the 
establishment of a Lebanese Central Bank (the Bank itself would open at the end of March 
1964). The law was the first real attempt to regulate the Lebanese banking industry.836  
Chehab pursued multiple tracks towards stabilising the country’s economic foundation, 
including efforts towards industrialisation.  
But with industrialisation the Lebanese Government is faced with what must be the 
central and most vital question in the economic field. Can the Lebanon afford to 
maintain its policy of (relatively) free trade? For years Lebanese industrialists with a 
tiny home market and with most nearby markets closed by Arab brotherly love, have 
been crying out for more protection. … With the weak but growing power of the trade 
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unions being added to that of the industrialists, the Government will probably have to 
yield.837 
In 1961, the IRFED Mission issued a 900-page report in two tomes on Lebanon’s needs 
and capabilities. This report “greatly influenced” the government, and led it to ask “the 
IRFED mission to extend its stay in Lebanon and make some specific plans regarding the 
implementation of some of the proposed recommendations, especially in respect to the 
revival of the rural areas economically and socially”.838  
In 1962, the Ministry of Planning issued a statement announcing its intention, after the 
success of the IRFED study, to engage the organisation to develop a five-year plan for 
development in Lebanon for the period 1964-68.839 Its activities would be drawn up 
through ten sub-plans, relating to roads, electricity, hydraulics, agriculture, fishing, 
tourism, industrial orientation, commercial orientation, teaching, and health.840 
In a liberal society, according to IRFED, directed planning required coordination between 
the public and private sectors in terms of socio-economic policy and specific objectives. 
However, where this kind of collaboration is not possible at present, the first stage of 
planning instead must focus on harmonising administrative activities with public 
investments; through the judicious use of economic stimulants, the private sector can be 
brought into alignment. This idea of principled, realistic, incremental progress underpinned 
IRFED’s Five-Year Plan for development in Lebanon.841 In June 1963, the cabinet 
appointed three economists to study the plans before implementation.842 Once again, 
however, a beautifully designed, comprehensive plan yielded mixed results. In part, 
observers complained that the Planning Ministry was just “lumping all types of projects 
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into a five-year plan, with little or no attempt to analyse them or to show their independence 
and objectives”.843  
The foundation of the Central Bank in the spring of 1964 heightened unease among the 
merchant class. Yet “even the prosperous Lebanese ruling class continues to be haunted by 
the intangible basis of their economy” as various factors keep a chokehold on Lebanese 
exports.844  
In the second phase of his presidency, Chehab made significant advances towards socio-
economic reforms and development. However, most of the projects were still in their early 
stages in 1964, and Chehab was spending at an unsustainable rate. And the Chehabist 
project for Le Social unfolded against an ominous backdrop of security crackdown and 
expansion, after an attempted coup against the president in the final moments of 1961. 
The Abortive Coup 
From the time Chehab withdrew his resignation in 1960 until the end of 1961, life in 
Lebanon was fairly stable. As noted, the country continued to prosper economically. There 
were a few security incidents, including (unexploded) dynamite found outside the house of 
Prime Minister Saeb Salam in March, and a small bomb outside parliament. There were 
also explosions in buildings which housed five pro-Nasser newspapers, and an escalating 
war of words between Nasser and several Lebanese Christian parties. Lawyers in Beirut 
went on strike in April 1961 to protest the accreditation of an Egyptian-subsidised law 
school in the city – the strike continued for the rest of the year, and dominated headlines.  
In late September 1961, a successful coup d’état took place in Syria, leading to the 
country’s secession from the UAR. 
Also over the course of the year, the government – seemingly at Nasser’s behest – had been 
taking increasingly hostile action against the Parti Populair Syrien, or PPS. When the 
Syrians revolted against Nasser, momentum lit up the ranks of disaffected Lebanese: “Anti-
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Nasserite groups … miscalculated the Syria events as the inception of the retreat of 
Nasserism in the area” and were thus emboldened.845 
In the early hours of the morning of 31 December 1961, the PPS in cooperation with several 
disgruntled army officers set out to seize control of Lebanon. They proceeded to abduct 
several prominent figures in the military, capture the telecoms ministry (where they 
ineffectively attempted to cut the country’s phone lines), and surround the Ministry of 
Defence. The events of that night would trigger an unprecedented security crackdown 
which altered the course of Chehab’s presidency and the Chehabist project. 
Unbeknownst to the PPS and their co-conspirators, a mole tipped off the Deuxième Bureau 
several hours before the coup was set in motion.846 In addition, Chehab later claimed that 
the authorities had been “75% sure” that such a plot was underway since November.847 
However, the government was not fully on guard. It was unaware that army officers were 
among the conspirators.848 The plotters had selected the date because many army officers 
would be on leave for the holidays, diminishing the ability of the security forces to 
respond.849 While only a handful of officers were knowingly complicit, they were able to 
mobilise unwitting troops on the night of the attack by informing them that a coup was 
being instigated by Kamal Jumblatt in cooperation with rogue army factions.850 
While this ploy may have bought the plotters an hour or two, the army was still able to 
swiftly bring the coup to an end with minimal casualties. Over the following months, 
Chehab “decided to impose tight security and military control over the political society in 
Lebanon. The army secret services or Second Bureau became Shehab’s main apparatus to 
achieve the above”.851 Chehab’s perceived overreliance on the security services would fuel 
considerable dissent in the years – and decades – that followed.  
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The primary instigators of the coup attempt were the Syrian Popular Party (PPS; this party 
is known in the present by the acronym SSNP), a radically nationalistic grouping that 
sought the union of Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, and Jordan into Greater Syria, with ’Cyprus 
as its star’. By 1961, the PPS had been nursing wounds inflicted by the Lebanese state for 
over a decade, since a previous failed uprising in 1949 led to its banning and the trial and 
execution of the Party’s founder and ideologue, Antoun Saadeh.  
In the wake of the 1958 crisis, the PPS felt ill-used. Their fighters had joined the Loyalists 
because the PPS vehemently opposed the UAR’s union of Syria with Egypt; they fought 
as Loyalist shock-troops in some of the summer’s fiercest battles. In contrast to most other 
Loyalist factions, the PPS also strongly supported Chehab’s election, paying tribute to his 
rational, ‘military’ approach and even temperament. After President Chamoun legally 
reinstated the party as one of his final acts in office, the PPS believed it was in the 
ascendant, with a new, more sympathetic president coming into office.852 However, as the 
autumn progressed, the party rapidly became disillusioned. 
In December 1958, the PPS clashed with the United National Front in Arsal, leading the 
cabinet to discuss re-instituting the party ban that Chamoun had lifted.853 However, nothing 
happened until February 1959 when Lebanon expelled a number of non-Lebanese PPS 
members from the country, many of whom were defectors from the Syrian military.854  
The party was actively working to undermine and sabotage the Syrian leadership, and 
believed that the expulsions were pushed by the UAR in their ongoing economic talks with 
Lebanon, and as such, a clear sign of Chehab kowtowing to Nasser.855 The PPS was a 
persistent thorn in Nasser’s side, and it was also not very popular among most Lebanese – 
making it a relatively palatable concession for the government. 
Over the course of 1959, the PPS felt increasingly persecuted by the authorities, and 
increasingly “excluded… from access to the economic and political resources of the 
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state”.856 In August, a plot was uncovered to blow up the offices of its mouthpiece, al-
Bina’. The PPS believed the attack was sponsored by Kamal Jumblatt, in retribution for a 
recent al-Bina’ editorial connecting him with the Naim Moughabghab murder.857  
Despite their ‘frustration’, the PPS continued to adopt a conciliatory position towards 
Chehab and his regime, in part to support their lone MP, Assad al-Ashkar. After 
Moughabghab was killed, it looked like the PPS had a good shot at filling his vacancy in 
the Chouf. The PPS candidate was backed by both Chamoun and the late MP’s family, but 
still lost the by-election to Jumblatt’s candidate by a considerable margin (8,908 votes to 
6,051).858 To most observers, this outcome was likely due to an aversion to the party among 
some voters who would normally have backed Chamoun, as well as the eleventh-hour 
decision by Majid Arslan to support the candidate of his rival, Jumblatt.859 To the PPS, 
however, their loss was a direct consequence of the other side’s corruption and the 
interference of the army in the by-election.860 
The final straw for the PPS came in the 1960 general elections when, despite the 
enlargement of the parliament, they failed to win a single seat. It promptly announced 
through al-Bina’ that it would now stand in opposition to the Chehab regime, which it 
characterised as “an unhappy blend of a dishonest dictatorship and a wishy-washy 
parliamentarism”.861  
By late 1961, the PPS felt it had been frozen out of all the official channels, and that it was 
only a matter of time before the regime pursued the party in earnest. Buoyed by the success 
of the Syrian coup, the party began to strategise how it might protect its own interests and 
future in Lebanon. 
The coup attempt 
According to the text of the third indictment, issued on 28 May 1962, the goals of the coup 
attempt were “modifying the Constitution by illegal means, provoking an armed rebellion 
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against the established powers in order to prevent them from exercising their duties, 
usurping civil and military powers, provoking a civil war and slaughter by arming the 
Lebanese against one another, inciting to murder and sabotage, kidnapping several officers 
and depriving them of their liberty by force, attempting to kidnap statesmen and 
politicians”.862  
While the PPS would probably not agree fully with that characterisation, depositions with 
the key PPS suspects clarify the motivations for the plot: In large part, it was a response to 
the party’s perceived oppression by the current regime; as well as the party’s conviction 
that true progress and justice could only be achieved with the abolition of political 
sectarianism.863 The plotters hoped that the establishment of a secular, modern and just 
state in Lebanon could serve as a model to the other states of the Fertile Crescent, who in 
time would unite as a single, unified Syrian state.864 The PPS members confessed to 
misrepresenting their party doctrine in 1958 when their authorisation was reinstated by 
asserting a commitment to Lebanese independence; however, it is hard to believe that the 
authorities genuinely believed the party had renounced its raison d’etre of uniting Greater 
Syria. 865 
The central army officers involved in the plot, on the other hand, were largely concerned 
by the perceived failings of Lebanon’s security forces and its leadership, particularly the 
Deuxième Bureau. According to the indictment, “they claimed that the Bureau was 
subscribed to partisanship and favouritism, rewarding the privileged and pursuing without 
cause those they frowned upon”; the only way they saw to remedy the status quo was to 
seize control of the military.866 
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The indictment text describes how the first seeds of the plot took root over the course of 
meetings between Captain Chawki Khairallah and the PPS leadership in the summer of 
1961. The success of the Syrian military coup in late September convinced the men that a 
coup could also succeed in Lebanon. By mid-October, the idea had been brought to the 
PPS Superior Council for discussion. Despite several resignations by council members who 
opposed the plan, it was eventually approved. The final preparatory meeting took place on 
29 December, fixing the details of how the action would unfold at 2:15 AM on the morning 
of 31 December.867  
The coup was largely financed by the PPS itself, through a donation campaign organised 
by the party’s leader; contributions from the party leadership themselves; as well as some 
contributions from sympathetic forces in Jordan.868 According to the indictment, the 
decision to stage a coup was only taken after the PPS believed it had exhausted all legal 
avenues for change, including appeals to Raymond Edde and Camille Chamoun.869 
Within the plan itself, there was a division of labour between the PPS and the officer 
contingent. The party would occupy the telecommunications ministry, in order to cut phone 
lines between Lebanon’s major cities. They were also tasked with kidnapping a number of 
top-ranking officers, the Prime Minister, the Speaker of Parliament, and Ministers Pierre 
Gemayel and Kamal Jumblatt. The PPS forces would also support the military operations, 
and facilitate the treatment of the wounded at the American University Hospital in Beirut. 
The officers, for their part, would occupy the Ministry of Defence, and kidnap several high-
ranking officers who lived in the Ministry’s vicinity.870 Joint operations included seizing 
radio broadcasters, the Emergency Services barracks, and the Kataeb House in Saifi.871  
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The subject of who would abduct President Chehab proved contentious, with neither side 
wanting to take responsibility. Ultimately, the matter was settled by making it another joint 
operation. Soldiers would escort PPS men in military uniforms to the Presidential Palace, 
where they would inform the Republican Guard that they needed to transport the president 
to meet with the Army Commander immediately for a ‘special mission’.872 Once inside, 
they would tell the president that a coup d’état was underway, and they needed to escort 
him to the Army General Staff for safety. The plotters chose ‘Hassoun’, or ‘goldfinch’, as 
their password for the operation.873  
In the end, the conspirators were too slow and unprepared for their task. In addition to the 
earlier information leaks, the failure to cut a secret telephone line between the Defence 
Ministry and the Internal Security Forces allowed the alarm to be raised almost 
immediately, and armoured vehicles had deployed in Sarba before they could reach it.874 
This failure to prioritise the operation to capture Chehab is held up by the PPS as a primary 
reason for the coup’s failure.875 
Had the attack succeeded, the men hoped to install Jawad Boulos as President of the 
Republic and Suleiman al-Ali as Prime Minister.876 Chehab would be exiled, and the 
current parliament dissolved. A new military command would be installed and promptly 
seal Lebanon’s borders, while communiques were broadcast to the general public 
explaining the rationale for the coup. A provisional government would be introduced, 
which would include several PPS leaders; the new government’s policy would emphasise 
secularisation and the abolition of political confessionalism; social security legislation; an 
updated electoral law; the adoption of a truly neutral foreign policy; the establishment of 
an economy on a more productive, pro-industry basis; and closer coordination between the 
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countries of the Fertile Crescent.  No real preparations were made in the event of failure.877 
Indeed, the conspirators were so sure of their success that in the days leading up to the 
attempted coup they despatched representatives to several international capitals so they 
would be in place to help persuade those states to recognise the new regime.878 
The aftermath 
The British embassy notified the Foreign Office of the incident around noon on 31 
December; at that point, it was characterised as follows: “There was some trouble in the 
army last night in the course of which dissident officers apparently occupied Ministry of 
Defence for a time and various high ranking officers were seized”. However, order had 
been swiftly restored. Although there were rumours of PPS involvement, it was at that 
point presented as chiefly an army affair.879 The Lebanese government convened in Jounieh 
that morning, and its swift response was to ban the PPS, appoint a special investigator, and 
appoint ministerial committees to draft legislation on: 
1. Observation (muraqabat) of party sources of income, activities and aims in 
Lebanon 
2. Organisation of the affairs of publications, press, radio and television and 
observation of the incomes of papers 
3. Entry and residence of foreigners, and political asylum 
4. Clandestine entry into the country 
5. The organisation of refugees’ affairs and residence.880 
The immediate reaction from all political sides was that the coup was “crazy”; the UK 
ambassador elaborated that “it is policy of PPS to work for a ‘Greater Syria’, but it passes 
comprehension how they can have hoped to achieve this end in present circumstances”.881 
In a follow-up telegram two hours later, Ambassador Crosthwaite warned that the UK must 
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“expect to be accused of responsibility” due to British support for Chamoun, an ally of the 
PPS, and various rumours circulating about UK interest in the Fertile Crescent.882 At the 
time of the coup attempt, “by an unfortunate coincidence a report had just reached President 
Chehab of some alleged decision by NATO which involved redrawing the map of the 
Middle East”.883  
And indeed, such speculation dominated the Lebanese press in the following days, as “all 
commentators agree that Her Majesty’s Government were behind the coup, which was a 
link in the chain of imperialist conspiracies against Arab socialism. … There are several 
feature articles about British intrigue and Britain’s failure to understand what is going on 
in the Arab world”.884 When the UK ambassador complained to Chehab that Jumblatt, who 
was Minister of the Interior at the time, had been telling the press that the UK was behind 
the coup attempt:  
The President nearly exploded. “Why can’t that man hold his tongue?” The Prime Minister 
and (I think) Gemayel had already been on to him about Jumblatt’s remarks. … Jumblatt 
must see some electoral advantage in taking this line. He complained about all Lebanese 
politicians. Gemayel had been just as embarrassing last year with his public challenge to 
Nasser to give the Syrians a chance of expressing their opinions. 885 
By 10 January, however, press accusations seemed to have shifted away from Britain 
towards Jordan and the Saudi royal family.886 Public references by Jordan’s King Hussein 
“to the Fertile Crescent, to ex-President Chamoun and to President Chehab’s knowledge 
of past Jordanian help to the PPS did not help matters”.887 The UK ambassador seems to 
reject the accusations, praising King Hussein’s tremendous restraint in the face of this 
abuse from the Lebanese press and authorities. However, in his memoirs, Boutros reveals 
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that the government early on seized PPS funds furnished by Jordan, but opted not to 
publicly name the country in the interests of regional harmony and stability.888  
There was no real suspicion of involvement by new Syrian regime, which was “viewed 
with considerable sympathy by Christians here and in business circles generally, and in 
spite of continuing opposition from Moslems some progress was at first made towards 
establishing better relations”.889 During a British visit to Chehab on 7 February, the 
President “accepted that we had not been responsible for the coup, though he added that 
we had a moral responsibility for it”. 890  Meanwhile,  
Authority to deal with the situation passed tacitly from the Government to the Army, 
acting on the instructions of the President. The country was combed for members of 
the PPS, and by the 6th of February more than 6,400 people had been arrested, 2,400 
of whom were still under detention in an improvised camp at the Beirut sports stadium. 
Conditions in the camp were at first appalling. Measures of this severity had been 
unknown in the short history of this easy-going country. They were due in part to the 
exasperation of the senior officers charged with the security of the country, most of 
whom had been kidnapped in their pyjamas. And in part to a wave of hysteria which 
swept the country. To most people it seemed incredible that a coup should have been 
attempted without some assurance of outside support.891 
In the wake of the failed coup, the security crackdown was severe. Fouad Boutros, who 
was Minister of Justice at the time of the attempt, claims that around 10,000 people were 
arrested over the first 20 days.892 The atrocious conditions for detainees in makeshift 
detention centres led both the Patriarch and Raymond Edde to voice concerns.893 In 
response, the Ministry of Defence issued a statement insinuating that the army’s critics 
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constituted “a second Fifth Column … in support of the armed Fifth Column which staged 
the coup”.894  
On 5 January, Chehab conveyed to the UK ambassador that “he was satisfied with the way 
the clearing-up operations were proceeding.” Although innocent people would have been 
caught in the dragnet, they would be released in due course. Chehab had opted not to 
declare a state of emergency because “Lebanon was a democracy and should operate as 
such, even if the limitations this imposed sometimes created difficulties”.895 Boutros 
corroborates this claim, recalling that the president made the same argument on the 
morning of the coup itself.896 
The Lebanese Deputy Chief-of-Staff informed the UK military attaché on 26 January that 
arrests were down, and around 1,500 “persons still in prison awaiting questioning”.897 
Based on the army’s daily communiques over the course of January, the UK estimated that 
5,500 arrests had taken place; and that “arms seized comprise 85 machine guns, 65 other 
automatic weapons, 363 rifles, 336 revolvers and sundry other items”.898 Shortly thereafter, 
however, Justice Minister Boutros declared that there were in fact 2,437 people still under 
detention, out of a total of 6,435 arrests to date.899 
By late February, few security measures had been relaxed: “Roadblocks continue to be 
maintained at strategic points on principal roads, and by night in Beirut” while military 
activity continued in PPS strongholds in the Metn and Koura.900  
The intensity of the Security Forces’ response was justified by the gravity of the plot, as 
well as their success in stopping it. According to Boutros, the use of force and repression 
in the aftermath of the coup was warranted.901 But it was also driven by outrage: For 
example, when the UK ambassador claimed that cypher telegrams to a British company 
                                               
894 Crosthwaite to Earl of Home, 12 Jan 1962, FO 371/164146/1015/30, p. 3 
895 Crosthwaite to Foreign Office, 5 Jan 1962, FO 371/164146/1015/9 
896 Boutros (2009), p. 95 
897 Crosthwaite to War Office, 29 Jan 1962, FO 371/164146/1015/48 
898 Edden to Figg, 9 Feb 1962, FO 371/164146/1015/58 
899 Crosthwaite to War Office, 29 Jan 1962, FO 371/164146/1015/48 
900 Edden to Figg, 20 Feb 1962, FO 371/164146/1015/59, p. 2 




were being held by the Lebanese authorities, Chehab excused it as “the result of some over-
zealous general disposition. He pointed out that the senior officers concerned had been 
kidnapped in the middle of the night in their pyjamas, and were feeling tough”.902  
The country had mostly settled down by Easter, and the summer was fairly quiet. Since 
most of those initially detained had been released, there was “no real excitement” about the 
trial of the plotters over the summer, especially as it dragged on and the prospect of death 
sentences “receded”.903  
Nonetheless, the coup had profound consequences for the future of the state and the 
Chehabist approach. The most serious consequence of the attempted coup d’état in 1961 
was the empowerment of the Deuxième Bureau and its interference in Lebanese politics. 
The Lebanese Deuxième Bureau, its military intelligence service, was created as part of 
the Lebanese Army in 1945. Until the PPS’s attempted coup d’état, however, the Bureau 
did not heavily intervene in Lebanese politics, and certainly did not do so openly.904 This 
is not to say that it had not already provoked some consternation: in the run-up to the 1960 
general election, the French military attaché warned of vote rigging: “There is a dangerous 
game unfolding in the shadow of President Chehab, in principle on his order or at least in 
his line, but which carries the mark of the head of the Deuxième Bureau, Lt-Col. Antoun 
Saad”.905  
The Bureau, and the Army in general, were loyal to their former commander. However, 
this could interfere in the normal conduct of government. Several ministers grew 
exasperated by the senior members of the security forces’ unwillingness of to work with 
them directly – orders had to come from Chehab himself.906 
Yet after the coup the Bureau was able to openly assume a more active and aggressive role 
on the pretext of ‘defending the regime’. In his memoirs, Boutros confirmed that, 
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There is no doubt that the attempted coup d’état reinforced the position and role of the 
Deuxième Bureau at the very heart of the Lebanese regime which still felt threatened. 
The unanimous condemnation of the coup d’état by the Lebanese provided the 
Deuxième Bureau with the favourable conditions for it to assert its stranglehold on the 
situation in Lebanon on the pretext that there were cracks which Lebanon’s enemies 
could exploit. Some officers of the Deuxième Bureau deliberately exaggerated the 
dangers that threatened the system and the regime, and tried to intervene in every detail 
of Lebanese political life as well as the press, associations, and parties. Conscious of 
this state of affairs, the president of the Republic tried to permanently separate security 
requirements from those of democratic political life in Lebanon.907  
Nonetheless, Boutros rejects the suggestion that Lebanon under Chehab was any manner 
of ‘police state’; Chehab just wanted to impose rational, military thinking, and to keep the 
country secure.908 Chehab himself later insisted to the UK ambassador that he was a 
“believer in freedom”, noting that “he could have taken over the country any time he 
wanted without bloodshed. But he did not and would not do so”.909  
Fouad Chehab came into the presidency as a non-politician, and as such he had no natural 
constituency or support base. To bolster his regime, Chehab may have substituted his base 
in the army, and the Deuxième Bureau in particular. In any case, this was certainly the 
popular perception. In 1974, a former chief of the Deuxième Bureau, Gaby Lahoud, stated 
the dynamic in more positive terms, saying that “the Lebanese people considered the Army 
to be the party of President-General Fouad Chehab”.910 The critics’ perspective, however, 
was that “the Bureau was used extensively by Chehab to bolster his own power-base and 
to help him bypass and compete with the country’s traditional power structure”.911 
Regardless of how much authority Chehab retained over the Bureau, it clearly escalated 
the scope of its activities after the failed coup. In every village, rural outpost, in every slum, 
the Bureau recruited paid informants to alert them to movements of arms, men, or political 
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allegiance.912 These clandestine activities were complemented by numerous army 
checkpoints across the country. 
The emboldened Deuxième Bureau soon attracted the ire of key members of the political 
elite, including Raymond Edde. In October 1962, Edde stood before Parliament and 
accused the Deuxième Bureau of seeking “to build a police state in Lebanon”. According 
to Boutros, Edde’s address marked the moment at which Chehab began to lose his “quasi-
unanimous support”, as other notable figures including Saeb Salam and Sleiman Frangieh 
joined Edde in his critique.913  
Even Boutros concedes that the Deuxième Bureau under Chehab went too far, and 
“committed abuses against the population” in its response to the abortive coup. Yet he 
remains steadfast that “those who accused the Chehab regime of wanting to install a police 
state didn’t know what they were talking about”, especially if one compared the actions of 
the Deuxième Bureau in the 1960s with those of the security forces in subsequent 
decades.914 Moreover, even if the Bureau overstepped, Boutros highlights the fact that other 
security services under Chehab acted beyond reproach, even clashing with the Bureau on 
occasion.915 
A despatch from the UK Embassy the following year does not dismiss the ‘police state’ 
accusations, observing that “Behind the façade of democracy it soon becomes apparent to 
anyone living here that the apparently ineffective little army, as well as the police, are 
engaged in a ceaseless effort to keep a firm hand on the movement of political suspects”. 
While Lebanon did not seem to hold onto political prisoners, “the security forces do not 
hesitate to arrest, detain and interrogate anyone against whom there might be even a slight 
suspicion”.916 
Yet at the turn of 1964, even in this environment of heightened security, as the coup leaders 
were condemned to death, as the broader region was in turmoil, all anyone in Lebanon 
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cared to talk about was whether or not General Chehab would stand for re-election the 
following summer. 
1964 Presidential Campaign 
From the outset, Fouad Chehab had been clear: He would not allow the Constitution to be 
amended so that he could serve another term. After his foiled attempt at resignation in 
1960, the president was determined not to get ‘trapped’ again. Yet Chehab’s supporters 
continued to press forward on the assumption that he eventually could be persuaded. The 
reasons for this dogged refusal to accept Chehab’s word, explained the UK Ambassador, 
were “complex and include personal, regional, and confessional antagonisms, and the 
support of the Egyptian government and certain elements in the army”.917 
In January of 1964, half a year ahead of the election, declassified Foreign Office documents 
indicate that both the UK and the US assessed Chehab’s reluctance to renew his mandate 
as genuine. In addition to the President’s own comments to the foreign diplomats, he had 
already begun making arrangements to secure posts for some of his key political 
supporters, such as Philippe Takla’s transfer to head up the new Central Bank.918 After 
holding the Foreign Affairs portfolio in five successive governments, Takla left for the 
Central Bank on 1 April 1964.919 
Chehab was also seriously ill for the first two months of the year. The UK Ambassador, 
Derek Riches, was unsure of the full catalogue of the President’s ailments, but reported 
they included “lumbago, a slipped disc, a weakness in one of his knees and perhaps 
phlebitis”.920 When Chehab returned from his long absence, still convalescing, 
[He] expressed his usual contempt for Lebanese politicians and indeed for the way the 
Lebanese in general behave; though he recognised that confessionalism and the history of 
the country had made them what they were. He particularly mentioned Jumblatt, whose 
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“socialism” he derided” after he turned down a request from Jumblatt to back his electoral 
list in the Chouf.921  
There was also, of course, a General Election on the way, to be held over four successive 
Sundays in April and May. In anticipation of the vote, Lebanon’s political elite were in 
negotiations with their foreign patrons. Already in January, Saeb Salam had travelled to 
Cairo to discuss his campaign, leading to speculation that either “he is only making 
technical arrangements to draw the cheque, or that he is disturbed by the prospects of 
inadequate support and wishes to negotiate an increase”.922 However, on the eve of the 
vote, UK intelligence suggested that Lebanese supplicants were returning from Cairo 
empty-handed. Foreign powers mirrored the Lebanese electorate in a general lack of 
enthusiasm for the polls.923 
The 1964 elections turned into a referendum on Chehab’s renewal, in spite of his insistence 
that he would not stand. In the end, several prominent leaders who opposed the renewal 
lost their seats, including Camille Chamoun and Raymond Edde.924 These defeats, among 
others, were quickly and widely blamed on the Deuxième Bureau and the Sûreté Général, 
“and indirectly President Chehab himself, under whose regime these two agencies have 
built up their present undesirably powerful positions”.925 While some charges of army 
interference were exaggerated – indeed, many Chehabists also lost seats in less crucial 
districts – there was ample evidence to suggest that the Deuxième Bureau in particular had 
interfered both behind the scenes as well as physically at the polls.926 In addition to reports 
of bribery, rumour-mongering, intimidation, and ballot-stuffing, the Bureau was accused 
of buying places for some of its preferred candidates on electoral lists.927 
While Chehab remained steadfast in his refusal to accept another presidential term, his 
supporters in parliament forged ahead with their plans to obtain a recommendation to 
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amend the constitution by the end of May. In order for Chehab to stand for a second term, 
a majority of sixty-six out of the ninety-nine deputies would have to vote in favour of the 
amendment. The Chehabists constituted the largest bloc in the new parliament. However, 
their opponents were furious about the conduct of elections which removed their allies 
from power, and opposed Chehab’s renewal.928 Kamel al-Assad’s bloc remained 
undecided, and a further number of MPs had indicated that they would only vote with the 
Chehabists if Chehab himself agreed to stand.929 Their scepticism was warranted, as 
Chehab continued to insist he would not accept a second term “whatever the Chamber may 
do” and even forbade popular demonstrations in his support.930  
Kamal Jumblatt and Rashid Karami led the Chehabist charge, but it began to look like they 
would not be able secure the numbers in time. However, the Chehabists kept lobbying 
deputies to come over to their side – partly, at this point, with the idea of building a strong 
enough coalition to “secure the election in due course of a second choice”.931 At the last 
minute, however, the Chehabists’ efforts paid off, and Assaad’s bloc came over to their 
side. On 26 May, the Chamber voted to recommend a constitutional amendment with a 
large majority of 79-14.932 
President Chehab’s response to the move was to immediately restate his staunch refusal. 
The cabinet, knowing that Chehab would veto the measure as soon as it came up for 
discussion, tried to buy time for Chehab’s allies to bring him around.933 However, they 
could only invent so many excuses to delay. At the end of May, the cabinet conceded the 
point to the President, and wrote back to the parliament declining its recommendation.934 
Under different circumstances, the matter of Chehab’s re-election might now have been 
taken as closed. But the Chehabists were unrelenting, and they still had another 
constitutional avenue: If they could convince the Speaker to call an extraordinary 
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parliamentary session, and if they could reach the higher bar of a three-fourths majority in 
favour, they could override the cabinet decision and issue a second recommendation. This 
move, however, came at far greater risk: If the president again rejected the Chamber’s 
advice, he would be forced to dissolve the current parliament and call fresh elections. 
Officially, the major foreign powers were not opposed to Chehab’s re-election, but they 
were not prepared to endorse him or any other candidate outright. Privately, figures 
including Nasser, Charles de Gaulle, Father Lebret and even Pope Paul VI all urged Chehab 
to stay on.935 
Chehab believed that his ardent supporters “were quite bewildered because it was the first 
time that they had been forced to face up to their responsibilities”, and unable to 
comprehend the idea of a leader who did not wish to cling to power. He explained that he 
had been unequivocal in his refusal and given them plenty of time to find another candidate 
– their present state of alarm was purely the result of their own refusal to listen.936 
Meanwhile, the more extreme among Chehab’s opponents wondered if the whole affair 
was an elaborate ruse designed to make it impossible to elect anyone else.937 
Through June and July, the Chehabists continued to lobby their peers to sign a petition for 
an extraordinary session of parliament to hold a second vote. However, faced by the 
prospect of triggering a new election, the deputies who had previously conditioned their 
votes on Chehab accepting to stand reverted to that position. Without their support, the 
Chehabists had only a bare majority, though it was clear that should the President 
reconsider, they could easily muster the required seventy-five.938  
Under pressure, Speaker Kamel al-Assaad agreed to call an extraordinary session for 30 
July. Two days prior to the vote, when the UK ambassador called upon Chehab,  
He referred spontaneously to the approaching end of his mandate as representing a release 
from his “prison”, after which he would be able to present at such events as the Baalbeck 
Festival without arousing accusations of political partiality. At the end of the call, when 
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bidding the President farewell, I said that I would have hoped to see him again as President, 
to which he replied, immediately and firmly but with a smile, that he had taken his decision 
and that was that.939 
His supporters, however, failed to get the message. The Chehabists had only been able to 
rally an additional three deputies to their side by the time of the extraordinary session; to 
avoid losing the vote, they boycotted the session they had fought so fiercely to convene in 
order to deny it quorum. They were hoping that Assaad would reschedule it for a later date, 
but after some consideration, the Speaker decided enough was enough. Instead, Assaad 
went ahead and called a parliamentary session for 18 August to elect a new president – the 
last possible date for this task, according to the rules laid out by the constitution, was 24 
August.940 In light of Assaad’s decision, “although the loyalists (and the Army leaders) 
have probably not fired their last round, the general feeling is that the campaign for the re-
election of President Chehab by constitutional means is lost”.941  
The indefatigable, increasingly desperate Chehabists continued to fight against the 
possibility of a new president coming into office, threatening to deny quorum to any 
electoral session. Fears began to mount that the Chehabists intended to prevent the election 
of a successor as a means to force Chehab to stay on when his mandate expired.942 Finally, 
and only after Chehab’s intervention, they were made to see that if they did not relent and 
find a new candidate, they might inadvertently pave the way for the election of an 
opposition president.943 Not everyone in their bloc was dyed-in-the-wool, and the 
opposition was allegedly prepared to buy off enough of these agnostic deputies to seize the 
majority in parliament.944 The loyalist coalition could also fracture behind different 
candidates, as the various Chehabist factions had their own preferences. If General Chehab 
absolutely would not stand, the army’s preferred successor was Abdel Aziz Chehab, while 
most of the Chehabist politicians backed Fouad Ammoun or Jean Aziz. The press 
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meanwhile threw in a handful of other names, including that of Charles Helou. Yet Boutros 
recalls that “the president… observed all of this and did not choose a side”.945  
As the election approached, Boutros and Chehab met to discuss potential candidates. 
Chehab immediately eliminated his kinsman Abdel Aziz – keen to avoid provoking 
allegations of a new ‘Shihabi’ emirate – and Ammoun, whose lack of popular base left him 
vulnerable to pressures from Jumblatt and, more worryingly, Nasser. In the end, Chehab 
reasoned that the only man who could preserve Lebanon’s balance and resist pressures 
from the Arabists was Helou.946  
Chehab encouraged the Chehabist majority to support Charles Helou as their candidate for 
the presidency.947 They agreed, in the end, because “no one could develop a convincing 
opposition” against Helou’s candidacy.948 For electoral purposes, it may not have mattered: 
on 18 August, the parliament convened and voted 92 to 8 to elect Charles Helou to succeed 
Fouad Chehab. For all the tension and theatrics of the first half of the year, power changed 
hands peacefully and democratically, in accordance with the Constitution and the National 
Pact. 
Outcomes 
The second phase of the Chehabist era was characterised by two trends: the 
institutionalisation of planning and development, and the securitisation of the state. Despite 
the more aggressive pursuit of reform from 1960-64, it was stymied by consociational 
imperatives for stability and democracy. However, the Chehabists’ objectives of national 
unity, modernisation, and social justice were also impeded by their own drive to empower 
Lebanon’s security forces. 
New battle lines formed as the Chehabist bloc in parliament struggled to convince their 
president to renew his mandate. The contentious nature of the debate ossified existing 
divisions, creating an unprecedented gulf between the Chehabists and their opposition in 
the parliament which threatened consociational consensus.  
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Consociationalism and Chehabism 
The most significant and far-reaching area of tension between consociational imperatives 
and Chehabism rose over the issue of the presidential elections. Four years on from 
Chehab’s attempted resignation, the country had still not found another credible 
presidential candidate acceptable to all sides, and all of Lebanon’s segmental elite were 
keenly aware of the problem. For this reason, all but Chehab’s staunchest opponents were 
prepared to support a constitutional change that would allow him to serve another term.949 
When Chehab did not yield to the pressure to stay on, the Chehabists considered using the 
consociational system to force his hand: If they boycotted every session to elect a 
successor, and thus denied the sessions quorum, Chehab would face a stark choice when 
his mandate expired – stay on, or abandon Lebanon in the midst of a fresh, avoidable 
crisis.950 
Helou’s landslide election was also the product of elite consensus, despite Pierre Gemayel 
insistence on running alongside him in the interest of ‘democratic principles’.951 His 
strength as a compromise candidate, however, was vested in his weakness: “Since Dr. 
Helou has long nursed ambitions to the Presidency this suggests that as the compromise 
candidate, he has succeeded in being all things to all men and may therefore … be unable 
to provide strong leadership”.952 Half a year into his mandate, the sheen was wearing off 
Helou in the eyes of the Chehabists, though they were not yet “openly antagonistic” 
towards the president. The UK ambassador asserts that “President Helou has so far been 
able to avoid becoming a seriously controversial figure only by a policy of flexibility 
verging sometimes on weakness”.953 
‘Feudal’ bargaining again dominated the scene ahead of general elections, albeit ironically 
enough often in favour of Chehab.954 Interestingly, the Lebanese public seemed to view the 
interference of the security forces in the general elections in a completely different (and 
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much dimmer) light from these other forms of meddling and interference. In part, this 
reaction stemmed from a growing uneasiness with the role the army, and the Bureau in 
particular, was now playing in Lebanese politics. Although the Deuxième Bureau would 
reach the height of its political power under the following presidential term, the 
encroachment would always be associated with Chehab. Regardless of whether or not he 
approved of their behaviour, the soldiers assuming a more aggressive posture were all 
supporters of the president-general, and the link could never be fully severed.955 
Lebanon’s segmental elite, in business and politics, shared an interest in preserving the 
limited nature of Lebanon’s central government and the continuation of laissez-faire. In 
order to preserve stability, these elite had to be accommodated. In terms of planning and 
reform, Chehabist reform could only advance as long as it served “to complement the 
private sector but not to enforce central controls over the economy”.956 
As the Chehabists moved forward on various projects aimed at modernisation and social 
justice, the reception accorded to these developments by the ruling and moneyed classes 
generally was not encouraging, but President Chehab and one or two competent civil 
servants seemed determined to promote their realisation. In practice the Lebanese character 
and the administrative deficiencies of the Government can be relied on to dilute the 
consistency of any planning, while these same individualistic and enterprising qualities 
have ensured and will continue to ensure considerable progress in a great number of useful 
projects without any planning at all. 957 
Disarmament had been a stated priority of the first phase of Chehab’s presidency, although 
little was accomplished to that end. The consociational reasons for this failure to disarm 
the population seemed somewhat clearer after the abortive coup. During the security 
crackdown against the PPS and other conspirators, the authorities set about collecting their 
arms. Rather than use this as an opportunity to remove illicit weapons from the population 
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at large, the government promised to return seized weapons to anyone cleared of 
involvement.958  
Once the authorities failed to disarm the population after the 1958 crisis, “a balance of a 
kind was left. Owing to the criminal folly of the P.P.S., this is now being upset”.959 In order 
to restore the balance, the government could not remove weapons from those against the 
coup, especially as the event gave them further reason to want them. This was a function 
of the broader obstacle to disarmament: no community would consent to forfeit its weapons 
if it believed other communities would retain their own. A specific, targeted campaign 
against the PPS was one thing, but any attempts to disarm the broader population without 
the strong and explicit approval of the sectarian elite was only likely to provoke fresh 
conflict. 
The PPS characterised its plot as a way to set right the political and military situation in 
the country, “while putting an end to confessional feudalism and favouritism”.960 It is 
impossible to ignore the fact that, with the significant exception of the Fertile Crescent 
policy, many of the PPS’s ‘secular’ principles have some resemblance to the principles of 
Chehabism. While Boutros, in the government’s first press conference after the coup, 
completed rejected the “methods and objectives of the PPS”, he was referring specifically 
to the coup itself and the Fertile Crescent project. 961 
Bassem al-Jisr argues that, although the coup did not fundamentally alter the Chehabist 
approach, it offered a pretext for the Deuxième Bureau to emerge from the shadows of 
clandestine intelligence work into overt political intervention. It was at this stage that 
Chehab began to lose control over the army.962  
After the coup, the Deuxième Bureau launched a massive surveillance operation within the 
political class; some claim that it even attempted to intimidate the regime’s enemies 
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through “slashing, shootings, lawsuits, and business pressures”.963 Jisr maintains that this 
securitisation of the state and the army’s intervention in political affairs never rose to the 
level of praetorianism.964 Still, in a sign of just how bold the army had become, the UK did 
not wholly discount this possibility as the end of Chehab’s mandate approached. A secret 
document was drawn up outlining the granted unlikely scenarios under which the army 
might seize power in Lebanon, either to keep Chehab in power (with or without his consent) 
or for sectarian political motives.965 
Chehab may not have specifically approved, or in some instances even been aware of the 
Bureau’s intimidation tactics, but they were nonetheless an outgrowth of the ‘rational’, 
efficient Chehabist approach. Moreover, the elite associated the president with the army, 
and as the latter became more problematic in their daily lives, their support for Chehab 
began to wane. The consociational consensus around Chehab and his project was rapidly 
falling apart. 
Consociational outcomes 
During the second phase of Chehabism, the constitutive elements of consociationalism 
were substantively present. Larger cabinets than those seen in the previous phase meant 
the Grand Coalition was more inclusive and representative of the country’s major blocs. 
When Saeb Salam emerged as the strongest Sunni leader after the 1960 elections, Chehab 
duly appointed him Prime Minister despite a personal dislike for the man.  
For the duration of this period, Lebanon enjoyed impressive continuity of government. 
Saeb Salam’s eight-man post-election government stood from August 1960 until October 
1961, with some alterations in May 1961. The 14-man government which followed, led by 
Rashid Karami, lasted for 28 months until February 1964; a new record for Lebanese 
governments. A full half of Karami’s government, moreover, had also served at some point 
on Salam’s. 
Yet as before, Chehab relied heavily on advice and expertise from outside the coalition, 
particularly where it came to development. This undermined power-sharing, and 
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contributed to the creation of a reform program that threatened the interests of the 
segmental elite. 
Political stability 
On balance, political stability was broadly preserved from 1960-64 under President 
Chehab. For all the panic and disruption of early 1962, the government stayed in office and 
effectively preserved civil order. Indeed, once the dust had settled, the threat posed by the 
abortive coup may have contributed to the preservation of order: 
Apart from the comfortable feeling of stability induced by the retention of the same 
Government and the continued presiding presence of the benevolent father figure of 
General Chehab, there were other and more generalised reasons for continued stability: 
the main one was the increasing awareness, fortified by reflections on the PPS plot, 
that equilibrium and tolerance must be maintained if independent Lebanon is to 
survive.966 
The delicacy with which the state handled its prosecution of the conspirators helped 
regulate maintain the peace from spring 1962 onwards, among the PPS and the broader 
public. Firstly, they attempted to depoliticise a manifestly political act in the public 
discourse.  Coming so soon after the events of 1958, the prosecution was at pains to 
distinguish the nature of the PPS’s plot from that of the anti-Chamoun rebellion. After all, 
the rebels had not been arrested and put on trial. To make this distinction, prosecutors 
minimised the plotters’ political motivations, and claimed they “had acted solely from a 
desire to seize power for their own advantage”, while also emphasising the violent, criminal 
nature of the night’s events. The defence, accordingly, attempted to prove that their clients 
were motivated by purely political aims.967 All sides, moreover, attempted to draw out the 
proceedings, so that “the heat may be allowed to go out of it”.968 
The state also offered concessions to the conspirators. After verdicts came down, an appeal 
was swiftly launched; the final ruling did not come until November 1963, by which point 
few were paying attention. The appeal saw a number of men’s sentences reduced or 
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commuted, and upheld only eight of the eleven death sentences handed down to the coup’s 
ringleaders. Chehab would quietly pardon the men before leaving office. 
Although stability was maintained during the period, it did witness a notable escalation in 
popular unrest over socio-economic issues. The expansion of Lebanon’s road and 
communications networks helped accelerate urbanisation, as villagers headed to the cities 
to seek their fortunes. As segmental groups grew less isolated from one another, tensions 
rose along with grievances. As Chehab’s government granted more rights to the country’s 
workers, they became more outspoken, and strikes were commonplace. Within a few years, 
these issues would begin to seriously destabilise the system. 
Finally, the rise of more muscular security services in the wake of the coup began to chip 
away at the last component of political stability: Legitimacy. The government, of course, 
was mindful of this threat. Boutros describes how, as justice minister in the aftermath of 
the coup attempt, “Right away I realised that the regime’s credibility was in the hot seat. 
Everyone was wondering if judicial procedures would be respected and if the PPS members 
would benefit from due process or even if the ‘national interest’ would be invoked to 
condemn them.” Boutros struggled over the months that followed to block military abuses 
or political interference in the justice process.969  
After the President’s Chief of Staff Elias Sarkis attempted to make demands of one of the 
investigating judges, Boutros went to Chehab, who ordered that henceforth all judicial 
inquiries must go through the Justice Minister, and that Boutros’s word on such requests 
would be final. Chehab arbitrated similar disputes with military in favour of Boutros and 
the defence of civil liberties.970 But was this enough to counteract the sense that a security 
state was coalescing? 
Political stability was undermined by the uncertainty of who Lebanon’s president would 
be once Chehab’s mandate ran out. Ambassador Riches saw just one, rather unlikely way 
that Chehab could be convinced to reconsider: “a serious deterioration of inter-confessional 
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relations could take place and lead to a situation in which General Chehab, in his un-
Lebanese but almost arrogant way, might find the call of duty imperative.” 971 
In other circumstances, the Maronite Patriarch might have been brought in to arbitrate this 
kind of national dispute. But Meouchy, who was already on bad terms with Chehab, had 
recently alienated half the country through his reconciliation with Camille Chamoun.972  
 
Democracy 
In the Chehabist reaction to the abortive coup, we see a movement stymied by its own 
contradictions. While the security forces proceeded to crack down, the president himself 
refused to declare martial law or a state of emergency, in a stated desire to preserve 
Lebanese democracy and minimise the disruption of normal life.  
Yet ‘normal life’ had already been disrupted. It would continue to be disrupted by mass 
arrests, deplorable conditions for detainees, and circumscribed movement for the country 
as a whole. The actions of the security forces and the Deuxième Bureau in particular 
undermined core tenets of democracy. Freedom of expression was hindered by partial 
censorship, and the targeting of the entire PPS arguably violated the principle of inclusive 
citizenship. Past and present members were instructed to make themselves known to 
authorities, and many people with no association whatsoever to the coup saw their civil 
rights and liberty curtailed. Of course, in a moment when the state itself is under threat, 
democratic governments all over the world often opt to use more heavy-handed tactics in 
neutralising the threat. Yet this is precisely why the ‘state of emergency’ exists in the first 
place. It may have actually been more legitimate, and in better keeping with democracy, if 
Chehab had declared a limited state of emergency under which the Lebanese authorities 
could implement their security crackdown. Instead, the government attempted a massive 
security clean-up while trying to maintain the fiction that their response was constitutional 
and compatible with ordinary democracy. 
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The 1964 General Elections were held on time, and mostly free and fair. Yet there was 
little expectation that the election would result in many new faces or perspectives. In the 
view of Ambassador Riches, 
This does not mean that the results will be rigged or that the secrecy of the vote will be 
technically infringed. It is simply that feudalism is not yet extinct in Lebanon, that the 
practice of distributing money and the promise of future services to voters is still the 
accepted order, and that candidates backed by the largest funds or the best prospects of 
influential office still tend to attract the most votes. Moreover the confessional pattern of 
the Chamber is immutably fixed. Consequently, though here and there the pendulum will 
swing back in favour of their traditional opponents, most of the old figures will doubtless 
be back in their old seats; and even where new figures are successful, it will be their faces 
rather than their philosophies which distinguish them from those they replace.973  
This, of course, is one of the most common democratic deficits in consociational 
democracies. The reason the 1960 elections saw so much change was that they were 
conducted under a new electoral law, and came after a rigged vote in 1957.  
Chehabist outcomes 
During this second Chehabist phase, significant work was made towards reform, 
modernisation, and rationalisation – of the country’s administration, welfare regime, 
monetary and fiscal policy, and infrastructure. Of course, disparities persisted, and 
grievances only grew as those in the periphery got a better view of the centre. Yet Chehab 
was optimistic that, in the years that followed, his initiatives would narrow the gap between 
rich and poor, rural and urban. 
Less progress was made towards national unity. The moments when the population felt 
most united was when it wanted to keep Chehab in office, at the start and again at the end 
of the 1960 – 1964 period. He himself was the unifying factor, and was unable to cultivate 
successful alternatives. 
                                               





While most of the work carried out over these four years was focused on modernisation 
and social justice, national unity was still at the heart of the Chehabist development plan. 
On the most basic level, aside from preserving the dignity of rural and marginalised 
populations, Chehabism literally connected them to the rest of the country through roads, 
amenities, and other infrastructure. More explicitly, Chehab’s development program 
included measures such as the establishment of ‘rural clubs’, meant to encourage social 
and cultural activities, but also to “awaken a national consciousness”.974 
The Chehabists attempted to frame the failure of the coup d’état staged against them as a 
by-product of this growing sense of nationalism. In the bill of indictment issued against the 
conspirators, they wrote that, 
If the plotters had been clairvoyant, they would have understood that their plot 
could only end in total failure, as this nation which has faced conquerors and 
preserved itself throughout the centuries, is today more solid than ever, and that it 
is in fact a strong fortification against all who plot against its entity and institutions; 
the Lebanese after much experience have accepted these institutions for their 
country and will not allow Lebanon to become an arena for conspiratorial 
attempts.975 
Yet the Chehabist vision of domestic harmony failed to fully imbed itself in the popular 
consciousness. In May 1963, Patriarch Meouchy issued a statement assuring the public that 
Lebanon’s integrity and independence were guaranteed – by national unity, but also “by 
the support of friendly countries that believe in freedom, justice, and human rights”; as the 
UK ambassador highlights, this latter notion “is out of line with President Chehab’s policy 
of reliance on internal harmony”, a fact which had not gone unnoticed by the public.976 
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By the mid-1960s, the public budget was clearly expanding, which seemingly indicated 
“that the role of the government has been increasing drastically … To a great extent the 
increase observed in the recent budgets is mainly connected with the government’s interest 
in promoting economic development”.977 As seen in previous chapters, Chehab’s approach 
to development was strongly influenced by the ideas of Father Lebret and the IRFED 
Mission. Development, IRFED explained, “is not simply a synonym for economic growth; 
it is economic growth accompanied by transformation.” This transformation needed to take 
place on both the economic and social planes.978 
Even once a caretaker government had assumed control in order to supervise the 1964 
elections, he insisted that they broaden their mandate to include socio-economic 
development.979  
Clearly, the many development projects pursued over these four years, like the Green Plan, 
the Social Security plan, public housing schemes, and connecting remote villages to the 
national grid, were explicitly designed to help achieve modernisation and Le Social. 
However, many administrative reforms also served this purpose. For example, in 1961, a 
Development Institute was created to train the Equipe Polyvalente, which would later 
merge with National Institute of Public Administration within Civil Service 
Commission.980 Administrative reforms were also designed to promote equality, by 
rationalizing personnel decisions and instituting a semblance of meritocracy.  
One of the major objectives of the administrative reform program was to define the duties 
and responsibilities of public positions. … The significance of a job classification plan lies 
in the degree of equity that it provides in the grouping of various positions under a certain 
class. 981 
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Yet the full realisation of the Chehabist reforms was beyond the scope of a single 
presidential mandate: it would take much more work to genuinely reform the 
administration, and it would have to derive from comprehensive study and analysis. 
Moreover, the project was beyond the scope of a single man in this consociational 
environment. Without the support of the elite or large-scale popular mobilisation in favour 
of reform, it could only accomplish so much: 
The prestige given to the concept of planning by presidential support and the raising 
of development to an ideology second only to that of national unity, have led the 
governing class to think more and more in terms of development projects and the 
reforms needed to ensure implementation. If planning does not function as it should, 
and if a reformed bureaucracy does not live up to expectations proclaimed by the 
successive cabinets, then reform cannot be expected to move except at a slow pace and 
without revolutionary or ideological fervour. If the Ministry of General Planning does 
not really plan, it nevertheless shares with the za’ims the task of instituting 
development projects under some sort of a plan. 982  
For all Chehab had to compromise with Lebanon’s elite, he was still able to pressure 
politicians to fall in line with his reform agenda “simply by getting angry”.983 The task 




During the second phase of Chehab’s presidency, he pursued his ‘Chehabist’ objectives 
with intensity. If he had to stay in office, then he would use that time to set in motion the 
socio-economic, administrative, and security reforms he envisioned for the country. 
Adopting a rational, scientific approach to development, he invested most of Lebanon’s 
reserves in the expansion and modernisation of infrastructure. 
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He used consociational mechanisms with less frequency. Perhaps the clearest sign of this 
was his refusal to allow the constitution to be amended to keep him in office. Aside from 
his own desire to step down, Chehab saw himself as a strict constitutionalist and insisted 
on abiding by the rules.  
Yet given the overwhelming consensus behind Chehab in 1964, staying on would have 
been compatible with Lebanon’s other, unwritten constitutional document, the National 
Pact.    There was no clear successor to Chehab – no one who could unite diverse segments 
of the population as he did, at a time when the country was only just cohering.  The 
consociational imperative would have been for Chehab to stay in office, but Chehabism 
dictated that he go. 
In the run-up to the election, Chehab lamented the “pre-1914” mutasarrifiya mind-set of 
the Maronite Patriarch, who in 1964 was still trying to dodge his taxes – over the Vatican’s 
objections – on the grounds that patriarchs had “traditionally” not paid them. Also on the 
subject of taxes, he lambasted Karami’s last minute about-face on raising municipal levies 
as the election approached.984 “Lebanon was still living in the past”, wrote the British 
ambassador, and would keep electing the same traditional feudal elite “because a new 
generation free of confessionalism and jobbery had not emerged”.985
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6.  Phase Three: The Chehabist Decline 
When Fouad Chehab stepped down in September 1964, it signalled the beginning of the 
end for his political program. The third and final Chehabist phase correlates with Charles 
Helou’s term in office, but Chehabism largely unravelled between 1964 and the end of 
1966. As such, this chapter will place its primary emphasis on those first two and a half 
years. 
In his 1964 inaugural address to the nation, President Charles Helou vowed to continue 
along the path laid by his predecessor.986 However, it did not take long for the weak and 
consociationally-minded Helou to break with the Chehabist majority in parliament. 
Meanwhile, the bitter divisions in parliament over Chehab’s re-election failed to heal. The 
bifurcation was along ideological rather than confessional lines, which further 
problematised its repair and the everyday workings of the chamber. Yet the Chehabist 
majority was narrow and by no means unified. Over the course of the following two years, 
the bloc would mostly disintegrate. Kamal Jumblatt split off to lead a socialist front, as 
economic tensions broke through to the centre of Lebanese politics. People were angry. 
Helou did attempt to continue reforms and socio-economic development, but he had 
different priorities – and different resources – than his predecessor. Helou was unable to 
find funding to sustain Chehab’s development drive. Lebanon was also increasingly unable 
to isolate itself from the Arab-Israeli conflict. Significant pressure came to bear on Helou 
and his coalition from regional and domestic players alike. Chehabism had weakened key 
elements of Lebanon’s consociational system. When an unprecedented financial crisis 
rocked the country in late 1966, it would devastate this unsteady structure.  
In this chapter, we will examine Helou’s moves and missteps from 1964 to 1966, as he 
struggled to manage the political class, the army, the economy, regional powers, and an 
aggrieved Lebanese public. Next, we take a more detailed look at the fall of Intra Bank in 
October 1966, a crisis from which Helou’s Lebanon would be unable to recover. Finally, 
                                               




we consider how Consociational and Chehabist imperatives were mutually destructive, and 
left Lebanon highly vulnerable at the very moment the region was set to explode. 
President Helou and the political elite 
Charles Helou was a former journalist at the Lebanese daily Le Jour and a protégé of 
Michel Chiha. However, he was better known for his tenure as ambassador to the Holy See 
in the late 1940s, and his emergence as a leading ‘independent’ political figure over the 
course of the decade that followed. The UK personalities report for 1959 describes him as 
“an intelligent and patriotic Lebanese of the Christian persuasion with a close eye on his 
own advancement”.987  
Even as post-electoral euphoria and cautious optimism reigned in 1964, many recognised 
Helou as a political operative, albeit one who manoeuvred by being a “compromiser and 
appeaser”.988 Any illusions that Helou would proceed as a Chehabist president, however, 
was not to last. According to Chehab’s brother Farid and his confidant Andre Elefteriades, 
by the end of Helou’s first year in office Chehab had split with the new president, and come 
to regret his choice of successor.989 Although the divorce would become permanent only 
in the latter years of Helou’s presidency, Boutros locates the irreconcilable split in Helou’s 
decision to support Raymond Edde over the Chehabist (and Deuxième Bureau) candidate 
in the 1965 Jbeil by-election.990 
After Helou’s election, the Chehabists clung to their grudge against the Speaker of 
Parliament, Kamel al-Assaad, whom they felt had betrayed them. With a narrow majority 
of the Chamber under their control, they swiftly unseated him in retribution, instead 
returning the “notoriously corrupt old hack” Sabri Hamade as speaker for the eighteenth 
time.991 Rachid Karame and Kamal Jumblatt worked to hold the Chehabist majority bloc 
from splintering, but now that they had settled the score with Assaad, observers hoped that 
the parliamentary divide would begin to ease.992 Instead, the parliament continued its 
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ossification into its two opposing camps, even though the question of Chehab’s renewal 
was long since resolved.993 
This enduring divide made it difficult for Helou to name anyone other than Oueini, the 
caretaker prime minister, to lead his first government. When consultations over the 
distribution of portfolios stalled, Helou personally intervened, coaxing Philippe Takla back 
from the Central Bank to anchor the government as its foreign minister.994 
 When the cabinet presented itself for a vote of confidence in December 1964, the debate 
was dominated “by speeches criticising and supporting the regime of President Chehab and 
the interference of the Army in politics”, which caused “a certain amount of heat” among 
the deputies.995  The divide between Chehabist majority and the minority remained highly 
salient.  
The rift persisted through 1965, making it difficult to replace Oueini with a more 
representative prime minister and almost impossible to form parliamentary cabinets. Its 
endurance was fuelled by discontent over the role of the Deuxième Bureau, as “the minority 
is profoundly opposed to the vestiges of the Chehab regime which it detects in the 
inclination of the army to intervene when it wishes”.996 
The Deuxième Bureau and President Helou 
The transition to a new president had done little to discourage the Deuxième Bureau’s rise. 
Indeed, the role of the army in politics continued to occupy the minds of the elite and the 
public alike, who were concerned over an apparent “dualism of power” in Lebanon.997 The 
question of the army’s involvement in politics, however, was not totally straightforward. 
In the eyes of many, including most Chehabists, they were a stabilising force: 
Sharing [Chehab’s] contempt for politicians and genuinely impressed by the dangers 
which seemed still to threaten Lebanon as an independent country, they regarded 
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themselves, probably with some justice, as the mainstay of internal stability as well as 
being responsible for the security of the state…998 
After 1965, this “duality of civil and military powers reached its paroxysm”, only declining 
after the 1968 elections.999 Initially, Helou was accused of granting too much government 
power to Deuxième Bureau, as critics saw the Bureau calling the shots behind scene. 
Despite denials from Helou and Oueini, the UK ambassador’s “other contacts” confirmed 
his suspicions that the army was behind Oueini’s abrupt resignation as prime minister in 
the summer of 1965. Their involvement was presumed to be inspired by “their intense 
dissatisfaction with the behaviour of the Minister of the Interior, Takieddin Solh, who 
among other things took measure to ensure a moderately fair poll in the Jbeil by-
election”.1000 
The country watched the 1965 Jbeil by-election with particular interest as a means to gauge 
the balance of power between Helou and the Bureau.1001 Helou actively supported 
Raymond Edde, who had lost the seat in 1964 due to the Bureau’s interference. Edde, who 
was the favourite, won by just 932 votes out of 20,020 cast, in vote marred “by unrest and 
violence unusual even for the Lebanon”.1002 The outcome, in terms of what it said about 
Helou and Bureau, was inconclusive. 
Helou did make moves to reduce the army’s influence in politics. He replaced the military 
heads of General Security and the Internal Security Forces with civilians, bringing them 
back under proper ministerial control.1003 Relations between Helou and the Army were 
marked by a “veiled hostility” that all too often came out in the open.1004 In another 
instance, a judicial inquiry found that the Gaby Lahoud and Deuxième Bureau had been 
interfering the appointment of ministers for a new cabinet, “paralysing the prerogatives of 
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legal power”.1005 By the end of the 1960s, the army’s role in politics was arguably the most 
contentious issue in Lebanese politics.  
Helou’s approach to reform: L’Epuration 
When Elie Salem tried to make sense of why development planning fell off so precipitously 
after Chehab’s departure, he noted that Helou “lacked Shihab’s enthusiasm for planning 
and did not give the Ministry the support needed to improve its performance”.1006 Another 
more practical issue was, of course, a lack of funds. Chehab had exhausted the state’s 
reserves, which meant that Helou would need to find a new source of funding if he were to 
continue the reforms at anything approaching a similar pace. Foreign loans and increased 
taxation were both floated as possible solutions, though neither seemed particularly 
realistic.1007 
Helou’s own reform agenda centred on a major administrative purge, or épuration, of 
corrupt officials within the judiciary, diplomatic core, and civil service. Two laws to this 
effect were passed in the summer of 1965, and the actual ‘purges’ took place from 
December through the early months of 1966.1008 In January of that year, Helou addressed 
the nation at some length on development, reform, and the cost of living. The épuration, 
he explained, was just the first phase of reform – a means to ensure the second, longer 
phase could proceed efficiently and correctly.1009 Despite his reassurances to Chehab, 
Helou quickly shelved IRFED’s five-year plan, and commissioned a new plan from the 
Planning and Development Council. Many Lebanese experts had resented IRFED’s 
appointment, and were quick to direct the new plan in a more liberal direction.1010   
The épuration was at once both narrower in scope and more dramatic in presentation than 
many would have liked: 
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The President told me on 22 February that he knew he had been criticised for 
excessive caution in his programme of reform; but he had had no alternative. He 
had lacked the means with which the previous regime had been able to keep 
agitation quiet and he had been obliged to use what he called “the sister of charity” 
approach rather than play the butcher.1011 
In part, Helou’s governments – compromised, as they were, by the parliamentary divide – 
were simply not strong enough to push through major legislation. When Helou informed 
the government of his intention to purge the administration of its corrupted elements, 
Minister of Information Najib Alamuddin saw the task as a “courageous, stupendous 
undertaking”, if perhaps overly ambitious for their government.1012  
The other major criticism of the épuration was that it denied its targets any right to know 
or challenge the grounds for their dismissal. Alamuddin’s enthusiasm waned as he watched 
the relevant legislation be rushed through parliament, but “the most serious misgivings 
began to plague me when special committees set up to purify the administration 
recommended the dismissal of a number of senior judges, ambassadors and a few senior 
civil servants” without providing any rationale.1013 The targeted judges had been 
“ruthlessly” and unjustifiably deprived of their right to due process, and to know and 
respond to the charges levelled against them. Indeed, the reform legislation dictated the 
government itself not know the nature of the charges, but must “approve the 
recommendations with no questions asked.” 1014 Alamuddin and several other ministers 
raised concerns about the épuration to little avail: 
It became clear that the proposed dismissals had nothing to do with the reforms we 
had so fervently supported. The new laws had been designed and exploited by 
unscrupulous men in power to take revenge on senior Lebanese personalities who had 
at some time in some way offended them. It was not reform but personal vendetta.1015 
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The government ultimately bowed to pressure to approve the full list of dismissals.1016 
Alamuddin, along with the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, resigned in protest at 
what they viewed as a ‘criminal’ abuse of power.1017 They were later convinced to return 
to the cabinet through insinuations (which proved to be false) that they would be able to 
correct these abuses.1018 In time, Alamuddin would come to believe that the Purge “was 
really designed to intimidate senior judges, top government executives and even politicians 
into submitting to plots that were then being prepared against Lebanon”.1019 
The UK, on the other hand, viewed the épuration as fairly successful, even if they were 
sceptical of its potential for long term impact. In particular, they were impressed by the 
boldness demonstrated by Helou in leading the charge.1020 When he felt like it, the new 
president was capable of exerting some strength. 
Helou’s central message was reform would be achieved slowly, in contrast to the plans of 
profligate former governments.1021 
The rise of socio-economic discontent 
As Helou entered office, Lebanon’s economic situation stagnated amidst an atmosphere of 
“financial unease”.1022 In 1964, Lebanon saw its first budget deficits, as a result of the 
Chehabist development drive over the past few years. The relatively stable cost of living 
in the country steadily ticked upward, as the population itself also expanded.1023 While the 
economy remained strong in the mid-1960s, Riches warned, “any economy resting on such 
an overwhelming proportion of invisible revenue and capital flows, must inevitably be 
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vulnerable and inflationary tendencies at home and political threats both at home and 
abroad are not conducive to the maintenance of long-term confidence”.1024 
Helou’s job was complicated by growing labour unrest. By the close of 1964, his first 
government was “faced less by political than social and economic problems” emerging 
from a mass teachers’ strike “and a general labour malaise stemming from the increase in 
the cost of living”.1025 The government’s intention to address these issues by raising the 
minimum wage met stern opposition from Lebanon’s commercial elite, who saw their 
profit margins threatened. Raising taxes for the wealthy – who were already skilled at 
evasion – was a non-starter. 
In late September, Kamal Jumblatt led a demonstration in solidarity with Lebanon’s apple 
growers, bringing together a diverse array of left-wing forces as well as his own base. He 
used the occasion to speak damningly about Lebanon’s economic system. The rally 
provoked a frenzy in the Lebanese press. For weeks, the question of the free market 
dominated the front pages as well as popular discussion.1026 While many of the leading 
papers vehemently opposed Jumblatt’s socialist proposals, by engaging in the debate both 
sides had to address to the issue of socio-economic reforms and development. The failures 
of the Helou regime to make significant advances in these areas came into sharp relief. 
The papers moved on from the economic debate when, for the first time since the 1949 
armistice agreement, the Israelis staged raids into Lebanese territories in pursuit of 
Palestinian rebels. As Lebanon was increasingly implicated in the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
Jumblatt’s Pan-Arab credentials and good relations with the Palestinians fortified his 
position as champion of the left. 
Although Jumblatt’s left-wing alliance was initially dismissed by the British, by the end of 
1965 they were watching it coalesce with some concern: “This is having its effect, for 
example, in the manoeuvrings within the trade unions and of course ties in with the growing 
                                               
1024 Riches to Stewart, ‘Lebanon: Economic and Financial Outlook’, 5 Mar 1965, FO 
371/180775/1102/1 
1025 Riches to Morris, 11 Dec 1964, FO 371/175696/1015/58 
1026 See Revue de la Presse Libanaise Arabe, 28 Sep – 26 Oct 1965 (Nos. 180-199), Ambassade de 




resentment at the lack of any real progress in the field of social reform”.1027 By the autumn, 
Jumblatt’s pro-socialism demonstrations were large enough “to excite counter-polemics” 
from Pierre Gemayel, who began holding opposing rallies in support of free enterprise. The 
developments were read as “an indication of a basically genuine feeling, namely, that 
unrestricted free enterprise in the Lebanon has failed to provide either a sufficiency for 
every citizen or the range of welfare services normal in a civilised state”.1028  
“Any attempt in the Lebanon to unite social classes behind ideas or policies”, warned the 
British ambassador in 1965, “comes up sooner or later against confessionalism”.1029 As 
many in the country clamoured for social justice, Helou faced renewed pressure from the 
country’s economic elite to ease socio-economic reforms, who believed that Lebanon’s 
prosperity “must always be coupled with an entirely free economic system” and worried 
that a reform agenda would leave the weaker new president susceptible to Arab socialist 
pressures.1030 
The summer of 1966 was marked by ever more intense industrial action, as everyone from 
bakers to dock workers and primary teachers went on strike. While strikes were nothing 
new, the latest were far better organised. Jumblatt, although now in the cabinet, was 
offering support to many of the strikers, and the Prime Minister Abdallah Yafi had a free 
hand to negotiate terms. Yet as soon as one dispute was resolved, two more seemed to rise 
up in its place. Discontent around the cost of living and the glacial pace of socio-economic 
development had reached a fever pitch. 
 
The collapse of Intra Bank 
Fouad Boutros recalls how, in 1966, three significant events struck Lebanon in quick 
succession: the murder of anti-Nasserist journalist Kamel Mroue on 16 May, the first 
confrontation between the Lebanese army and Palestinian commandos the following month 
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on 22 June, and the failure of Intra Bank four months later on 14 October,1031 an event 
“which imperilled Lebanon’s position as banker to the Middle East”.1032 As the largest 
financial institution in the Middle East, Intra Bank’s dramatic fall in late 1966 irreparably 
harmed Lebanon’s economy and its credibility as the region’s banking capital.  
On the one hand, there was certainly mismanagement and corruption at Intra. The IRFED 
report had warned of the dangers of these kind of financial practices in the starkest terms. 
On the other, the crisis itself was clearly manufactured – an expression of xenophobia, 
parochialism, and spite. Chehab openly detested the sectarian elite and politicians for just 
this kind of behavior, and he had tried to make it harder for them via marginalisation and 
reform.  The Intra crisis was an embodiment, thus, of so much of what Chehabism opposed. 
But it was also, indirectly, its product. 
On 14 October 1966, Intra Bank (short for ‘International Traders’) suddenly stopped 
payments. Initially, the Central Bank indicated that it would provide funds in order to 
guarantee Intra Bank’s liquidity, and allow the bank to reopen. As the run on Intra spread 
to other local banks, the government held an emergency meeting to stave off catastrophe. 
They declared a three-day bank holiday, and asked the Central Bank to assist all Lebanese 
banks in staying afloat. However, on spurious grounds, the government decreed that one 
bank would be excluded from this measure – Intra.  
MEA Chairman and former Information Minister Najib Alamuddin, who was also on the 
Intra board at the time, suggests in his memoirs that the Prime Minister, Abdallah Yafi – a 
known enemy of Intra and its chairman, Youssef Beidas – intentionally deceived his 
government in order to secure Intra’s exclusion.1033 Whether through conspiracy or 
incompetence, errors in Intra’s subsequent audit led to a gross misrepresentation of the 
bank’s solvency that no one in government seemed interested in correcting.1034 Indeed, 
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according to the daily An-Nahar newspaper at the time, “The intention was to bankrupt the 
bank despite the fact that it was solvent”.1035 
While the Intra crisis immediately drew attention, it was not until 18 October that the affair 
began to dominate the Lebanese press coverage.1036 Across the political spectrum, heavy 
blame was laid upon the Lebanese authorities and the Central Bank in particular for their 
failure to prevent the crisis. Ash-Shams already used its editorial to blame the government 
for allowing ‘foreigners’ to assume such a large stake in Lebanon’s economy.1037 Several 
papers argued that Lebanon’s failure to preserve its inter-Arab neutrality had also helped 
provoke the crisis, driving Gulf Arabs to withdraw their deposits from Intra. Arab 
shareholding in Intra in 1966 was no higher than 20.32% -- yet an exaggeration of Arab 
control fueled opposition to the bank’s activities.1038  
Ad-Diyar reported on a phone call between former President Chehab and Helou. Chehab 
warned that the far left would reap the rewards of any major financial crisis, and urged his 
successor to find a ‘positive solution to the question of liquidity’.1039 Indeed, with the 
region split between the revolutionaries and the traditionalists, many on the left seized upon 
Intra’s downfall as firm evidence that capitalism could not work in an Arab context. The 
Intra affair was also “an unpleasant reminder of the corruption which seems to be endemic 
in Lebanese affairs”, with as many as two-thirds of the parliament recipients of Intra 
‘loans’.1040  
If the establishment of a Central Bank had initially worried Lebanon’s economic elite, fears 
of government intervention were put to rest with the Central Bank’s “aloof” response to 
the Intra crisis.1041 The Central Bank was not prepared to bail out Intra, but surely someone 
else would. Intra counted Lebanese emigrés, wealthy Arabs, and the Kuwaiti and Qatari 
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governments among its clients.1042 In the weeks following the crash, it was reasonably 
expected that the Arabs might thus show some interest in rescuing Intra.1043 Yet the 
authorities continued to thwart attempts to save the bank in late 1966 and early 1967. When 
Kuwait signed a loan agreement in late 1966, it faced sharp criticism. Kuwait swiftly 
cancelled the agreement just one month later, on the pretext that Lebanon’s Commercial 
Court had failed to authorise it.1044 The Lebanese government eventually passed revised 
banking legislation in response to the crisis, but 
The resultant law, product of the noteworthy immobilisme which has enabled Lebanon 
to survive politically, revealed that the scope and nature of the economic problem was 
not understood and that faction interests still reigned. … The Government failed to 
exploit the crisis momentum, and the economy was free to drift further. 1045  
The plot against Intra 
Intra Bank was founded in Beirut 1951 by a naturalised Palestinian Christian, the 
charismatic and impulsive Youssef Beidas. By 1966, Intra had grown to become Lebanon’s 
largest bank, with branches in every global financial capital and an eye watering portfolio 
of assets.  
It is not for nothing that Lebanon is called the Switzerland of the Middle East. Its wide-
open banking laws, the result of how much baksheesh on Allah could guess, have 
made it a haven of cash for anybody with a balance to hide – U.S. tax evaders, oil-rich 
sheiks who want to lay something by for the rainy day of revolution, and assorted 
racketeers and purveyors of stolen or smuggled wealth from all over the world. 
“Beirut,” said Bedas, with a sigh of nostalgia, “was a green oasis of free enterprise.” 
To foreign depositors, Bedas’ own patch of oasis was the greenest garden of all.1046  
From his early days as a Beirut money-changer, Beidas’s success was driven by the man’s 
embrace of risky ventures where a profit could be made. Among his notable achievements 
                                               
1042 King to Brown, 1 Jan 1968, FCO 17/312/EL1/2 
1043 Riches to Brown, 1 Jan 1967, FCO 17/312/EL1/2/1   
1044 Financial Times, ‘Kuwait cancels £6M. Intra Bank Loan’, 1 Jan 1966 
1045 ‘No End to the Affair’, 14 Sep 1967, The Times (London), p. 23 




was the transformation of Lebanon’s struggling flagship carrier, Middle East Airlines: just 
a few years after Beidas’s acquisition, MEA had become one of the world’s most profitable 
airlines. However, even as so many of Beidas’s gambles seemed to pay off, they left him 
with highly illiquid assets. 
Intra Bank’s success and impressive portfolio could have been a source of national pride. 
Instead it provoked resentment among the Consortium’s power brokers: over time, Intra 
had come to be “the supreme symbol of the Palestinian bourgeoisie to Lebanese national 
life”.1047 To many observers, Intra’s sudden reversal of fortunes in October 1966 looked 
suspicious: 
The success of Intra Bank aroused the envy and hostility of the older-established 
Lebanese political and financial bourgeoisie, who were alarmed by its growing power. 
In October 1966, a conspiracy which appears to have involved the whole of the 
traditional Lebanese establishment brought about the sudden collapse of Intra. A 
carefully engineered run on the bank forced the Intra management to appeal for help 
to the central Bank of Lebanon, which refused to come to the rescue, although the 
assets of the Intra Bank at the moment were known to be far in excess of its 
liabilities.1048 
As an Intra Board member, a personal friend of both Beidas and Helou, Alamuddin’s 
memoir offers particular insight into how the crisis unfolded.  
In October 1966, President Helou called Alamuddin to ask him about Intra’s financial 
troubles. Alamuddin replied that the President had been misinformed – the Bank was in 
the process of expansion, and had recently taken on a number of strong investments. In 
response, Helou confided that Beidas had recently come to him for help securing an urgent 
substantial loan from the Central Bank. Alamuddin, needless to say, was baffled. When he 
managed to finally get a hold of Beidas, who was in the US for a World Bank meeting, the 
Intra chairman gave a very different account: According to Beidas, Helou had come to him, 
and requested that Intra increase investments in Lebanon. When Beidas politely declined, 
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Helou pushed the matter, and encouraged chairman to use the bank’s existing Lebanese 
investments as collateral for a loan from the Central Bank. Beidas agreed to meet with 
Helou’s brother in law, a Central Bank official, to discuss the matter further.1049 He had 
not informed the Intra board of the meeting yet because he saw no rush to bring up such a 
mundane affair while he was travelling. Alamuddin writes, 
He then remarked angrily: ‘You know me and my love for Intra. Would I have left 
Beirut to attend a routine World Bank meeting had I felt the least suspicion that my 
bank was in trouble? And had I wanted assistance from Charles Helou, would I not 
have asked for your help to get it?’1050 
Upon hearing about Helou’s call to Alamuddin, Beidas was “convinced that the President’s 
story would spark off a run on the bank”, and he asked his friend to intercede as soon as 
possible. Alamuddin was also abroad, but he immediately flew back to Beirut. However, 
by the time his plane touched down, there had been “a rapid deterioration in the situation. 
News was spreading like wildfire that Intra was in trouble and depositors were withdrawing 
their money”, including those banks among Intra’s clients. However, panic had not yet 
advanced to terror, as Alamuddin was briefed on Intra’s substantial assets which could be 
used as collateral for government assistance.  
Upon arriving to meet Helou, Alamuddin “argued for immediate help from the Central 
Bank to avoid the biggest financial catastrophe in the history of Lebanon and the 
destructive blow to the economy that must inevitably follow”.1051 But Helou and the Prime 
Minister, Abdullah Yafi, insisted to Alamuddin that Beidas was crooked and Intra was 
beyond saving. Yafi explained that he had received a report detailing this sorry state, which 
rang false to Alamuddin. When Alamuddin demanded to see the report himself, Yafi 
replied that the report “has been sent to me confidentially. I can neither let you see it nor 
disclose the name of its author”.1052  
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Boutros rejects the charges that government allowed Intra to fail.1053 Yet it became clear 
over the following hours and days that not only the President and Prime Minister but many 
other members of the political elite had no interest in saving the bank nor in defending 
Youssef Beidas. Even so, Alamuddin and his allies did not truly believe that Lebanon 
would allow its largest bank to fail.  
 “How could a bank, even the biggest, ward off a run if the President of the Republic and 
the Prime Minister spread the news that it was in financial difficulties and that it had applied 
for government assistance which they were convinced should not be given?” 1054 This 
executive assault, contended Alamuddin, was then bolstered by an on the ground campaign 
of letters, calls, and door to door canvassing imploring ordinary Lebanese to withdraw their 
deposits from Intra “before it was too late”.1055 
Furthermore, even as Arab participation was held up as a boogeyman, Beidas believed that 
much of the animus actually derived from his efforts to boost Lebanese control of the 
economy: “My associates and I initiated the Lebanonisation plan in the full knowledge that 
in so doing we were challenging, not only powerful foreign interests, but also a small but 
highly influential group of Lebanese.” 1056 Alamuddin suggests, in fact, that foreign 
investors – specifically the French – encouraged their allies in the Lebanese elite to initiate 
a brutal propaganda campaign against Beidas and Intra. 1057 
The preponderance of evidence suggests that the Intra crisis was the result of an 
orchestrated campaign against the bank and its chairman. It is irrefutable, however, that 
such a campaign gathered momentum once the crisis was underway, and prevented Intra 
from being saved by local or foreign actors. The collateral damage, however, was heavy. 
Not only did other local banks suffer, and sources of investment dry up, the Lebanese 
economy as a whole was damaged, and confidence in Lebanon’s banking industry fell 
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precipitously. Even among Intra’s foes, the government and Central Bank came in for harsh 
criticism for their handling of the affair – and their failure to prevent it.  
All this damage was then consolidated in June 1967 by the regional instability expressed 
in the six-day war, and Lebanon never recovered its position as the region’s banker. 
Lebanon could not afford to pursue the development projects it so desperately needed, and 
socio-economic inequalities expanded. The communal mistrust exemplified by the Intra 
affair deepened these widening gaps among Lebanon’s population. On both ideological 
and material planes, the government and population alike were visibly worse off. 
 
The Fall of Chehabism 
The Intra affair cast a long shadow over 1967. It was in this gloomy climate that, in June, 
regional tensions exploded in an Arab-Israeli war. While Lebanon played no offensive role 
in the conflict, it took a heavy economic, political, and psychic toll on the country: “If the 
Intra Bank crash was the fault of the Lebanon, the June war was a reminder of the extent 
to which their prosperity depends on factors outside their control”.1058 
As banking confidence plummeted, trade also began to stagnate. Meanwhile, costs of living 
continued to rise without a commensurate adjustment in incomes, raising popular 
frustration over the country’s wealth gap.1059 For many of the marginalised, Jumblatt’s 
socialist ideas appealed despite the man’s erraticism and bombast; his movement was 
bolstered, moreover, by its pro-Palestinian credentials in an era when Israel had begun to 
strike out against Lebanon. For the first time, an opposition began to coalesce around 
explicitly class-based Leftist ideology in addition to sectarian concerns. 
Ahead of the 1968 parliamentary elections, Chamoun, Edde, and Gemayel brought their 
respective parties together in a Tripartite alliance or Hilf, with the support of Patriarch 
Meouchy. The alliance’s central message was that the Palestinian commando movement 
constituted a kind of Trojan Horse for radical incursion into Lebanon’s traditional 
system.1060 The message resonated with many Christian voters. Although the new 
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parliament was split down the middle, the moral victory went to the Tripartite Hilf, which 
unseated key Chehabists.  
If it had been difficult to form a government out of the 1964 parliament, doing from the 
1968 parliament was all but impossible. The impasse caused Helou to briefly resign, though 
the act excited little in the way of public passions. He withdrew the resignation when a 
distasteful solution was found in a ‘government of four’ – the same compromise as a decade 
prior, and with almost the same line-up: the ministers were Oueini, Gemayel, and Edde, 
but with Yafi (rather than Karami) as Premier.1061  
According to Freiha, the decision to give the Hilf half of the cabinet – and to keep the 
Chehabists out – was an attempt by Helou to counterbalance the influence of the Deuxième 
Bureau.1062 After the 1968 elections, “the Christian sector of the Nahj began to show more 
concern with the commando movement, and the Shihabist Army command and Deuxième 
Bureau in particular began to take more energetic measures to restrict commando activities 
in the refugee camps”.1063  
The pressure only continued to escalate. Toward the end of Helou’s term, some began to 
believe the only way to exit the mounting tension was for Chehab to stand again as 
president.  The constitutional barriers he was so loath to violate, after all, only applied to 
consecutive presidential terms. This, naturally, provoked angry reactions from the Hilf. 
Chehab mulled the proposition seriously enough that when he finally decided not to run in 
August 1970, he issued a public statement explaining his reasons. The statement is 
reproduced here in full: 
In response to the pressures I have been subject to, to make me stand as a candidate to 
the first office, I have deemed it my duty, before taking any final decision, to proceed 
to an in depth study of the elements of the conjuncture and of their implications in 
every field. I undertook this task, to assess the possibilities that would be presented to 
me in order to serve my country, according to my personal conception of that duty and 
of the imperatives of the future. 
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Based on the experience I have acquired during the exercise of my various duties, 
notably as the Head of State; taking into account the political, economical and social 
evolutions; drawing inspiration from my personal conception of authority and of the 
role of the State, as well as from the prestige that must be attached to it; and 
conforming to my method of work and to what the Lebanese would expect from a man 
who has the experience of government, I believe that the situation is as follows: 
The Lebanese political institutions and the traditional customs of public life do not 
appear to constitute a tool suited to the imperatives of the Lebanese recovery as 
required by the new decade in all fields. Our political institutions are, in many respects, 
lagging behind the modern political regimes that try to ensure the efficiency of the 
State. 
Our electoral laws are based on temporary and provisional elements. As to our 
economical regime, the defects in its application favour the development of situations 
of monopoly. All this leaves little room for a project of a national level. 
The ambition of such an endeavour is the establishment of an authentic, lasting 
parliamentary democracy, the suppression of monopolies, the guaranty of a dignified 
life and a better existence for the Lebanese, within the framework of a truly liberal 
economy where jobs and equal opportunities are ensured, and where all can benefit 
from the positive elements of a true economical and social democracy. 
But the many contacts that I established and the analysis that I made have confirmed 
my conviction that the country is not yet ready to accept these fundamental solutions, 
that I would only consider within the respect of legality and of the fundamental 
freedoms to which I have always been attached. 
This is why I have decided not to be a candidate to the Presidency of the Republic. By 
rendering this decision public, I thank the Members of Parliament, the politicians, the 
authorities, and the citizens who have granted me their trust. I wish them to succeed 
in the service of Lebanon.1064 
                                               







Chehabism’s final phase was characterised by several trends: the irreconcilable 
parliamentary divide, the role of the army in politics, and rising regional tensions which 
Lebanon could not escape. Unrest was aggravated by the re-emergence of consociational 
practices which had been somewhat muzzled by Chehab’s steady, unifying presence. 
Perhaps most significantly, the period saw rising socio-economic discontent.  
At the turn of 1965, “Behind the façade of prosperity the social and economic progress of 
an important minority of the population faltered”.1065 Chehabism had raised expectations 
to a level Helou simply could not reach, and grievance inevitably rose. Chehabism’s 
socialist leanings and its focus on socio-economic inequality had also helped foment a 
culture where people felt entitled to basic services like housing, health, and education. 
After years of what they perceived as broken promises by politicians, the lower-middle 
class “might be turning away from the traditional political leaders to the trade unions in the 
hope of bettering their general social conditions”.1066 
In contrast to other consociational democratic systems, Lebanon explicitly defines its 
segments and their representation in its constitutional documents. This is a strength, as long 
as the status quo remains intact, but it makes it difficult to accommodate changes. This is 
notably an issue in terms of proportional representation. It also becomes a problem when 
new issues cleave the population along different lines.  
At the start of the Chehabist era in 1958, the two opposing camps broadly correlated with 
the fundamental segments – the loyalists were mostly Christian and the opposition mostly 
Muslim. This meant that both issues could be accounted for simultaneously in government 
formation and other negotiating spaces. In 1964, by the time of the third era, the sharp 
division between Chehabists and anti-Chehabists cut across sectarian lines. This state of 
affairs was highly disruptive to normal consociational political order and decisionmaking. 
By the end of the Chehabist era in 1970, there were four kinds of salient political cleavage 
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in Lebanon: in additional to the confessional divisions, people were divided by their 
position on the army (and its role in politics), their economic leanings (in favour of social 
justice or conservatism), and the issue of how free a hand to give the Palestinian 
commandos in Lebanon.1067  
Lebanon’s government could not truly crack down on labour unrest – and risk its 
democracy – nor could it intervene in the economy to create fairer conditions and risk its 
elite cooperation. The consociational democratic system was fundamentally incompatible 
with Chehabist social justice, and the battles looked increasingly like a zero-sum game. 
Chehabism and consociationalism also clashed where it came to the role of the army in 
politics. Under Helou, much was made of the apparent ‘duality of power’ in the country. 
The UK ambassador, echoing the Chehabists, suggests that such ‘dualism’ may on balance 
be a force for good in Lebanon:  
The Lebanese are a nation of individualists, the only coherent and semi-disciplined 
forces in civil life being (apart from association of bankers and industrialists) 
confessional groups. The army does form a disciplined element and it is an advantage 
to the country that this comparatively solid island should maintain a position in a sea 
of conflicting currents.1068 
To most of Lebanon’s traditional sectarian elite, however, this was an unacceptable 
encroachment. They surely resented giving up some of their power and privileges, but 
many also felt that the army’s intervention was a threat to democracy in Lebanon. In a 
consociational system, they were not wrong.  
The Deuxième Bureau was at the centre of the intractable parliamentary divide during 
Helou’s tenure. In the parliament, the Chehabists and their consociational opponents 
refused to cooperate, making it impossible to form a Grand Coalition with any real 
authority. Without that forum and its traditional checks and balances, little could be done 
to mollify the public and catastrophes like the Intra Bank crisis and its handling were 
possible. 
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Under the circumstances of the third Chehabist phase, political stability in Lebanon was 
surprisingly high. Policymakers were ineffective, but civil order was largely sustained, 
even in times of crisis – which became increasingly common. They weathered the June 
1967 War, and the regular violence of raids and reprisals between Israel, the Palestinians, 
and frustrated Lebanese did not escalate into full-blown conflict.  
While Charles Helou proved unable to cut a unifying figure for the country, Chehab, 
although removed from the public eye, continued to be “a stabilising influence” on 
Lebanon amidst rising labour disputes and problems with Nasser.1069 But this dynamic 
could not endure indefinitely. 
Democracy 
In terms of polyarchal criteria, Lebanon under Helou was a mixed bag. Elections were held 
on time, and transitions of power were peaceful. However, the elections continued to be 
marginalised by consociational voting, and were becoming less fair as the Deuxième 
Bureau grew bolder in its interventions. And as tensions heightened, democratic 
imperatives could be at odds with one another.  For example, Raymond Edde was a major 
Christian leader, so his return to parliament in 1965 should have been palliative. Yet under 
the circumstances, the presence in the chamber of another anti-Chehabist firebrand was 
“likely to prolong the present rather unfortunate polarisation of the Chamber into two, 
artificially constituted and sharply divided groups – unfortunate because it constantly gets 
in the way of the smooth conduct of the Chamber’s day-to-day business”.1070 
The full range of viewpoints and sources of information was available in the Lebanese 
press, despite occasional censorship. The problem of army involvement in politics was not 
helped when, in the summer of 1965, Helou declared press denigration of the army would 
no longer be tolerated, and to demonstrate his seriousness, legal action would be pursued 
against several outspoken journalists.1071 The assassination of Kamel Mroue, the editor of 
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al-Hayat, the following summer was also taken as a challenge to free expression, as the 
Egyptian Embassy was widely believed to be behind the murder. Associational autonomy 
remained intact, although some groups (including the PPS) had been banned. Inclusive 
citizenship was also broadly respected. 
Despite these issues, as well as bifurcated parliament’s undermining of the principle of 
‘grand coalition’, Lebanon’s elite were still able to shut down segmental unrest when it got 
out of hand in the third Chehabist stage, or when it took on a particularly sectarian 
character.1072 Democratic institutions were thus still present under Helou, though by the 
end of the decade they would all be seriously threatened by the pressures of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict and the movements of Palestinian commandos in Lebanon. 
Constitutive Elements 
If we only considered the indicators of political stability and democracy, Lebanon’s 
condition in the final Chehabist era would look sufficiently robust. Yes, these institutions 
had been weakened and marginalised, but the country does not appear on the brink of 
collapse into war. Perhaps this is why so many Lebanese and foreigners alike during the 
period seemed to believe that the situation was bound to improve. There was, at the time, 
“a familiar Lebanese saying that nothing ever actually happens in the Lebanon: a proverb 
which may well hold good a little longer, though not indefinitely”.1073 
When we turn to the specifically consociational characteristics, however, we see just how 
fragile Lebanon had become. The essential, definitional factor in a consociational 
democracy is its elite coalition: Segmental leaders must come together to forge national 
policy through concessions and compromise. This solution only works if, however, if the 
coalition is genuinely representative, and its members have the power and authority to 
make decisions on behalf of their communities.  During Helou’s tenure, these conditions 
were met for only about fourteen months out of seventy-two total;1074 even then, internal 
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and external pressures left even these governments weak and ineffective. In the period from 
1964 through 1966, no governments met the criteria.  
The foremost issue was the bifurcation of the parliament. The very existence of a 
parliamentary majority was seen as fundamentally incompatible with the formation of a 
coalition government – a basic premise of Lebanon’s consociation was that every segment 
was, on its own, a minority, and each was proportionally represented. But within the 
parliament, ‘Chehabist/anti-Chehabist’ had become the most salient political division, with 
members of all sects were on both sides. Which kind of representation would take 
precedence? 
For illustrative purposes, imagine an eight-man government, a relatively common size in 
the era. Constitutionally, it must be divided into four Christians, four Muslims; 
subdivisions might likely yield two Maronites, one Greek Orthodox, and a minority 
Christian on one side, and two Sunni, one Shia, and one Druze on the other. You could 
appoint an extra-parliamentary cabinet, but that will not be representative, and as such will 
cripple the ‘Grand Coalition’. By the end of 1964, deputies were anxious to form a new 
parliamentary government, and once again distribute portfolios, prestige, and patronage 
equally among the different confessional groups. 1075 
So, you need to divide the ministerial positions between Chehabists and anti-Chehabists. 
For the sake of simplicity, assume an even split (although the Chehabists had the slightly 
larger bloc). Do you give each side two Christians and two Muslims? Or do you give, say, 
three Christians to the anti-Chehabists, because their side is more representative of 
Christians in general? What about the four sects with just one seat – which side gets each 
of them? All this is before you even factor in issues like regional representation, or start 
distributing ministries. Are the valuable ‘sovereign’ ministries allotted according to sect, 
or according to bloc? 
Creating a representative, effective grand coalition becomes exponentially more difficult 
when you have to factor in multiple, overlapping cleavages. (It was in this context that 
                                               




Helou’s renewed attempts to encourage a parliamentary coalition in late 1965 were taken 
by some as an indication he was turning on the Chehabist bloc.1076) 
Within the elite and the public alike, popular opinion was divided on what Lebanese 
democracy meant. Either the Deuxième Bureau was undermining democracy by interfering 
in politics, or the consociational system was a corrupt, undemocratic oligarchy. Many 
people likely believed both were true. As early as 1965, issues of social justice were stirring 
up “a strong and genuine resentment” among an intelligentsia who “though suffering no 
hardship themselves, feel on humanitarian grounds that the system is wrong”.1077 
The sectarian cleavages enshrined in Lebanon’s constitution continued to have high 
political salience, but the questions of the army and Chehabism were highly salient, too. 
Segments were less isolated in the late 1960s, both physically and ideologically. The 
Chehabist/anti-Chehabist split also reduced the system’s multipolarity, even if not quite to 
the point of a bipolar system. This change made immobilism more likely. 
The major unfavourable factor in this phase, however, was the shift from relatively low to 
relatively high loads on the Lebanese system. Internally, in addition to political issues, 
socio-economic discontent weighed heavily on the consociation. The external pressures of 
the Palestinian issue interplayed with sect and class, bringing the Lebanese system near to 
a standstill. 
Lebanon’s government could not crack down on labour unrest – and risk its democracy – 
nor could it intervene in the economy to create fairer conditions and alienate the 
consociational elite.  
Lebanon’s aspiration to democratic processes of government, her relative 
sophistication and prosperity, the sectarian nature of her political life, all these 
preclude her from adopting towards manifestations of labour and popular unrest with 
social causes the authoritarian attitude common in other Arab states. It is likely that … 
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the Lebanon will find her social problems posed with an acuteness and immediacy 
which will prove an embarrassment to President Helou.1078 
Up until 1961, Lebanon maintained a budget surplus. This had helped the government 
minimise foreign pressures, as they were not dependent for financial assistance.1079 The 
imperative to not be indebted to the wrong country was part of why Helou was unable to 
raise substantial funds for development. Under Helou’s weak grasp, sectarian leaders more 
openly courted foreign support, especially from Nasser. Ambassador Riches warned that 
“the Egyptians and the Communists and the egregious Kemal Jumblatt are in effect 
working together to stimulate unrest in ways which could possibly be diverted into 
confessional channels”.1080 Meanwhile, Nasser increasingly staged anti-regime operations 
against Syria from Lebanese soil.1081 
Chehabist Outcomes 
National Unity 
Through this final phase, Chehab himself persisted as a factor of cohesion – even if the rise 
of the military in the years since the PPS coup had eroded some of the support behind him. 
Yet there were clearly other factors at work as well. When the new UK Ambassador arrived 
in Lebanon after a long absence from the country, he was stunned by the relative unity he 
found.1082 When he paid a visit to Chehab several weeks later, Ambassador Edden raised 
the point again: 
I mentioned that I had been very struck, coming back to Lebanon, by the apparent 
improvement in interconfessional relations. Chehab fully agreed that this was no 
longer a serious problem and that some degree of Lebanese national feeling existed. 
… He had not even realised himself, until he had ceased to be President, how far this 
process had succeeded. He thought it had recently gone even further. … Now, if it at 
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any time it became essential to bash (taper) the Fedayeen he would not expect a 
Moslem reaction.1083 
In hindsight, Chehab overestimated the strength of that national feeling – or, perhaps, he 
underestimated the strength of confessional allegiances. But it is clear that the promotion 
of a sense of Lebanese nationalism had some success. 
Le Social/Modernisation 
The economic unrest was partly a function of Chehabist policy. Chehab’s impassioned 
pursuit of development had emptied the government coffers, and there were no longer 
sufficient funds to continue apace.1084 While Lebanon remained far from the point of crisis, 
the people “were disquieted by the lack of solid and enduring foundations for Lebanese 
prosperity”.1085 The public was also more attuned to socio-economic disparities after 
Chehab. In word and deed as President, Chehab had identified the achievement of social 
justice, equality, and modernisation as Lebanon’s most urgent tasks. Shortly before leaving 
office, he had announced a Five-Year Plan for development that was now gathering dust, 
its ambitious projects unrealised. 
Chehab’s commitment to social reform and social justice never wavered, and he genuinely 
seemed to have expected Helou to follow suit. In early 1964, Chehab described to the UK 
ambassador how hard he had worked over the previous six years just to get things moving, 
but he was unfalteringly optimistic that his successor would continue on the same path.1086 
Shortly before the end of his tenure, Chehab again impressed upon the UK ambassador that 
socio-economic development and social justice must continue to progress if Lebanon were 
to survive; he was confident, however, “that the very force of circumstances would oblige 
his successor to continue his policies”.1087 Indeed, according to Boutros, it was this 
‘obsession’ with ensuring the Chehabist path towards building a modern state continued 
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which prevented him from more forcefully opposing those who insisted upon his re-
election.1088 
In a series of letters from 1964-65, Father Lebret reiterates his desire that Chehab stay on 
as president for at least another two or three years, so they could see IRFED’s five-year 
plan implemented. Although he always adds provisos that of course Chehab knows best, it 
is clear Lebret has little faith that their work will go forward without him.1089   
Chehab began to strike a somewhat more pessimistic tone after Helou’s election, not so 
much in reference to the president-elect as the political class in general. Chehab now told 
Ambassador Riches that, “though he had conducted his six-year rescue operation like a 
soldier and thought that he had brought it to a successful conclusion, the patient was still 
only convalescent. The politicians, he added with some scorn, seemed to think it was fully 
restored to health”.1090 In his dispatch on the subject, Riches noted that despite Chehab’s 
endorsement, he worried Helou may not have the fortitude to pursue a difficult reform 
agenda.1091 In the end, Helou failed, 
To give a forceful lead in asserting that the need of the State to provide the Lebanon 
with a proper infrastructure of public works and utilities, of social services and 
institutions within which Lebanese free enterprise can flourish and develop, connotes 
a real financial contribution to public revenue and a real devotion to the public good 
on the part of that same free enterprise.1092 
Chehab wrote to Lebret with an update on their project in November 1965, a year into 
Helou’s tenure. Chehab was so frustrated with the new regime’s failure to carry on with 
development that he had spoken out publicly for the first time since his resignation. Yet he 
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evidently still believed that if things ever got bad enough, the intransigence would end.1093 
Lebret replied to Chehab: 
We knew well that, with you out of power and us departed, the project drawn up 
with much effort under your direction would crash into systemic opposition. In 
terms of scientific development research, our five years of work beside you were 
very fruitful; but in terms of practical application, under current conditions, we are, 
it must be admitted, faced with a grave failure.1094 
When Kamal Jumblatt began to rally together a leftist coalition with explicitly socialist 
aims, it was believed that many Chehabists, including the general himself, were quietly 
sympathetic to the movement, “because he represents the only form of pressure which 
might effectively influence the selfishness and lack of social conscience of those who 
dominate the Lebanese economy”.1095 A social justice movement with Chehab at its head 
was moderate, if somewhat ineffective. The daring and confrontational Kamal Jumblatt, 
however, meant that this new wave could include the seeds of revolution; it also provided 
organisation necessary to mobilise people, which had been precluded by Chehab’s refusal 
to form a formal party. But this organisation also provided something more substantive to 
oppose: by late 1965, the Kataeb and others were staging counter demonstrations to 
Jumblatt’s leftist rallies, which deteriorated into “a free-for-all on the subject of free 
enterprise versus socialism”.1096  
Jumblatt’s movement was “unedifying and, in a way, farcical, but is also, I think, an 
indication of a basically genuine feeling, namely, that unrestricted free enterprise in the 
Lebanon has failed to provide either a sufficiency for every citizen or the range of welfare 
services normal in a civilised state”.1097 In fact, 
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We may be witnessing the hesitant beginnings of a major change in the political and 
social structure of the Lebanon, in which the present organisation, split vertically into 
confessions and sects, will be replaced by a horizontal one reflecting economic rather 
than confessional differences. For the moment, however, the change is only in 
embryo.1098 
By 1968, there was a sense that given Lebanon’s combination of extreme socioeconomic 
disparities, a “rigid” political structure, and free expression, “some form of social 
revolution seems inevitable in the longer term. … It might be no bad thing if it came sooner 
rather than later, but the confessional complications will clearly make it much harder for 
such a revolution to be brought about moderately”.1099 
Chehab, wrote the British in 1965, “is no revolutionary”.1100 Chehabism was ineffective at 
making long term changes because it refused to pick up a revolutionary mantle. However, 
that was also what had allowed Chehabist social justice to proceed as far as it did without 
inspiring true domestic confrontation. Naccache described Chehab as “a lawmaker 
patiently working, amidst moral anarchy and against factional turbulence, to make the law 
prevail and reason heard. Yet there is perhaps no greater revolution to carry out, in 
Lebanon, than that one”.1101 
 
Conclusions 
Fouad Chehab’s decision to return to civilian life was the catalyst for an unprecedented 
chasm in the Lebanese parliament after 1964. the parliamentary divide expanded until the 
formation of a parliamentary coalition government became impossible.1102 Yet due to 
Lebanon’s consociational framework, a simple majority government was also 
unacceptable: “In the absence of a properly constituted party system it is felt that such a 
solution, which would be contrary to normal practice here, would only inflame existing 
                                               
1098 Riches to Stewart, 1 Jan 1966, FO 371/180766/1011/3 
1099 Moore to King, 5 Apr 1968, FCO 17/314/23 
1100 Riches to Morris, 21 Dec 1965, FO 371/186627/1015/1 
1101 Naccache (1960), p. 23 




feelings and in the long run weaken the efficacy of the Lebanese Parliamentary system”.1103 
The consociational democracy was deprived of a true elite coalition in its executive branch, 
just as it had lost the strong, unifying presence of Chehab at its helm. Helou was not up to 
the task, nor did he fully understand its implications. 
The National Pact codified the idea that Lebanon’s foreign policy must lean neither East 
nor West. But regional pressures continued to mount from 1964 to 1966, especially without 
Chehab’s intercessions with Nasser. Nasser had little personal affect for Helou, and the 
Arabs expected Lebanon to meet certain commitments in regards to Israel: first with the 
Jordan waters diversion and the United Arab Command, and later as a host to Palestinian 
commandos. Under these conditions, “Lebanon found it increasingly difficult 
simultaneously to play her two roles as an Arab country and as a country in which half the 
population is not Muslim and which enjoys the benefits of democracy and a free enterprise 
economy”.1104  
And indeed, democracy and the free market were the other axis of contention in the final 
Chehabist era. Cost of living was up, development was stalled, and the economy was in the 
doldrums. The segmental elite, bolstered by a false sense of optimism in Lebanon’s eternal 
resilience, had little interest in pursuing reform at their own expense. In the absence of a 
functioning grand coalition there was simply no means to find a way out of these 
overlapping crises. By the end of the Chehabist era, more than ever before, demands for 
social justice and consociational stability were devouring each other. Moreover, much of 
the elite failed to anticipate the ramifications of allowing Intra Bank to collapse, and 
inadvertently triggered the demise of their economy. As for the Chehabist “system of 
government” itself, the UK ambassador wrote in September 1970,  
Now, with the election of an anti-Chehabist, by anti-Chehabists, for anti-Chehabists, 
the system is only of historical interest.1105 
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7.  Conclusions 
Stability in independence-era Lebanon was a fragile thing, for “political uncertainty in the 
Lebanon means concern not merely about the next Government but even for the future 
existence of the State”.1106 In his memoirs, Najib Alamuddin explains his rationale for 
offering up a public account of the Intra crisis:  
I am convinced that the affair was the beginning of the disintegration of Lebanon 
and its old type of Lebanese government – a system corrupt in style and morals that 
had plagued Lebanon since independence and finally plunged the nation into a civil 
war that threatened its very survival as an independent state.1107 
If the 1967 Arab-Israeli war demonstrated Lebanon’s vulnerability to external stressors, 
the Intra affair exposed equally keen internal weaknesses, including corruption, inequality, 
patrimonialism, and xenophobia. The conflict between Chehabism and consociationalism 
did not generate these ills, but it amplified them and left them unrestrained.  
Over the years that followed, an amalgam of these stressors would drive Lebanon from its 
“golden age” into civil war. The Intra crash was a warning that largely went largely 
unheeded; an indicator that the Lebanese system could no longer bear its internal loads and 
a clear sign of the internationalisation of the domestic. The Intra crisis also revealed how 
precarious Lebanon’s foreign-policy neutrality was. In what was, fundamentally, a crisis 
of confidence, belief mattered more than fact. 
Although the fall of Intra dealt a potentially mortal blow to Lebanon’s reputation as an 
economic centre as well as the Lebanese economy, Alamuddin believed that for those who 
instigated the crash, it was a success: “The upstart had been destroyed”.1108 Yet when we 
look into consociational theory, there is no reason why the system would encourage this 
level of self-sabotage. On the contrary, consociationalism is predicated on resisting the 
impulse to settle scores among rival groups, and instead tries to channel their energies into 
consensus. In a strong consociational democracy, the Intra crash could never have 
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happened, because someone with Intra’s interests in mind would have wielded veto power. 
These confessional checks and balances, however, had all but eroded by the end of 1966 
between the friction of Chehabism and consociationalism. A Foreign Office paper from 
1967 captures this conflict, in the challenges preventing a shift of Lebanon’s economy to a 
more stable foundation: 
In order to cope with these problems, vigorous direction by the Government would 
appear to be needed. But this would run contrary to Lebanese political tradition and 
would involve partial abandonment of the laisser-faire principle on which the economy 
so far has thrived. Such intervention would also depend upon agreement between all 
the opposing interests at each level of the administration. There has been some 
expansion of Government activities in the last few years, but there is understandably 
hesitation in tampering with the present successful system. Moreover, Lebanese 
politics are dominated by the merchant and banker class, whose immediate interests 
lie in maintaining the existing economic structure.1109 
A consociational system can only be ‘democratic’ to the extent that its coalition of elites 
genuinely represents the major segments of a population, and is able to enforce 
compromises he makes on their behalf –  the segment must defer to his decision-making. 
Moves to narrow socio-economic inequalities and develop infrastructure have the potential 
to disrupt the elite-segmental relationship in several ways. Firstly, in a system such as 
Lebanon’s, a part of that bond is established through various forms of patronage: in 
exchange for political support, people expect assistance with healthcare, employment, 
dealing with administrative red tape, and other basic services. If suddenly, the government 
then begins to provide healthcare, job training, and a more efficient bureaucracy, it reduces 
the leader’s leverage and accountability. Development may also make communities more 
mobile. A segment whose members are dispersed may lose its internal coherence, and, as 
such, some of its political salience. Meanwhile, modernisation inevitably increases 
grievance in the short term, as less advantaged people become more attuned to the 
discrepancies between their living conditions and those of their betters.  
                                               




This is not to suggest that Chehab and his followers were wrong to place so much emphasis 
on social issues and development. However, they designed the project in a fundamentally 
unsustainable way, failing to recognise that their successors would need more than a 
change of attitude to continue along their path. In addition to the funds that Helou could 
not raise, the continued pursuit in earnest of Le Social would have required structural 
alterations in the consociational system – or a heavy-handed approach that violated the 
spirit of the Pact.  
The Chehabist aim to cultivate the seeds of Lebanese national identity and unity yielded 
bittersweet fruit. In the moment, the drive itself worked against consociational stability by 
undermining segmental autonomy: A consociational system works best when the segments 
have high political salience and are isolated from one another. However, once the 
consociational system stopped working, this nascent national feeling may have done much 
to hold Lebanon together over the turbulent decades that followed. Despite the re-
emergence of Arab Nationalism with Palestinian commando issue, the Lebanese Arabists 
no longer opposed Lebanon’s existence as an independent state. Through the years of 
Lebanon’s devastating civil war and after, people from all sects and socio-economic 
spheres held tightly to the memory of Lebanon in the Chehabist era. In the Lebanese 
collective imagination, the late 1950s and early 1960s came to embody prosperity, 
opportunity, stability, and cultural relevance. For the first time, there was an idealised 
vision of Lebanon that appealed beyond the Christian Lebanist fold. 
It is this vision which, for many, still comes to mind when they think about Fouad Chehab 
and his presidency. What they too often overlook, however, is that Chehabism’s successes 
were not simply snuffed out by the ignition of regional (and, by association, sectarian) 
tensions. Present-day conditions in Lebanon, as Picard and Ramsbotham note, are not 
unlike those produced by the internal and external pressures of the late 1960s – in fact, they 
are “perhaps even more precarious”.1110 Meanwhile, Lebanon remains constitutionally 
consociational – although in practice, the system barely functions. Just as the Lebanese 
grew accustomed to a presidential vacuum, they are now familiar with lengthy delays in 
government formation, postponed elections, closures of parliament, and the endless 
                                               




deferral of critical issues for some future, more authoritative coalition to decide. The army 
suffers from “Commander’s syndrome”, as the past three presidents – in a trend initiated 
by Chehab – have been former commanders-in-chief.1111 
The Taif Accord, which marked the end of the civil war in 1990, adjusted the terms of the 
national compromise. It changed the power-sharing formula to better reflect demographics, 
and transferred prerogatives from the presidency to transition Lebanon to a more 
parliamentary system. Nonetheless, the same consociational mechanisms formally 
structure Lebanese political life. Taif also tacked on a host of reforms to the new agreement, 
though few have seen progress nearly two decades on. Karam’s description of the status 
quo in 2012 echoes the example of the Chehabist era: 
Arbitrary and partial application of reforms that have been initiated by Lebanese ruling 
elites under Syrian tutelage between 1990 and 2005 have in fact exacerbated 
confessional tension and competition, and have generated new imbalances in the post-
war political system. Together, these developments have undermined the operation of 
Lebanon’s consociational political system and of its institutions, which could be 
described as quasi-dysfunctional.1112 
Yet Karam still identifies the central problem not as the contradiction between 
consociationalism and reform, but “the Lebanese mentality of clientelism and 
sectarianism”.1113 He laments that 
Post-Taif governance is not based on the expression of the will of the majority, but on 
consensus between political elites representing major ‘communities’ and partisan 
formations. This is why consensus democracy has prioritised managing successive 
crises over realizing reforms. Electoral reform was only tackled from a perspective of 
inter-confessional balance and interest.1114 
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Yet these examples (if not the postwar Lebanese situation more generally) show precisely 
how consociationalism is supposed to work. They are not examples of its failure, but rather 
its proper functioning. 
For a consociational political system to maximise its stability and democracy, 
consociational conditions must be met. Consociationalism may not be very democratic, or 
all that good at promoting stability. It may be incompatible with much reform and 
development. What it is not, and what it will never be, is simply a ‘broken’ Westminster-
style democracy. Much like a rabbit is not a broken dog, it is a different beast. As such, a 
consociational democracy cannot be reformed into another kind of democratic system. Any 
stability or democracy it can offer is dependent on the establishment of a consociation at 
its centre, a Grand Coalition of segments. Now as then, reforms which do not account for 
political confessionalism are liable to make Lebanon’s current political system less stable 
and less democratic.  
Social justice, modernisation and a more robust Lebanese national identity cannot be 
achieved by undermining stability and democracy in Lebanon. Either they must somehow 
be realised in a way that does not threaten the system, or the consociational apparatus itself 
must be uprooted. Uprooting would be a formidable task. Through the 1970s and 1980s, 
widespread interest in reform and de-confessionalisation spurred the development of many 
serious proposals on the subject. Yet even then, none was able to gain traction, and when 
the civil war finally halted it was through a reassertion of consociational principles.1115  
The question of how to safely dismantle a consociational democracy are well beyond the 
scope of this thesis. What can be stated, however, is that it cannot simply be reformed 
away, or erased by generosity of spirit. 
--- 
In his memoirs, Fouad Boutros wonders whether things would have turned out differently 
for Lebanon if Chehab had allowed his mandate to be renewed; if Chehab could have 
protected Lebanon from the crises which soon came its way. So many things might have 
gone differently. Perhaps the Chehabist era would have continued if Chehab had served 
                                               




another term in 1964 or ’70, or if just one more MP had voted for his protégé Elias Sarkis 
in that latter election, rather than Sleiman Frangieh; if a Chehabist political party had been 
formed. 
Within the limits of what can be known, Boutros believes that the situation would have 
unfolded much the same regardless of who was in power: “Fouad Chehab did not have a 
magic wand that, alone, could have saved Lebanon from the wild path it followed, after 
1967, towards the abyss”.1116 
Lebanon’s consociational system was sophisticated in many respects, but it had not yet 
developed an effective mechanism for the transfer of power. Indeed, this is a problem that 
persists in contemporary Lebanon, though the diminished power of the presidency means 
it is less problematic. The campaign posters for Chehab that appeared on the streets of 
Beirut in 2014 would be plastered over and forgotten long before a president was elected. 
The idea of a presidential vacuum – so terrifying in 1964 that the Chehabists thought the 
very prospect might force their General to stay in office – had become banal, a source not 
of fear but of frustration. 
The absence of such a mechanism forced Chehab to assume power in 1958, as the only 
person around whom a consensus could be built. But the general did not recognise the 
realities of the system he had so reluctantly joined. He believed in a democratic, more equal 
and fairer Lebanon which was simply outside the scope of possibility for a consociational 
democracy. The Chehabists attempted to quietly reform their way out of consociationalism 
through social justice, modernisation, and national unity, but in so doing they compromised 
the system’s ability to function. This, ultimately, is what condemned the Chehabist project. 
It is important to not undersell Chehabism’s achievements. The Chehabist approach 
succeeded, for a time, in leading Lebanon away from the perils of confessional conflict. 
Chehab was able to persuade the Lebanese Arab nationalists – as well as Nasser himself – 
of the benefits of Lebanon’s continued existence as an independent, sovereign state, and 
forge the nucleus of a broader Lebanese national identity. While his reforms were 
circumscribed, Chehab helped rationalise significant elements of Lebanon’s 
                                               




administration, and brought public services like piped water, electricity, and schooling to 
many thousands of the least-advantaged Lebanese.  
While Chehab was in office, Lebanon was reasonably stable and prosperous, and when the 
time came for power to change hands, it happened peacefully and constitutionally. It is 
worth remembering that both of independent Lebanon’s previous experiences of the 
transfer of power, in 1952 and 1958, had yielded crises that were only resolved upon 
General Chehab’s intervention. 
Here, perhaps, is a key observation: the political stability that persisted under Fouad 
Chehab took place despite his policies of unity and social justice, both of which threatened 
the consociational system. Stability was maintained through the presence of Chehab 
himself, as perhaps the only public figure in Lebanon who appeared unmotivated by wealth 
or power. Chehab declined to stay in power and refused to create a formal political party 
which might have been able to sustain the agenda in his absence. All these decisions come 
down to his character, but also his understanding of democracy and propriety. This is the 
final paradox of the Chehabist project, the ultimate irony: Fouad Chehab was too proud 
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